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Yearn OG USDC

Risk reportEthereum0xf9bd…ec49

Risk

Depositing into Yearn OG USDC means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

37%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 17% of deposit

Driven by PT-USD3-17DEC2026 −30% 6% · USD3 −30% 6% · OETH −30% 3% · other 2% · −100% 86% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

PT-USD3-17DEC2026Hybrid34%of vault · bad debt · $3.46mOracle exposure 5%

39%of vault · $4m34%of vault · $3.46m5%separate path

What it's made of

PT-USD3-17DEC2026 token page

Hybrid(composite)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xe5e6…8d72

Room to grow: $4m of $4m cap (100% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$3.61m9 vaultsToken:0x7f47…eb4dAllocation: 39% of the vault · $4m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 6% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $4m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 5% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

USD3AUM / rate25%of vault · bad debt · $2.59mOracle exposure 5%

30%of vault · $3.11m25%of vault · $2.59m5%separate path

What it's made of

USD3 token page

AUM / rate(exchange-rate)

Priced off an exchange rate / AUM — insulated from spot depegs, but exposed to rate-provider corruption.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x68b4…9c06

Room to grow: $3.11m of $10m cap (31% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$3.78m9 vaultsToken:0x056b…5eccAllocation: 30% of the vault · $3.11m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 6% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $3.11m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 5% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

OETHMarketChainlink15%of vault · bad debt · $1.58mOracle exposure 2%

17%of vault · $1.76m15%of vault · $1.58m2%separate path

What it's made of

OETH token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

OETH is priced via ETH / USD, quoted in USDC / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDC / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 23hDeviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xe8ad…edb0Chainlink

Room to grow: $1.76m of $10m cap (18% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.03m7 vaultsToken:0x856c…8dc3Allocation: 17% of the vault · $1.76m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 3% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.76m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

siUSDHybrid6%of vault · bad debt · $587,707Oracle exposure 1%

7%of vault · $691,4176%of vault · $587,7071%separate path

What it's made of

siUSD token page

Hybrid(composite)

siUSD is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (Chainlink-formatted InfiniFi RT Oracle, Dummy feed with 12 decimals, ERC4626 vault share-rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BaseChainlink-formatted InfiniFi RT OracleNAVQuoteDummy feed with 12 decimalsNAVBaseERC4626 vault share-rateVault

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0xd2cc…fa6d

Room to grow: $691,417 of $10m cap (7% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.32m17 vaultsToken:0xdbdc…9bcbAllocation: 7% of the vault · $691,417

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $691,417 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-siUSD-7JAN2027Hybrid5%of vault · bad debt · $488,915Oracle exposure 0.4%

5%of vault · $534,9265%of vault · $488,9150.4%separate path

What it's made of

PT-siUSD-7JAN2027 token page

Hybrid(composite)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xf9c1…7570

Room to grow: $534,926 of $2.5m cap (21% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$209,4663 vaultsToken:0x7654…5fd1Allocation: 5% of the vault · $534,926

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.9% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $534,926 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

YFIMarketChainlink1%of vault · bad debt · $128,556Oracle exposure 0.1%

1%of vault · $142,6541%of vault · $128,5560.1%separate path

What it's made of

YFI token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0x6370…4ad5Chainlink

Room to grow: $142,654 of $199,923 cap (71% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$29,8344 vaultsToken:0x0bc5…d93eAllocation: 1% of the vault · $142,654

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $142,654 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WOUSDAUM / rate0.1%of vault · bad debt · $6,713Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.1%of vault · $7,4270.1%of vault · $6,713<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

WOUSD token page

AUM / rate(exchange-rate)

Priced off an exchange rate / AUM — insulated from spot depegs, but exposed to rate-provider corruption.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x7c65…7d80

Room to grow: $7,427 of $1.5m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$9,3154 vaultsToken:0xd2af…fa62Allocation: 0.1% of the vault · $7,427

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $7,427 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+3 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed1 control point

Up to14%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $1.4m

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink / RedStone·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, LBTC, OETH, YFI0x21f7…73ca2% of vault · $190,109drainable if it is compromised
Unidentified feeds· vendor and onchain control not resolvedprices PT-USD3-17DEC2026, siUSD, PT-siUSD-7JAN20277% of vault · $685,086mispriceable if these feeds lie
Onchain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices USD3, WOUSD5% of vault · $525,313mispriceable only via the issuing contract


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	17%	up to 86%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	17%	up to 86%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	17%	up to 86%	Instant
	17%	up to 86%	Instant
	—	up to 14%	Instant
	1%	up to 7%	Instant
	1%	up to 6%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(4)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days
	—	up to 3%	Instant

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner4-of-7 multisig0xe5e2…89c0

Curator2-of-3 multisig0x90d0…6b51

Guardian6-of-9 multisig0xfeb4…ff52

Allocators42 contracts2 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

contract0xffb8…0862
contract0xfd32…c75d
single key (EOA)0x50b7…a8fa
single key (EOA)0x75a1…780d

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner6-of-1012 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting Token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

10 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 11min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Yearn OG USDC

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle