Flowdesk AUSD RWA Strategy
Risk reportEthereum0x3240…2f0c
Risk
Depositing into Flowdesk AUSD RWA Strategy means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.
Collateral and oracle exposure
Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.
Driven by sUSDat −30% 13% · PT-USDat-27AUG2026 −30% 5% · wSPYx −30% <1% · other <1% · −100% 90% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling
sUSDatHybrid69%of vault · bad debt · $5mOracle exposure 7%77%of vault · $5.52m69%of vault · $5m7%separate path
sUSDatHybrid69%of vault · bad debt · $5mOracle exposure 7%What it's made of
sUSDat is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (ERC4626 vault share-rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.
- → AUSD86% LLTV0x78e1…b23a
If it breaks
−30% defaultPT-USDat-27AUG2026HybridPTMarket rate20%of vault · bad debt · $1.46mOracle exposure 2%23%of vault · $1.63m20%of vault · $1.46m2%separate path
PT-USDat-27AUG2026HybridPTMarket rate20%of vault · bad debt · $1.46mOracle exposure 2%What it's made of
PT-USDat-27AUG2026 PT is priced by a Pendle market-rate oracle.
- → AUSD92% LLTV0xdad0…e6b8
If it breaks
−30% defaultwSPYxAUM / rate0.7%of vault · bad debt · $47,901.15Oracle exposure 0.1%0.7%of vault · $52,103.610.7%of vault · $47,901.150.1%separate path
wSPYxAUM / rate0.7%of vault · bad debt · $47,901.15Oracle exposure 0.1%What it's made of
Priced off an exchange rate / AUM — insulated from spot depegs, but exposed to rate-provider corruption.
- → AUSD86% LLTV0x01fd…bac5
If it breaks
−30% defaultsUSDaiMarketChainlink<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $617.52Oracle exposure <0.1%<0.1%of vault · $674.76<0.1%of vault · $617.52<0.1%separate path
sUSDaiMarketChainlink<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $617.52Oracle exposure <0.1%What it's made of
Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.
- → AUSD92% LLTV0x3eba…362eChainlink
If it breaks
−30% default+2 markets with no current position
Oracle dependencies
1 feed · 1 control pointUp to10%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $698,266.93
Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.
- Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices sUSDai0x21f7…73ca<1% of vault · $57.25drainable if it is compromised
- On-chain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices sUSDat, wSPYx7% of vault · $520,144.97mispriceable only via the issuing contract
- Unidentified feeds· vendor and on-chain control not resolvedprices PT-USDat-27AUG20262% of vault · $178,064.7mispriceable if these feeds lie
Loss scenarios
Each row is a distinct failure, and every loss is a share of your deposit — the same percentage whatever you deposited. Loss is that share at a −30% collateral crash, the standard stress; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong, a conditional loss if it happens rather than a likelihood. Open a row for the loss at every crash depth, the dollar amounts, conditions, and the math.
| Full-deposit & protocol-level(2) | ||||
| 100% | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| 18% | up to 90% | Instant | ||
| Price-driven collateral stress(1) | ||||
| 18% | up to 90% | Instant | ||
| Oracle & liquidation failures(5) | ||||
| 10% | up to 99% | Instant | ||
| 18% | up to 90% | Instant | ||
| 18% | up to 90% | Instant | ||
| 18% | up to 90% | Instant | ||
| — | up to 10% | Instant | ||
| Vault role & allocator(3) | ||||
| — | Full deposit | 3 days | ||
| — | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| — | up to 50% | 3 days | ||
Trust and control
The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.
Vault operators
The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.
Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land
Sentinels3 · 1 contract · 2 EOAsSafety role · veto only
Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.
- contract0x0000…0d2a
- single key (EOA)0xbe07…4050
- single key (EOA)0xd6dd…af5f
Allocators2 · 2 EOAsReaches deposit · instant
Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.
- single key (EOA)0xd5b4…c361
- single key (EOA)0xb317…deca
Audits
- Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
- Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
- Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
- Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report
Governance & control
Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.
MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2Dependencies that can affect your deposit
8 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.
Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).
No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.