Flowdesk AUSD RWA Strategy

Risk reportEthereum0x3240…2f0c

Risk

Depositing into Flowdesk AUSD RWA Strategy means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

$3.73mrealistic worst · −50% collateral crashup to $10.43mSmart-contract bug · extreme only

−10%−30%−50%extreme

Left to right, a deeper collateral crash. Hover any point for the scenarios that drive the loss — only a smart-contract bug reaches a total loss.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest 15 Dec, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropvault-wide · no liquidations · stress estimate

−30%est. bad debt up to $1.74m

tap a preset or drag

Driven by sUSDat $1.14m · PT-USDat-27AUG2026 $425,973 · sUSDai $147,316 · other $23,672 · −100% $8.71m modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

sUSDatHybrid$6.15m59% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $1.12m

$7.27m70% of vault$6.15m59% of vault$1.12mseparate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(exchange-rate)

sUSDat is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (ERC4626 vault share-rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BaseERC4626 vault share-rateVault

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ AUSD86% LLTV0x78e1…b23a

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.43m5 vaultsToken:0xd166…2df7Allocation: $7.27m · 70% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $1.14mUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $7.27m · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $1.12m drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-USDat-27AUG2026HybridPTMarket rate$1.81m17% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $523,510

$2.34m22% of vault$1.81m17% of vault$523,510separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(composite)PTMarket rate

PT-USDat-27AUG2026 PT is priced by a Pendle market-rate oracle.

BasePendle Chainlink-compatible OracleNAV

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ AUSD92% LLTV0xdad0…e6b8

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.14m7 vaultsToken:0x1d69…1e08Allocation: $2.34m · 22% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $425,973Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2.34m · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $523,510 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

sUSDaiMarketChainlink$626,9506% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $58,217

$685,1677% of vault$626,9506% of vault$58,217separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ AUSD92% LLTV0x3eba…362eChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$6.84m2 vaultsToken:0x0b2b…5ef9Allocation: $685,167 · 7% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $147,316Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $685,167 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $58,217 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wSPYxAUM / rate$127,2391% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $13,355

$140,5931% of vault$127,2391% of vault$13,355separate path

What it's made of

AUM / rate(exchange-rate)

Priced off an exchange rate / AUM — insulated from spot depegs, but exposed to rate-provider corruption.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ AUSD86% LLTV0x01fd…bac5

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$13,3512 vaultsToken:0xc88f…4c02Allocation: $140,593 · 1% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $23,672Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $140,593 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $13,355 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+2 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to$1.72mdrainable if these feeds are mispriced · 16% of vault

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices sUSDai0x21f7…73ca$58,217 · <1% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised
On-chain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices sUSDat, wSPYx$1.14m · 11% of vaultmispriceable only via the issuing contract
Unidentified feeds· vendor and on-chain control not resolvedprices PT-USDat-27AUG2026$523,510 · 5% of vaultmispriceable if these feeds lie

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure. Possible loss is the share of your deposit at the selected collateral drop; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong — a conditional loss if it happens, not a likelihood. Price-scaling rows move with the drop selector; the rest are fixed. Enter a deposit to see the dollar figures as your own. Open a row for conditions, mitigations, and the math.

10 scenarios · 8 with no time to exit

Collateral drop


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	$10.43m	Full deposit	Instant
	17%	$1.74m	up to $8.71m	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	17%	$1.74m	up to $8.71m	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(4)
	17%	$1.74m	up to $8.71m	Instant
	17%	$1.74m	up to $8.71m	Instant
	15%	$1.57m	up to $7.96m	Instant
	—	—	up to $1.72m	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	—	up to $5.21m	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Ownersingle key (EOA)0x3bda…57ea

Curatorsingle key (EOA)0xa817…78ec

Sentinels3 · 1 contract · 2 EOAsSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

contract0x0000…0d2a
single key (EOA)0xbe07…4050
single key (EOA)0xd6dd…af5f

Allocators2 · 2 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0xd5b4…c361
single key (EOA)0xb317…deca

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· 15 Dec, 2025report
Blackthorn· 4 Dec, 2025report
Spearbit· 4 Dec, 2025report
Blackthorn· 15 Sep, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer3-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 254,036

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

8 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 19 Jul, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql