Re7 WETH (OP Mainnet) Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 20% of deposit

Driven by wstETH −30% 20% · −100% 78% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

wstETHMarketChainlink78%of vault · bad debt · $1.45mOracle exposure 22%

99.4%of vault · $1.85m78%of vault · $1.45m22%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ WETH95% LLTV0x2c2c…4316Chainlink
→ WETH95% LLTV0x999f…b310Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$11.77m20 vaultsToken:0x1f32…4ebbAllocation: 99.4% of the vault · $1.85m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 20% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $1.85m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 22% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

mRe7ETHHybridno bad debtno modeled pathOracle exposure <0.1%

<0.1%of vault · $254.99no bad debt<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(composite)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ WETH95% LLTV0xcd33…9dec

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$256.491 vaultsToken:0xe7ba…21b3Allocation: <0.1% of the vault · $254.99

If it breaks

−30% default

No borrowing is drawn against this collateral — no modeled bad-debt path.

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

Unallocatednot lent into any market — no collateral exposure0.6% · $10,276.57

0.6%of vault · $10,276.57——

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to22%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $403,770.99

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices wstETH0xabc7…c07822% of vault · $403,516drainable if it is compromised
Unidentified feeds· vendor and on-chain control not resolvedprices mRe7ETH<1% of vault · $254.99mispriceable if these feeds lie

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure, and every loss is a share of your deposit — the same percentage whatever you deposited. Loss is that share at a −30% collateral crash, the standard stress; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong, a conditional loss if it happens rather than a likelihood. Open a row for the loss at every crash depth, the dollar amounts, conditions, and the math.

10 scenarios · 8 with no time to exit · loss as % of deposit


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	20%	up to 78%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	20%	up to 78%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(4)
	20%	up to 78%	Instant
	20%	up to 78%	Instant
	20%	up to 78%	Instant
	—	up to 22%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	up to 78%	3 days
	—	up to 78%	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Curator change queued

The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.

raise a market's supply cap ×4— applies in 2 days; time to exit first

Owner2-of-4 multisig0xd8b0…c940

Curator2-of-4 multisig0xd8b0…c940

Guardiannone appointed

Allocators1 · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0x0d0c…f167

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xd1b9…6b44

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.56m

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

8 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.