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Steakhouse High Yield Instant

Risk reportEthereum0xbeef…b13d

Risk

Depositing into Steakhouse High Yield Instant means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

24%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 12% of deposit

Driven by syrupUSDC −30% 11% · sUSDe −30% <1% · reUSD −30% <1% · other <1% · −100% 53% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

syrupUSDCHybrid45%of vault · bad debt · $416,213Oracle exposure 46%

92%of vault · $839,31745%of vault · $416,21346%separate path

What it's made of

syrupUSDC token page

Hybrid(exchange-rate)

syrupUSDC is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (ERC4626 vault share-rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BaseERC4626 vault share-rateVault

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ AUSD92% LLTV0xea87…09bc

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$9.11m21 vaultsToken:0x80ac…cc0bAllocation: 92% of the vault · $839,317

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 11% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $839,317 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 46% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

sUSDeHybridChainlink4%of vault · bad debt · $34,473Oracle exposure 0.3%

4%of vault · $37,3614%of vault · $34,4730.3%separate path

What it's made of

sUSDe token page

Hybrid· Chainlink(managed)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ AUSD92% LLTV0xe582…92bbChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$26.3m20 vaultsToken:0x9d39…3497Allocation: 4% of the vault · $37,361

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.9% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $37,361 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

reUSDHybrid4%of vault · bad debt · $33,546Oracle exposure 0.3%

4%of vault · $36,6524%of vault · $33,5460.3%separate path

What it's made of

reUSD token page

Hybrid(exchange-rate)

reUSD is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (reUSD/USD exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BasereUSD/USD exchange rateExchange rate

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ AUSD92% LLTV0xa66a…4e70

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.21m21 vaultsToken:0x5086…0c72Allocation: 4% of the vault · $36,652

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.9% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $36,652 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbBTCMarketChainlink0.2%of vault · bad debt · $1,766Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.2%of vault · $1,7980.2%of vault · $1,766<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

cbBTC token page

Market· Chainlink(managed)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ AUSD86% LLTV0x4c6e…610cChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$299.69m104 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: 0.2% of the vault · $1,798

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1,798 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WBTCMarketChainlink0.1%of vault · bad debt · $1,201Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.1%of vault · $1,3280.1%of vault · $1,201<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

WBTC token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ AUSD86% LLTV0x09db…dec4Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$457.92m93 vaultsToken:0x2260…c599Allocation: 0.1% of the vault · $1,328

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1,328 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

AA_FalconXUSDCHybrid<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $102.88Oracle exposure <0.1%

<0.1%of vault · $111.37<0.1%of vault · $102.88<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

AA_FalconXUSDC token page

Hybrid(composite)

AA_FalconXUSDC is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (Idle Tranches exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BaseIdle Tranches exchange rateExchange rate

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ AUSD77% LLTV0x52ea…93fc

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$609,71717 vaultsToken:0xc26a…f99cAllocation: <0.1% of the vault · $111.37

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $111.37 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+13 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed1 control point

Up to47%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $429,265

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC, wstETH, FLHYon, WETH, sUSDe, weETH, PT-srUSDe-25JUN2026, PT-USDG-24SEP2026, PT-USDG-28MAY20260x21f7…73ca<1% of vault · $3,047drainable if it is compromised
Onchain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices syrupUSDC, reUSD47% of vault · $426,210mispriceable only via the issuing contract
Unidentified feeds· vendor and onchain control not resolvedprices AA_FalconXUSDC<1% of vault · $8.49mispriceable if these feeds lie


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	12%	up to 53%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	12%	up to 53%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	47%	Full deposit	Instant
	12%	up to 53%	Instant
	12%	up to 53%	Instant
	12%	up to 53%	Instant
	—	up to 47%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Ownercontract0x51b6…7a58

Curator3-of-9 multisig0x827e…ecdb

Sentinels11 contractSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

contract0x091b…f647

Allocators71 multisig3 contracts3 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

1-of-7 multisig0x0000…9da8
contract0x00b8…1e27
single key (EOA)0xbbf1…bceb
contract0xbeef…beef
contract0xaad8…35e7
single key (EOA)0xfc58…d827
single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner6-of-1012 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting TokenMORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 56min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Steakhouse High Yield Instant

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle