Gauntlet USDC Prime
Risk reportBase0x050c…56f0
Risk
Depositing into Gauntlet USDC Prime means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.
Collateral and oracle exposure
Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.
Driven by cbBTC −30% 16% · WETH −30% <1% · cbETH −30% <1% · other <1% · −100% 87% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling
cbBTCMarketChainlink85%of vault · bad debt · $75.79mOracle exposure 13%97%of vault · $87.29m85%of vault · $75.79m13%separate path
cbBTCMarketChainlink85%of vault · bad debt · $75.79mOracle exposure 13%What it's made of
cbBTC is priced via BTC / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).
- → USDC86% LLTV0x663b…39b9Chainlink
If it breaks
−30% defaultcbETHMarketChainlink1%of vault · bad debt · $1.16mOracle exposure 0.3%2%of vault · $1.39m1%of vault · $1.16m0.3%separate path
cbETHMarketChainlink1%of vault · bad debt · $1.16mOracle exposure 0.3%What it's made of
cbETH mixes exchange-rate/NAV (cbETH-ETH Exchange Rate) with market-rate (ETH / USD, USDC / USD) — insulated from cbETH-ETH Exchange Rate market deviation, but exposed to ETH / USD, USDC / USD.
- → USDC77% LLTV0x97ff…8295Chainlink
- → USDC86% LLTV0xb40d…cd96Chainlink
- → USDC86% LLTV0x4756…9425Chainlink
If it breaks
−30% defaultWETHMarketChainlink0.9%of vault · bad debt · $785,604.08Oracle exposure 0.1%1%of vault · $899,659.860.9%of vault · $785,604.080.1%separate path
WETHMarketChainlink0.9%of vault · bad debt · $785,604.08Oracle exposure 0.1%What it's made of
WETH is priced via ETH / USD, quoted in USDC / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).
- → USDC86% LLTV0xfea2…afe4Chainlink
If it breaks
−30% defaultwstETHMarketChainlink<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $285.18Oracle exposure <0.1%<0.1%of vault · $330.21<0.1%of vault · $285.18<0.1%separate path
wstETHMarketChainlink<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $285.18Oracle exposure <0.1%What it's made of
wstETH is priced via WSTETH / ETH × ETH / USD, quoted in USDC / USD — 3-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).
- → USDC86% LLTV0xd7a1…289aChainlink
If it breaks
−30% defaultOracle dependencies
1 feed · 1 control pointUp to13%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $11.84m
Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.
- Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices wstETH, WETH, cbBTC, cbETH0xf0db…5b1b13% of vault · $11.84mdrainable if it is compromised
Loss scenarios
Each row is a distinct failure, and every loss is a share of your deposit — the same percentage whatever you deposited. Loss is that share at a −30% collateral crash, the standard stress; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong, a conditional loss if it happens rather than a likelihood. Open a row for the loss at every crash depth, the dollar amounts, conditions, and the math.
| Full-deposit & protocol-level(2) | ||||
| 100% | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| 16% | up to 87% | Instant | ||
| Price-driven collateral stress(1) | ||||
| 16% | up to 87% | Instant | ||
| Oracle & liquidation failures(6) | ||||
| 16% | up to 87% | Instant | ||
| 16% | up to 87% | Instant | ||
| 16% | up to 87% | Instant | ||
| — | up to 13% | Instant | ||
| <1% | up to <1% | Instant | ||
| <1% | up to <1% | Instant | ||
| Vault role & allocator(3) | ||||
| — | Full deposit | 3 days | ||
| — | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| — | up to 50% | 3 days | ||
Trust and control
The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.
Vault operators
The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.
Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land
Curator change queued
The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.
- change who can move liquidity— applies in 5 days; time to exit first
Sentinels3 · 1 multisig · 2 EOAsSafety role · veto only
Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.
- single key (EOA)0x0df6…cdee
- single key (EOA)0x41a5…1eed
- 3-of-7 multisig0x7084…84cd
Allocators3 · 1 multisig · 2 EOAsReaches deposit · instant
Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.
- 3-of-7 multisig0x9e33…0585
- single key (EOA)0xc314…7c66
- single key (EOA)0xa690…da21
Audits
- Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
- Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
- Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
- Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report
Governance & control
Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.
MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2Dependencies that can affect your deposit
9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.
Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).
No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.