Steakhouse ETH (Ethereum) Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 25% of deposit

Driven by wstETH −30% 25% · cbBTC −30% <1% · −100% 90% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

wstETHHybrid90%of vault · bad debt · $28.7mOracle exposure 10%

99.8%of vault · $31.85m90%of vault · $28.7m10%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(exchange-rate)

wstETH is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (wstETH/stETH exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BasewstETH/stETH exchange rateExchange rate

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ WETH97% LLTV0xbd60…71d8
→ WETH95% LLTV0xbd60…71d8

Room to grow: $31.85m of $2.727b cap (1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$962.68m106 vaultsToken:0x7f39…2ca0Allocation: 99.8% of the vault · $31.85m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 25% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $31.85m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 10% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbBTCMarketChainlink0.2%of vault · bad debt · $49,462Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.2%of vault · $54,8360.2%of vault · $49,462<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(managed, aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ WETH92% LLTV0x998e…9366Chainlink
→ WETH92% LLTV0x8f65…f5d4Chainlink

Room to grow: $54,836 of $54.55m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$471.51m102 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: 0.2% of the vault · $54,836

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $54,836 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+1 market with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to10%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $3.15m

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC0x21f7…73ca<1% of vault · $5,374drainable if it is compromised
On-chain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices wstETH10% of vault · $3.15mmispriceable only via the issuing contract

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure, and every loss is a share of your deposit — the same percentage whatever you deposited. Loss is that share at a −30% collateral crash, the standard stress; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong, a conditional loss if it happens rather than a likelihood. Open a row for the loss at every crash depth, the dollar amounts, conditions, and the math.

12 scenarios · 10 with no time to exit · loss as % of deposit


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	25%	up to 90%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	25%	up to 90%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	10%	Full deposit	Instant
	25%	up to 90%	Instant
	25%	up to 90%	Instant
	25%	up to 90%	Instant
	—	up to 10%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(4)
	—	Full deposit	7 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 90%	Instant
	—	up to 50%	7 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 7 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Curator change queued

The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.

raise a market's supply cap— applies now; no time to exit first

Owner5-of-10 multisig0x0a0e…f8dd

Curator2-of-7 multisig0x827e…ecdb

Guardiancontract0x4ef0…4fe9

Allocators6 · 2 contracts · 4 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0x7a17…4e8d
single key (EOA)0xfc58…d827
contract0x9e91…f9e1
contract0xfd32…c75d
single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a
single key (EOA)0x0d61…9c5b

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner6-of-1012 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.