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Gauntlet USDC Balanced

Risk reportArbitrum0x55a2…5e0f

Risk

Depositing into Gauntlet USDC Balanced means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

39%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 18% of deposit

Driven by WBTC −30% 8% · wstETH −30% 5% · syrupUSDC −30% 4% · other 1% · −100% 91% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

WBTCMarketChainlink42%of vault · bad debt · $69,023Oracle exposure 4%

46%of vault · $75,87942%of vault · $69,0234%separate path

What it's made of

WBTC token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

WBTC uses Chainlink market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseChainlink market-rate feed pathQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x8819…14d9Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$47.56m12 vaultsToken:0x2f2a…5b0fAllocation: 46% of the vault · $75,879

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 8% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $75,879 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChainlink28%of vault · bad debt · $45,808Oracle exposure 3%

31%of vault · $50,36328%of vault · $45,8083%separate path

What it's made of

wstETH token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

wstETH uses Chainlink market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseChainlink market-rate feed pathQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x8e02…ae31Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$57.93m12 vaultsToken:0x5979…0529Allocation: 31% of the vault · $50,363

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 5% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $50,363 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

syrupUSDCHybridChainlink16%of vault · bad debt · $26,151Oracle exposure 2%

18%of vault · $28,89716%of vault · $26,1512%separate path

What it's made of

syrupUSDC token page

Hybrid· Chainlink(aggregator)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x8f30…7009Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$318,5477 vaultsToken:0x41ca…42b5Allocation: 18% of the vault · $28,897

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 4% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $28,897 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

sUSDSHardcodedChainlink5%of vault · bad debt · $8,634Oracle exposure 0.5%

6%of vault · $9,5235%of vault · $8,6340.5%separate path

What it's made of

sUSDS token page

Hardcoded· Chainlink(aggregator)

Price is fixed and won't move on a real depeg — divergence accrues as bad debt.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC95% LLTV0x52cc…7124Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$19,29810 vaultsToken:0xddb4…7610Allocation: 6% of the vault · $9,523

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $9,523 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.5% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+1 market with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed1 control point

Up to9%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $15,046

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices wstETH, syrupUSDC, WBTC, sUSDS, PT-USDai-18JUN20260x2f3b…d3c59% of vault · $14,157drainable if it is compromised


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	18%	up to 91%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	18%	up to 91%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(6)
	18%	up to 91%	Instant
	18%	up to 91%	Instant
	18%	up to 91%	Instant
	2%	up to 23%	Instant
	5%	up to 21%	Instant
	—	up to 9%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner4-of-7 multisig0x5a4e…d4d0

Curator3-of-7 multisig0x9e33…0585

Sentinels21 multisig1 EOASafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

single key (EOA)0x41a5…1eed
3-of-7 multisig0x7084…84cd

Allocators21 multisig1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

3-of-7 multisig0x9e33…0585
single key (EOA)0xa690…da21

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xfd35…d9b2

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting TokenMORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 55min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Gauntlet USDC Balanced

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle