Clearstar ETH Reactor (Base) Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 19% of deposit

Driven by yoETH −30% 18% · wstETH −30% <1% · wsuperOETHb −30% <1% · −100% 82% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

yoETHAUM / rate76%of vault · bad debt · $51,922Oracle exposure 17%

93%of vault · $63,53576%of vault · $51,92217%separate path

What it's made of

yoETH token page

AUM / rate(exchange-rate)

Priced off an exchange rate / AUM — insulated from spot depegs, but exposed to rate-provider corruption.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ WETH92% LLTV0xbf99…1dbc

Room to grow: $63,535 of $6.06m cap (1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$30,2173 vaultsToken:0x3a43…9de7Allocation: 93% of the vault · $63,535

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 18% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $63,535 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 17% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHHybridChainlink3%of vault · bad debt · $2,227Oracle exposure 0.4%

4%of vault · $2,4763%of vault · $2,2270.4%separate path

What it's made of

wstETH token page

Hybrid· Chainlink(aggregator)

wstETH is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (wstETH-stETH Exchange Rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BasewstETH-stETH Exchange RateExchange rateChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ WETH95% LLTV0x4a11…ca65Chainlink
→ WETH97% LLTV0xae10…a7a4Chainlink

Room to grow: $2,476 of $12.11m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$24.92m34 vaultsToken:0xc1cb…e452Allocation: 4% of the vault · $2,476

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.8% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $2,476 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wsuperOETHbHybrid3%of vault · bad debt · $1,846Oracle exposure 0.3%

3%of vault · $2,0463%of vault · $1,8460.3%separate path

What it's made of

wsuperOETHb token page

Hybrid(exchange-rate)

wsuperOETHb is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (ERC4626 vault share-rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BaseERC4626 vault share-rateVault

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ WETH92% LLTV0x28c9…cf93

Room to grow: $2,046 of $2.02m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$249,5137 vaultsToken:0x7fcd…8ea6Allocation: 3% of the vault · $2,046

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.6% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2,046 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+5 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed1 control point

Up to18%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $12,061

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices wstETH, weETH, cbBTC, cbETH, USDC, rETH0xf0db…5b1b<1% of vault · $249drainable if it is compromised
Onchain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices yoETH, wsuperOETHb17% of vault · $11,812mispriceable only via the issuing contract

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure, and every loss is a share of your deposit — the same percentage whatever you deposited. Loss is that share at a −30% collateral crash, the standard stress; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong, a conditional loss if it happens rather than a likelihood. Open a row for the loss at every crash depth, the dollar amounts, conditions, and the math.

13 scenarios · 11 with no time to exit · loss as % of deposit


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	19%	up to 82%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	19%	up to 82%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(6)
	19%	up to 82%	Instant
	19%	up to 82%	Instant
	19%	up to 82%	Instant
	—	up to 18%	Instant
	<1%	up to 7%	Instant
	1%	up to 6%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(4)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days
	—	0%	Instant

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Ownersingle key (EOA)0x3098…3458

Curatorsingle key (EOA)0x7288…f0ef

Guardian2-of-4 multisig0x1bb2…8458

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting TokenMORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

10 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.