Felix USDT0

Risk reportHyperliquid L10xfc51…151e

Risk

Depositing into Felix USDT0 means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

20%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 1% of deposit

Driven by UBTC −30% 1% · −100% 88% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

WHYPEMarketRedStone67%of vault · bad debt · $1.93mOracle exposure 10%

77%of vault · $2.21m67%of vault · $1.93m10%separate path

What it's made of

Market· RedStone(aggregator)

WHYPE uses RedStone market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseRedStone market-rate feed pathQuoteRedStone quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USD₮063% LLTV0x8f36…a973RedStone

Room to grow: $2.21m of $29.98m cap (7% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$10.74m19 vaultsToken:0x5555…5555Allocation: 77% of the vault · $2.21m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2.21m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 10% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

UBTCMarketRedStone14%of vault · bad debt · $401,605Oracle exposure 2%

16%of vault · $459,77314%of vault · $401,6052%separate path

What it's made of

Market· RedStone(aggregator)

UBTC uses RedStone market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseRedStone market-rate feed pathQuoteRedStone quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USD₮077% LLTV0xce5b…317fRedStone

Room to grow: $459,773 of $14.99m cap (3% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$2.4m14 vaultsToken:0x9fdb…3463Allocation: 16% of the vault · $459,773

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $459,773 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

kHYPEHybridRedStone5%of vault · bad debt · $136,009Oracle exposure 0.5%

5%of vault · $151,6325%of vault · $136,0090.5%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· RedStone(aggregator)

kHYPE is priced from a fundamental/NAV feed (RedStone), not a raw market-rate feed.

BaseRedStone fundamental/NAV feed pathQuoteRedStone quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USD₮063% LLTV0x5f52…08c7RedStone

Room to grow: $151,632 of $44.97m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$41.86m19 vaultsToken:0xfd73…296dAllocation: 5% of the vault · $151,632

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $151,632 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.5% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstHYPEHybridRedStone2%of vault · bad debt · $46,620Oracle exposure 0.1%

2%of vault · $49,4482%of vault · $46,6200.1%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· RedStone(composite)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USD₮063% LLTV0x10e8…5d78RedStone

Room to grow: $49,448 of $299,822 cap (16% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$23.41m11 vaultsToken:0x94e8…cf38Allocation: 2% of the vault · $49,448

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $49,448 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+3 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to12%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $354,993

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

RedStone·a 2/3 Safe multisigprices beHYPE, UBTC, kHYPE, WHYPE, wstHYPE, PT-kHYPE-13NOV2025, PT-kHYPE-19MAR20260xce77…30cf12% of vault · $354,993drainable if it is compromised


Full-deposit & protocol-level(3)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	1%	up to 88%	Instant
	1%	up to 88%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	1%	up to 88%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	1%	up to 88%	Instant
	1%	up to 14%	Instant
	—	up to 12%	Instant
	<1%	up to 7%	Instant
	0%	up to 6%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(4)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days
	—	0%	Instant

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Curator changes queued

The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.

raise a market's supply cap— applies now; no time to exit first
remove a market— applies now; no time to exit first

Owner4-of-6 multisig0x4a82…0b3a

Curator1-of-3 multisig0x18e4…f979

Guardiannone appointed

Allocators1 · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0xdd00…8f6c

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0x34ed…acba

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated Sep 29, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Felix USDT0

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle