Risk
Depositing into Gauntlet DAI Core means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.
Left to right, a deeper collateral crash. Hover any point for the scenarios that drive the loss — only a smart-contract bug reaches a total loss.
Collateral & oracles
Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.
Driven by sUSDe $357,651 · USDe $21,285 · PT-USDe-31JUL2025 $10,379 · other $30.84 · −100% $1.94m modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling
sUSDeHybrid$1.78m80% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $274,726$2.06m92% of vault$1.78m80% of vault$274,726separate path
sUSDe is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (ERC4626 vault share-rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.
- → DAI95% LLTV0x5d91…ae25
- → DAI86% LLTV0x5d91…ae25
- → DAI92% LLTV0x5d91…ae25
USDeHybrid$114,4055% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $18,916$133,3216% of vault$114,4055% of vault$18,916separate path
USDe uses a constant oracle path; verified external provider(s): no verified external provider.
- → DAI92% LLTV0xae47…ca35
- → DAI86% LLTV0xae47…ca35
PT-USDe-31JUL2025Hybrid$44,1712% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $4,703$48,8742% of vault$44,1712% of vault$4,703separate path
Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.
- → DAI92% LLTV0xfcae…2e5c
PT-USDS-14AUG2025Hybrid$100.11<0.1% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $16.21$116.32<0.1% of vault$100.11<0.1% of vault$16.21separate path
Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.
- → DAI97% LLTV0xd7c8…27a5
PT-sUSDE-31JUL2025Hybrid$14.24<0.1% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $10.92$25.17<0.1% of vault$14.24<0.1% of vault$10.92separate path
Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.
- → DAI92% LLTV0x7880…b732
+1 market with no current position
Oracle dependencies
Up to$298,371drainable if these feeds are mispriced · 13% of vault
Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.
- On-chain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices sUSDe, USDe$293,641 · 13% of vaultmispriceable only via the issuing contract
- Unidentified feeds· vendor and on-chain control not resolvedprices PT-USDe-31JUL2025, PT-USDS-14AUG2025, PT-sUSDE-31JUL2025$4,730 · <1% of vaultmispriceable if these feeds lie
How you could lose money
Each row is a distinct failure. Possible loss is the share of your deposit at the selected collateral drop; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong — a conditional loss if it happens, not a likelihood. Price-scaling rows move with the drop selector; the rest are fixed. Enter a deposit to see the dollar figures as your own. Open a row for conditions, mitigations, and the math.
| Full-deposit & protocol-level(2) | |||||
| 100% | $2.24m | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| 17% | $389,345 | up to $1.94m | Instant | ||
| Price-driven collateral stress(1) | |||||
| 17% | $389,345 | up to $1.94m | Instant | ||
| Oracle & liquidation failures(4) | |||||
| 17% | $389,345 | up to $1.94m | Instant | ||
| 17% | $389,345 | up to $1.94m | Instant | ||
| 17% | $378,935 | up to $1.89m | Instant | ||
| — | — | up to $298,371 | Instant | ||
| Vault role & allocator(4) | |||||
| — | — | Full deposit | 3 days | ||
| — | — | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| — | — | up to $1.12m | 3 days | ||
| — | — | $0 | Instant | ||
Who you're trusting
The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.
The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.
Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land
Curator change queued
The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.
- raise a market's supply cap— applies now; no time to exit first
Allocators2 · 1 contract · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant
Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.
- single key (EOA)0x172b…1dff
- contract0xfd32…c75d
- Certora· 15 Dec, 2025report
- Blackthorn· 4 Dec, 2025report
- Spearbit· 4 Dec, 2025report
- Blackthorn· 15 Sep, 2025report
Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.
Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).
No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.