Gauntlet USDC (Hyperliquid L1) Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 2% of deposit

Driven by UBTC −30% 2% · −100% 81% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

kHYPEHybridRedStone58%of vault · bad debt · $1.12mOracle exposure 14%

72%of vault · $1.39m58%of vault · $1.12m14%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· RedStone(aggregator)

kHYPE is priced from a fundamental/NAV feed (RedStone), not a raw market-rate feed.

BaseRedStone fundamental/NAV feed pathQuoteRedStone quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0xe876…8469RedStone

Room to grow: $1.39m of $2.5m cap (56% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$40.32m19 vaultsToken:0xfd73…296dAllocation: 72% of the vault · $1.39m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.39m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 14% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

UBTCMarketRedStone22%of vault · bad debt · $424,510Oracle exposure 5%

27%of vault · $530,12322%of vault · $424,5105%separate path

What it's made of

Market· RedStone(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0x6df6…1c29RedStone

Room to grow: $530,123 of $3m cap (18% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$2.32m14 vaultsToken:0x9fdb…3463Allocation: 27% of the vault · $530,123

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $530,123 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 5% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WHYPEMarketRedStone0.7%of vault · bad debt · $14,084Oracle exposure 0.2%

0.9%of vault · $17,5380.7%of vault · $14,0840.2%separate path

What it's made of

Market· RedStone(aggregator)

WHYPE uses RedStone market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseRedStone market-rate feed pathQuoteRedStone quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0x194f…4f31RedStone

Room to grow: $17,538 of $2.5m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$12.62m19 vaultsToken:0x5555…5555Allocation: 0.9% of the vault · $17,538

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $17,538 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to19%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $378,534

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

RedStone·a 2/3 Safe multisigprices UBTC, kHYPE, WHYPE0xce77…30cf19% of vault · $378,534drainable if it is compromised

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure, and every loss is a share of your deposit — the same percentage whatever you deposited. Loss is that share at a −30% collateral crash, the standard stress; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong, a conditional loss if it happens rather than a likelihood. Open a row for the loss at every crash depth, the dollar amounts, conditions, and the math.

13 scenarios · 11 with no time to exit · loss as % of deposit


Full-deposit & protocol-level(3)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	2%	up to 81%	Instant
	2%	up to 81%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	2%	up to 81%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	2%	up to 81%	Instant
	14%	up to 72%	Instant
	0%	up to 58%	Instant
	2%	up to 22%	Instant
	—	up to 19%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(4)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days
	—	0%	Instant

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner4-of-7 multisig0x0934…ec57

Curator3-of-7 multisig0xe3ea…f396

Guardian3-of-7 multisig0x0685…5e8f

Allocators2 · 1 contract · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0xff09…5ef9
contract0x5175…f4fc

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0x34ed…acba

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.