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Gauntlet DAI Core

Risk reportEthereum0x5003…74a5

Risk

Depositing into Gauntlet DAI Core means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

39%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 19% of deposit

Driven by sUSDe −30% 18% · PT-USDe-31JUL2025 −30% <1% · USDe −30% <1% · other <1% · −100% 92% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

sUSDeHybrid90%of vault · bad debt · $1.82mOracle exposure 8%

98%of vault · $1.98m90%of vault · $1.82m8%separate path

What it's made of

sUSDe token page

Hybrid(exchange-rate)

sUSDe is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (ERC4626 vault share-rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BaseERC4626 vault share-rateVault

Markets this collateral backs · 3

→ DAI86% LLTV0x5d91…ae25
→ DAI95% LLTV0x5d91…ae25
→ DAI92% LLTV0x5d91…ae25

Room to grow: $1.98m of $4m cap (50% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$47.75m20 vaultsToken:0x9d39…3497Allocation: 98% of the vault · $1.98m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 18% of depositUses 3 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $1.98m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 8% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-USDe-31JUL2025Hybrid2%of vault · bad debt · $44,829Oracle exposure 0.2%

2%of vault · $49,5322%of vault · $44,8290.2%separate path

What it's made of

PT-USDe-31JUL2025 token page

Hybrid(composite)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ DAI92% LLTV0xfcae…2e5c

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$4,7081 vaultsToken:0x9174…d667Allocation: 2% of the vault · $49,532

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.5% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $49,532 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

USDeHybrid<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $357.79Oracle exposure <0.1%

<0.1%of vault · $389.37<0.1%of vault · $357.79<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

USDe token page

Hybrid(constant)

USDe uses a constant oracle path; verified external provider(s): no verified external provider.

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ DAI92% LLTV0xae47…ca35
→ DAI86% LLTV0xae47…ca35

Room to grow: $389.37 of $2m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$159.74m7 vaultsToken:0x4c9e…68b3Allocation: <0.1% of the vault · $389.37

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $389.37 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-sUSDE-31JUL2025Hybrid<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $14.05Oracle exposure <0.1%

<0.1%of vault · $15.57<0.1%of vault · $14.05<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

PT-sUSDE-31JUL2025 token page

Hybrid(composite)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ DAI92% LLTV0x7880…b732

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$54.991 vaultsToken:0x3b3f…f634Allocation: <0.1% of the vault · $15.57

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $15.57 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-USDS-14AUG2025Hybrid<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $4.08Oracle exposure <0.1%

<0.1%of vault · $4.48<0.1%of vault · $4.08<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

PT-USDS-14AUG2025 token page

Hybrid(composite)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ DAI97% LLTV0xd7c8…27a5

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$0.501 vaultsToken:0xffec…9a48Allocation: <0.1% of the vault · $4.48

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $4.48 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+1 market with no current position

Oracle dependencies

Up to8%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $167,800

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Onchain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices sUSDe, USDe8% of vault · $163,094mispriceable only via the issuing contract
Unidentified feeds· vendor and onchain control not resolvedprices PT-USDe-31JUL2025, PT-sUSDE-31JUL2025, PT-USDS-14AUG2025<1% of vault · $4,706mispriceable if these feeds lie


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	19%	up to 92%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	19%	up to 92%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	8%	up to 98%	Instant
	19%	up to 92%	Instant
	19%	up to 92%	Instant
	18%	up to 90%	Instant
	—	up to 8%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(4)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days
	—	0%	Instant

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Curator change queued

The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.

raise a market's supply cap— applies now; no time to exit first

Owner4-of-7 multisig0xc684…faec

Curator3-of-7 multisig0x9e33…0585

Guardian3-of-7 multisig0x7084…84cd

Allocators21 contract1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0x172b…1dff
contract0xfd32…c75d

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner6-of-1012 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 991,904.24

Voting TokenMORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

8 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 47min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Gauntlet DAI Core

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle