GTUSDCPRisk · Base
Risk
Depositing into GTUSDCP means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.
Left to right, a deeper collateral crash. Hover any point for the scenarios that drive the loss — only a smart-contract bug reaches a total loss.
Collateral & oracles
Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.
Driven by cbBTC $11.92m · WETH $2.66m · cbETH $424,208 · other $1,271 · −100% $81.4m modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling
cbBTCMarketChainlink$64.05m70% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $8.29m$72.34m79% of vault$64.05m70% of vault$8.29mseparate path
cbBTC is priced via BTC / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).
- → USDC86% LLTV0x663b…39b9Chainlink
WETHMarketChainlink$14.3m16% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $1.85m$16.15m18% of vault$14.3m16% of vault$1.85mseparate path
WETH is priced via ETH / USD, quoted in USDC / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).
- → USDC86% LLTV0xfea2…afe4Chainlink
cbETHMarketChainlink$3.04m3% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $396,764$3.44m4% of vault$3.04m3% of vault$396,764separate path
cbETH mixes exchange-rate/NAV (cbETH-ETH Exchange Rate) with market-rate (ETH / USD, USDC / USD) — insulated from cbETH-ETH Exchange Rate market deviation, but exposed to ETH / USD, USDC / USD.
- → USDC77% LLTV0x97ff…8295Chainlink
- → USDC86% LLTV0xb40d…cd96Chainlink
- → USDC86% LLTV0x4756…9425Chainlink
wstETHMarketChainlink$6,830<0.1% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $840.69$7,670<0.1% of vault$6,830<0.1% of vault$840.69separate path
wstETH is priced via WSTETH / ETH × ETH / USD, quoted in USDC / USD — 3-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).
- → USDC86% LLTV0xd7a1…289aChainlink
Oracle dependencies
1 feed · 1 control pointUp to$10.54mdrainable if these feeds are mispriced · 11% of vault
Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.
- Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices wstETH, WETH, cbBTC, cbETH0xf0db…5b1b$10.54m · 11% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised
How you could lose money
Each row is a distinct failure. Possible loss is the share of your deposit at the selected collateral drop; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong — a conditional loss if it happens, not a likelihood. Price-scaling rows move with the drop selector; the rest are fixed. Enter a deposit to see the dollar figures as your own. Open a row for conditions, mitigations, and the math.
| Full-deposit & protocol-level(2) | |||||
| 100% | $91.94m | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| 16% | $15m | up to $81.4m | Instant | ||
| Price-driven collateral stress(1) | |||||
| 16% | $15m | up to $81.4m | Instant | ||
| Oracle & liquidation failures(5) | |||||
| 16% | $15m | up to $81.4m | Instant | ||
| 16% | $15m | up to $81.4m | Instant | ||
| 16% | $14.86m | up to $79.89m | Instant | ||
| — | — | up to $10.54m | Instant | ||
| <1% | $2,875 | up to $15,451 | Instant | ||
| Vault role & allocator(3) | |||||
| — | — | Full deposit | 3 days | ||
| — | — | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| — | — | up to $45.97m | 3 days | ||
Who you're trusting
The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.
The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.
Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land
Curator change queued
The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.
- change who can move liquidity— applies in 5 days; time to exit first
Allocators2 · 1 multisig · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant
Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.
- 3-of-7 multisig0x9e33…0585
- single key (EOA)0xc314…7c66
- Certora· 15 Dec, 2025report
- Blackthorn· 4 Dec, 2025report
- Spearbit· 4 Dec, 2025report
- Blackthorn· 15 Sep, 2025report
Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.
Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).
No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.