STEAKUSDTRisk · Ethereum

Risk

Depositing into STEAKUSDT means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho Blue

ethereumVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

$36.53mrealistic worst · −50% collateral crashup to $89.89mSmart-contract bug · extreme only

−10%−30%−50%extreme

Left to right, a deeper collateral crash. Hover any point for the scenarios that drive the loss — only a smart-contract bug reaches a total loss.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 7-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest 15 Dec, 2025

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropvault-wide · no liquidations · stress estimate

−30%est. bad debt up to $16.24m

tap a preset or drag

Driven by wstETH $16.19m · cbBTC $39,950 · WBTC $6,700 · −100% $87.27m modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

wstETHMarketChainlink$87.02m97% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $2.6m

$89.62m99.7% of vault$87.02m97% of vault$2.6mseparate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(composite)

wstETH is priced via Custom price feed for wstETH / ETH × ETH / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseCustom price feed for wstETH / ETHMarketETH / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDT86% LLTV0x95db…6992Chainlink
→ USDT86% LLTV0xe087…9f9fChainlink

Room to grow: $89.62m of $1.998b cap (4% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$594.24m163 vaultsToken:0x7f39…2ca0Allocation: $89.62m · 99.7% of the vault

If it breaksvault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $16.19mUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $89.62m · inherits vault-wide stressOracle exposure: up to $2.6m drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbBTCMarketChainlink$214,7310.2% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $19,185

$233,9160.3% of vault$214,7310.2% of vault$19,185separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(composite, aggregator, managed)

cbBTC is priced via BTC / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 1h · Deviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDT86% LLTV0x9f98…34d2Chainlink
→ USDT86% LLTV0x0e05…38acChainlink

Room to grow: $233,916 of $199.79m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$271.96m146 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: $233,916 · 0.3% of the vault

If it breaksvault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $39,950Uses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $233,916 · inherits vault-wide stressOracle exposure: up to $19,185 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WBTCMarketChainlink$36,012<0.1% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $3,246

$39,257<0.1% of vault$36,012<0.1% of vault$3,246separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator, managed)

WBTC uses a deviation/timelock managed oracle over Chainlink price-source leg(s), not a direct raw market-rate feed.

BaseWBTC / BTCMarketBTC / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDT / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDT86% LLTV0x008b…e1efChainlink
→ USDT86% LLTV0xf156…0cf4Chainlink

Room to grow: $39,257 of $998.97m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$432.58m144 vaultsToken:0x2260…c599Allocation: $39,257 · <0.1% of the vault

If it breaksvault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $6,700Uses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $39,257 · inherits vault-wide stressOracle exposure: up to $3,246 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+2 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to$2.62mdrainable if these feeds are mispriced · 3% of vault

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC, wstETH, sUSDS, XAUt0x21f7…73ca$2.62m · 3% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised

Each row is a distinct failure. Possible loss is the share of your deposit at the selected collateral drop; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong — a conditional loss if it happens, not a likelihood. Price-scaling rows move with the drop selector; the rest are fixed. Enter a deposit to see the dollar figures as your own. Open a row for conditions, mitigations, and the math.

11 scenarios · 9 with no time to exit

Collateral drop


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	$89.89m	Full deposit	Instant
	18%	$16.24m	up to $87.27m	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	18%	$16.24m	up to $87.27m	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(4)
	18%	$16.24m	up to $87.27m	Instant
	18%	$16.24m	up to $87.27m	Instant
	—	—	up to $2.62m	Instant
	<1%	$46,650	up to $250,743	Instant
Vault role & allocator(4)
	—	—	Full deposit	7 days
	—	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	—	up to $44.95m	7 days
	—	—	up to $24.73m	Instant

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 7 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Curator change queued

The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.

raise a market's supply cap— applies in 3 days; time to exit first

Owner5-of-10 multisig0x0a0e…f8dd

Curator2-of-6 multisig0x827e…ecdb

Guardiancontract0xaec7…c67f

Allocators4 · 1 multisig · 2 contracts · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

contract0x9e91…f9e1
1-of-5 multisig0x29d4…74f7
contract0xfd32…c75d
single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· 15 Dec, 2025report
Blackthorn· 4 Dec, 2025report
Spearbit· 4 Dec, 2025report
Blackthorn· 15 Sep, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer3-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 254,036

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit · 9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control — select one for its story

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 6 Jul, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

STEAKUSDTRisk · Ethereum

Risk

Collateral & oracles

Oracle dependencies

How you could lose money

Who you're trusting

Market Specific oracle