Smokehouse USDT

Risk reportEthereum0xa080…7484

Risk

Depositing into Smokehouse USDT means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

40%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 20% of deposit

Driven by PT-sUSDS-26NOV2026 −30% 8% · PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 −30% 4% · reUSD −30% 3% · other 5% · −100% 90% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

PT-sUSDS-26NOV2026UnclassifiedChainlink35%of vault · bad debt · $8.23mOracle exposure 3%

39%of vault · $9.01m35%of vault · $8.23m3%separate path

What it's made of

Unclassified· Chainlink(managed)

Oracle design not classified (long-tail market).

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDT92% LLTV0x3464…35bfChainlink

Room to grow: $9.01m of $20m cap (45% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$2.78m9 vaultsToken:0xdc16…6094Allocation: 39% of the vault · $9.01m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 8% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $9.01m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026HybridPTMarket rate16%of vault · bad debt · $3.82mOracle exposure 3%

19%of vault · $4.48m16%of vault · $3.82m3%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(composite)PTMarket rate

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 PT is priced by a Pendle market-rate oracle.

BaseOjo PT Feed Pendle Chainlink-compatible OracleNAV

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDT92% LLTV0x217d…51f0

Room to grow: $4.48m of $10m cap (45% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$17.56m16 vaultsToken:0xecfa…3957Allocation: 19% of the vault · $4.48m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 4% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $4.48m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChainlink13%of vault · bad debt · $2.99mOracle exposure 1%

14%of vault · $3.28m13%of vault · $2.99m1%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(composite)

wstETH is priced via Custom price feed for wstETH / ETH × ETH / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseCustom price feed for wstETH / ETHMarketETH / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDT86% LLTV0x95db…6992Chainlink
→ USDT86% LLTV0xe087…9f9fChainlink

Room to grow: $3.28m of $249.99m cap (1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$958.73m162 vaultsToken:0x7f39…2ca0Allocation: 14% of the vault · $3.28m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $3.28m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

reUSDHybrid12%of vault · bad debt · $2.68mOracle exposure 1%

13%of vault · $2.96m12%of vault · $2.68m1%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(exchange-rate)

reUSD is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (reUSD/USD exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BasereUSD/USD exchange rateExchange rate

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDT92% LLTV0xa66a…4e70

Room to grow: $2.96m of $20m cap (15% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$4.73m17 vaultsToken:0x5086…0c72Allocation: 13% of the vault · $2.96m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 3% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2.96m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WBTCMarketChainlink9%of vault · bad debt · $2.11mOracle exposure 0.9%

10%of vault · $2.31m9%of vault · $2.11m0.9%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator, managed)

WBTC uses a deviation/timelock managed oracle over Chainlink price-source leg(s), not a direct raw market-rate feed.

BaseWBTC / BTCMarketBTC / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDT / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDT86% LLTV0x008b…e1efChainlink
→ USDT86% LLTV0xf156…0cf4Chainlink

Room to grow: $2.31m of $99.99m cap (2% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$428.85m140 vaultsToken:0x2260…c599Allocation: 10% of the vault · $2.31m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $2.31m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.9% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbBTCMarketChainlink3%of vault · bad debt · $802,008.41Oracle exposure 0.4%

4%of vault · $883,876.23%of vault · $802,008.410.4%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(composite, aggregator, managed)

cbBTC is priced via BTC / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 1h · Deviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDT86% LLTV0x9f98…34d2Chainlink
→ USDT86% LLTV0x0e05…38acChainlink

Room to grow: $883,876.2 of $99.99m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$379.76m153 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: 4% of the vault · $883,876.2

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.6% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $883,876.2 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

sUSDSHybridChainlink1%of vault · bad debt · $294,394.51Oracle exposure 0.1%

1%of vault · $322,479.251%of vault · $294,394.510.1%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(aggregator)

sUSDS mixes exchange-rate/NAV (ERC4626 vault share-rate) with market-rate (DAI / USD, USDT / USD) — insulated from ERC4626 vault share-rate market deviation, but exposed to DAI / USD, USDT / USD.

BaseDAI / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDT / USDMarketChainlinkBaseERC4626 vault share-rateVault

Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 25bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDT97% LLTV0x0c42…4c79Chainlink

Room to grow: $322,479.25 of $50m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$6.73m23 vaultsToken:0xa393…7fbdAllocation: 1% of the vault · $322,479.25

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.3% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $322,479.25 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

sUSDeMarketRedStone / Chainlink<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $6,960.06Oracle exposure <0.1%

<0.1%of vault · $7,645.38<0.1%of vault · $6,960.06<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Market· RedStone / Chainlink(aggregator)

sUSDe is priced via RedStone Price Feed for sUSDe, quoted in USDT / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (RedStone + Chainlink).

BaseRedStone Price Feed for sUSDeMarketRedStoneQuoteUSDT / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDT92% LLTV0xe47e…bd99RedStone / Chainlink

Room to grow: $7,645.38 of $50m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$253.55m76 vaultsToken:0x9d39…3497Allocation: <0.1% of the vault · $7,645.38

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $7,645.38 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+7 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

2 feeds · 2 control points

Up to10%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $2.33m

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink / RedStone·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC, wstETH, TSLAon, FLHYon, WETH, sUSDe, weETH, stcUSD, sUSDS, PT-sUSDS-26NOV2026, PT-USDG-24SEP20260x21f7…73ca6% of vault · $1.38mdrainable if it is compromised
RedStone / Chainlink·a 2/3 Safe multisigprices sUSDe, stcUSD, PT-stcUSD-23JUL20260x6906…4472<1% of vault · $685.32drainable if it is compromised
Unidentified feeds· vendor and on-chain control not resolvedprices PT-reUSD-10DEC20263% of vault · $660,450.59mispriceable if these feeds lie
On-chain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices reUSD, syrupUSDC1% of vault · $283,797.94mispriceable only via the issuing contract

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure, and every loss is a share of your deposit — the same percentage whatever you deposited. Loss is that share at a −30% collateral crash, the standard stress; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong, a conditional loss if it happens rather than a likelihood. Open a row for the loss at every crash depth, the dollar amounts, conditions, and the math.

12 scenarios · 10 with no time to exit · loss as % of deposit


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	20%	up to 90%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	20%	up to 90%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	20%	up to 90%	Instant
	19%	up to 84%	Instant
	5%	up to 37%	Instant
	8%	up to 33%	Instant
	—	up to 10%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(4)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 70%	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner5-of-10 multisig0x0a0e…f8dd

Curator2-of-7 multisig0x827e…ecdb

Guardiancontract0x4fcd…c1dd

Allocators4 · 1 multisig · 2 contracts · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

contract0x9e91…f9e1
1-of-5 multisig0x29d4…74f7
contract0xfd32…c75d
single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.56m

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

10 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated Sep 4, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql