Steakhouse ETH
Risk reportEthereum0xbeef…8cd4
Risk
Depositing into Steakhouse ETH means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.
Collateral and oracle exposure
Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.
Driven by wstETH −30% 23% · WBTC −30% <1% · cbBTC −30% <1% · −100% 85% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling
wstETHHybrid85%of vault · bad debt · $19.58mOracle exposure 15%99.8%of vault · $22.99m85%of vault · $19.58m15%separate path
wstETHHybrid85%of vault · bad debt · $19.58mOracle exposure 15%What it's made of
wstETH is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (wstETH/stETH exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.
- → WETH97% LLTV0xbd60…71d8
- → WETH95% LLTV0xbd60…71d8
If it breaks
−30% defaultWBTCMarketChainlink0.2%of vault · bad debt · $39,400.55Oracle exposure <0.1%0.2%of vault · $45,511.410.2%of vault · $39,400.55<0.1%separate path
WBTCMarketChainlink0.2%of vault · bad debt · $39,400.55Oracle exposure <0.1%What it's made of
WBTC is priced via BTC / ETH — market-rate feed (Chainlink).
- → WETH92% LLTV0x46d1…a009Chainlink
- → WETH92% LLTV0xc29b…e663Chainlink
If it breaks
−30% defaultcbBTCMarketChainlink<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $14.51Oracle exposure <0.1%<0.1%of vault · $16.77<0.1%of vault · $14.51<0.1%separate path
cbBTCMarketChainlink<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $14.51Oracle exposure <0.1%What it's made of
Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.
- → WETH92% LLTV0x998e…9366Chainlink
- → WETH92% LLTV0x8f65…f5d4Chainlink
If it breaks
−30% defaultOracle dependencies
1 feed · 1 control pointUp to15%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $3.42m
Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.
- Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC0x21f7…73ca<1% of vault · $6,113.12drainable if it is compromised
- On-chain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices wstETH15% of vault · $3.41mmispriceable only via the issuing contract
Loss scenarios
Each row is a distinct failure, and every loss is a share of your deposit — the same percentage whatever you deposited. Loss is that share at a −30% collateral crash, the standard stress; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong, a conditional loss if it happens rather than a likelihood. Open a row for the loss at every crash depth, the dollar amounts, conditions, and the math.
| Full-deposit & protocol-level(2) | ||||
| 100% | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| 23% | up to 85% | Instant | ||
| Price-driven collateral stress(1) | ||||
| 23% | up to 85% | Instant | ||
| Oracle & liquidation failures(5) | ||||
| 15% | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| 23% | up to 85% | Instant | ||
| 23% | up to 85% | Instant | ||
| 23% | up to 85% | Instant | ||
| — | up to 15% | Instant | ||
| Vault role & allocator(4) | ||||
| — | Full deposit | 7 days | ||
| — | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| — | up to 85% | Instant | ||
| — | up to 50% | 7 days | ||
Trust and control
The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.
Vault operators
The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.
Role timelock 7 days to exit before owner/curator actions land
Curator change queued
The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.
- raise a market's supply cap— applies now; no time to exit first
Allocators4 · 2 contracts · 2 EOAsReaches deposit · instant
Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.
- contract0x9e91…f9e1
- contract0xfd32…c75d
- single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a
- single key (EOA)0x0d61…9c5b
Audits
- Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
- Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
- Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
- Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report
Governance & control
Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.
MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2Dependencies that can affect your deposit
9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.
Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).
No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.