Steakhouse High Yield USDC

Risk reportArbitrum0x5c0c…63ba

Risk

Depositing into Steakhouse High Yield USDC means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

$677,982realistic worst · −50% collateral crashup to $1.92mSmart-contract bug · extreme only

−10%−30%−50%extreme

Left to right, a deeper collateral crash. Hover any point for the scenarios that drive the loss — only a smart-contract bug reaches a total loss.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest 15 Dec, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropvault-wide · no liquidations · stress estimate

−30%est. bad debt up to $306,273

tap a preset or drag

Driven by weETH $217,674 · PT-USDai-15OCT2026 $36,031 · wstETH $29,202 · other $23,366 · −100% $1.61m modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

weETHMarketRedStone$1.17m61% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $242,696

$1.41m73% of vault$1.17m61% of vault$242,696separate path

What it's made of

Market· RedStone(aggregator)

weETH uses RedStone market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseRedStone market-rate feed pathQuoteRedStone quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x4e49…bc77RedStone

Room to grow: $1.41m of $49.99m cap (3% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$45.8m28 vaultsToken:0x3575…4dbeAllocation: $1.41m · 73% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $217,674Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.41m · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $242,696 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChainlink$156,9608% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $21,635

$178,5949% of vault$156,9608% of vault$21,635separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

wstETH uses Chainlink market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseChainlink market-rate feed pathQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x8e02…ae31Chainlink

Room to grow: $178,594 of $99.98m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$71.25m36 vaultsToken:0x5979…0529Allocation: $178,594 · 9% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $29,202Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $178,594 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $21,635 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-USDai-15OCT2026UnclassifiedChainlink$153,3428% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $30,987

$184,32910% of vault$153,3428% of vault$30,987separate path

What it's made of

Unclassified· Chainlink(managed)

Oracle design not classified (long-tail market).

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0xaae5…15b1Chainlink

Room to grow: $153,349 of $20m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$30,9892 vaultsToken:0xc9d2…ccaeAllocation: $184,329 · 10% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $36,031Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $184,329 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $30,987 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WETHMarketChainlink$118,0336% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $18,626

$136,6597% of vault$118,0336% of vault$18,626separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

WETH uses Chainlink market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseChainlink market-rate feed pathQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x282f…71a2Chainlink

Room to grow: $136,659 of $20m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$56.03m35 vaultsToken:0x82af…bab1Allocation: $136,659 · 7% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $21,960Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $136,659 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $18,626 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WBTCMarketChainlink$5,8100.3% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $866.44

$6,6760.3% of vault$5,8100.3% of vault$866.44separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

WBTC uses Chainlink market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseChainlink market-rate feed pathQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x8819…14d9Chainlink

Room to grow: $6,676 of $99.98m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$63.43m37 vaultsToken:0x2f2a…5b0fAllocation: $6,676 · 0.3% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $1,081Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $6,676 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $866.44 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

XAUt0MarketChainlink$2,8570.1% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $530.85

$3,3880.2% of vault$2,8570.1% of vault$530.85separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0xa576…bf8bChainlink

Room to grow: $3,388 of $20m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$3,5115 vaultsToken:0x4046…7159Allocation: $3,388 · 0.2% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $259.74Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $3,388 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $530.85 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

sUSDSHardcodedChainlink$252.06<0.1% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $28.01

$280.07<0.1% of vault$252.06<0.1% of vault$28.01separate path

What it's made of

Hardcoded· Chainlink(aggregator)

Price is fixed and won't move on a real depeg — divergence accrues as bad debt.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC95% LLTV0x52cc…7124Chainlink

Room to grow: $280.07 of $49.99m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$162,86711 vaultsToken:0xddb4…7610Allocation: $280.07 · <0.1% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $65.35Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $280.07 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $28.01 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+2 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

2 feeds · 2 control points

Up to$315,369drainable if these feeds are mispriced · 16% of vault

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

RedStone·a 2/3 Safe multisigprices weETH0x3c8b…fe4f$242,696 · 13% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised
Chainlink / Chronicle·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices wstETH, syrupUSDC, wsrUSD, XAUt0, WBTC, sUSDS, WETH, PT-USDai-15OCT20260x2f3b…d3c5$72,645 · 4% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure. Possible loss is the share of your deposit at the selected collateral drop; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong — a conditional loss if it happens, not a likelihood. Price-scaling rows move with the drop selector; the rest are fixed. Enter a deposit to see the dollar figures as your own. Open a row for conditions, mitigations, and the math.

12 scenarios · 10 with no time to exit

Collateral drop


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	$1.92m	Full deposit	Instant
	16%	$306,273	up to $1.61m	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	16%	$306,273	up to $1.61m	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	16%	$306,273	up to $1.61m	Instant
	16%	$306,273	up to $1.61m	Instant
	16%	$306,273	up to $1.61m	Instant
	—	—	up to $315,369	Instant
	<1%	$65.35	up to $252.06	Instant
Vault role & allocator(4)
	—	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	—	up to $1.61m	Instant
	—	—	up to $961,367	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner5-of-9 multisig0x0a0e…f8dd

Curator2-of-7 multisig0x827e…ecdb

Guardiancontract0x0f83…e193

Allocators4 · 1 multisig · 2 contracts · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

1-of-6 multisig0x0000…9da8
contract0x7695…355e
contract0xeafa…8380
single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· 15 Dec, 2025report
Blackthorn· 4 Dec, 2025report
Spearbit· 4 Dec, 2025report
Blackthorn· 15 Sep, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xfd35…d9b2

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer3-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 254,036

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

12 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 21 Jul, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql