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Gauntlet USDC Frontier

Risk reportEthereum0x9a1d…6f3e

Risk

Depositing into Gauntlet USDC Frontier means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

38%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 18% of deposit

Driven by PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 −30% 6% · weETH −30% 4% · cbBTC −30% 4% · other 4% · −100% 88% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026HybridPTMarket rate24%of vault · bad debt · $5.4mOracle exposure 3%

26%of vault · $6m24%of vault · $5.4m3%separate path

What it's made of

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 token page

Hybrid(composite)PTMarket rate

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 PT is priced by a Pendle market-rate oracle.

BaseOjo PT Feed Pendle Chainlink-compatible OracleNAV

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x217d…51f0

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$15.83m22 vaultsToken:0xecfa…3957Allocation: 26% of the vault · $6m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 6% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $6m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

weETHMarketChainlink / RedStone22%of vault · bad debt · $4.97mOracle exposure 3%

25%of vault · $5.76m22%of vault · $4.97m3%separate path

What it's made of

weETH token page

Market· Chainlink / RedStone(composite, aggregator)

weETH is priced via Redstone Price Feed — market-rate feed (RedStone).

BaseRedstone Price FeedMarketRedStone

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDC86% LLTV0xa3a7…8411Chainlink
→ USDC86% LLTV0x5635…6a68RedStone

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$221.64m49 vaultsToken:0xcd5f…b7eeAllocation: 25% of the vault · $5.76m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 4% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $5.76m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbBTCMarketChainlink21%of vault · bad debt · $4.78mOracle exposure 3%

24%of vault · $5.46m21%of vault · $4.78m3%separate path

What it's made of

cbBTC token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbBTC is priced via BTC / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 1hDeviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xa6d6…182aChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$257.17m101 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: 24% of the vault · $5.46m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 4% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $5.46m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-sUSDS-26NOV2026UnclassifiedChainlink7%of vault · bad debt · $1.61mOracle exposure 0.8%

8%of vault · $1.8m7%of vault · $1.61m0.8%separate path

What it's made of

PT-sUSDS-26NOV2026 token page

Unclassified· Chainlink(managed)

Oracle design not classified (long-tail market).

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x3464…35bfChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.55m9 vaultsToken:0xdc16…6094Allocation: 8% of the vault · $1.8m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.8m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.8% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

LBTCMarketRedStone / Chainlink6%of vault · bad debt · $1.3mOracle exposure 0.5%

6%of vault · $1.42m6%of vault · $1.3m0.5%separate path

What it's made of

LBTC token page

Market· RedStone / Chainlink(aggregator)

LBTC is priced via Redstone Price Feed × BTC / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (RedStone + Chainlink).

BaseRedstone Price FeedMarketRedStoneBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 1hDeviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xdcc0…29dbRedStone / Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$3.29m16 vaultsToken:0x8236…4494Allocation: 6% of the vault · $1.42m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.42m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.5% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

AUTOMarketChainlink4%of vault · bad debt · $928,045Oracle exposure 0.3%

4%of vault · $998,8074%of vault · $928,0450.3%separate path

What it's made of

AUTO token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0x9abd…1854Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$183,9496 vaultsToken:0x997e…1da9Allocation: 4% of the vault · $998,807

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.4% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $998,807 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

reUSDHybrid3%of vault · bad debt · $577,144Oracle exposure 0.4%

3%of vault · $677,2723%of vault · $577,1440.4%separate path

What it's made of

reUSD token page

Hybrid(exchange-rate)

reUSD is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (reUSD/USD exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BasereUSD/USD exchange rateExchange rate

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0xa66a…4e70

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$6.62m20 vaultsToken:0x5086…0c72Allocation: 3% of the vault · $677,272

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.6% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $677,272 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-sUSDD-26NOV2026UnclassifiedChainlink1%of vault · bad debt · $311,144Oracle exposure 0.2%

2%of vault · $345,6741%of vault · $311,1440.2%separate path

What it's made of

PT-sUSDD-26NOV2026 token page

Unclassified· Chainlink(managed)

Oracle design not classified (long-tail market).

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0xcd4a…6b46Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$34,4502 vaultsToken:0x459b…408bAllocation: 2% of the vault · $345,674

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.3% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $345,674 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+4 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

2 feeds2 control points

Up to11%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $2.63m

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink / RedStone·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, LBTC, PT-sUSDD-26NOV2026, AUTO, PRIME, PT-sUSDD-27AUG2026, weETH, sUSDD, PT-sUSDS-26NOV2026, PT-USDG-28MAY20260x21f7…73ca8% of vault · $1.92mdrainable if it is compromised
RedStone / Chainlink·a 2/3 Safe multisigprices LBTC, weETH0x6906…44724% of vault · $908,375drainable if it is compromised
Unidentified feeds· vendor and onchain control not resolvedprices PT-reUSD-10DEC2026, AA_FalconXUSDC, siUSD3% of vault · $608,181mispriceable if these feeds lie
Onchain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices reUSD, syrupUSDC<1% of vault · $100,550mispriceable only via the issuing contract


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	18%	up to 88%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	18%	up to 88%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	18%	up to 88%	Instant
	18%	up to 88%	Instant
	7%	up to 56%	Instant
	10%	up to 49%	Instant
	—	up to 11%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Curator changes queued

The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.

raise a market's supply cap ×2— applies in 3 days; time to exit first
decrease timelock— applies in 3 days; time to exit first
increase timelock— applies in 7 days; time to exit first

Owner4-of-7 multisig0xc684…faec

Curator3-of-7 multisig0x9e33…0585

Sentinels21 multisig1 EOASafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

3-of-7 multisig0x7084…84cd
single key (EOA)0x8b58…f0dc

Allocators21 multisig1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

3-of-7 multisig0x9e33…0585
single key (EOA)0xa064…8698

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner6-of-1012 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 991,904.24

Voting TokenMORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 33min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Gauntlet USDC Frontier

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle