GTUSDCPRisk · Base
Risk
Depositing into GTUSDCP means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.
Left to right, a deeper collateral crash. Hover any point for the scenarios that drive the loss — only a smart-contract bug reaches a total loss.
Collateral & oracles
Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.
Driven by cbBTC $65.41m · WETH $4.15m · cbETH $564,202 · other $109,335 · −100% $378.31m modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling
cbBTCMarketChainlink$351.58m82% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $46.4m$397.98m93% of vault$351.58m82% of vault$46.4mseparate path
cbBTC is priced via BTC / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).
- → USDC86% LLTV0x663b…39b9Chainlink
WETHMarketChainlink$22.28m5% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $2.95m$25.23m6% of vault$22.28m5% of vault$2.95mseparate path
WETH is priced via ETH / USD, quoted in USDC / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).
- → USDC86% LLTV0xfea2…afe4Chainlink
cbETHMarketChainlink$3.85m0.9% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $508,008$4.36m1% of vault$3.85m0.9% of vault$508,008separate path
cbETH is priced via CBETH / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).
- → USDC86% LLTV0xb40d…cd96Chainlink
- → USDC86% LLTV0x4756…9425Chainlink
- → USDC77% LLTV0x97ff…8295Chainlink
wstETHMarketChainlink$587,6770.1% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $73,488$661,1650.2% of vault$587,6770.1% of vault$73,488separate path
wstETH is priced via WSTETH / ETH × ETH / USD, quoted in USDC / USD — 3-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).
- → USDC86% LLTV0x957e…ce5fChainlink
- → USDC86% LLTV0xd7a1…289aChainlink
Oracle dependencies
1 feed · 1 control pointUp to$49.93mdrainable if these feeds are mispriced · 12% of vault
Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.
- Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices wstETH, WETH, cbBTC, cbETH0xf0db…5b1b$49.93m · 12% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised
How you could lose money
Each row is a distinct failure. Possible loss is the share of your deposit at the selected collateral drop; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong — a conditional loss if it happens, not a likelihood. Price-scaling rows move with the drop selector; the rest are fixed. Enter a deposit to see the dollar figures as your own. Open a row for conditions, mitigations, and the math.
| Full-deposit & protocol-level(2) | |||||
| 100% | $428.25m | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| 16% | $70.23m | up to $378.31m | Instant | ||
| Price-driven collateral stress(1) | |||||
| 16% | $70.23m | up to $378.31m | Instant | ||
| Oracle & liquidation failures(5) | |||||
| 16% | $70.23m | up to $378.31m | Instant | ||
| 16% | $70.23m | up to $378.31m | Instant | ||
| 16% | $69.98m | up to $376.17m | Instant | ||
| — | — | up to $49.93m | Instant | ||
| <1% | $99,633 | up to $535,529 | Instant | ||
| Vault role & allocator(4) | |||||
| — | — | Full deposit | 7 days | ||
| — | — | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| — | — | up to $214.12m | 7 days | ||
| — | — | $0 | Instant | ||
Who you're trusting
The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.
The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.
Role timelock 7 days to exit before owner/curator actions land
Allocators2 · 1 contract · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant
Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.
- contract0xa090…0467
- single key (EOA)0xffd6…119b
- Certora· 15 Dec, 2025report
- Blackthorn· 4 Dec, 2025report
- Spearbit· 4 Dec, 2025report
- Blackthorn· 15 Sep, 2025report
Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.
Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).
No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.