⌘K

Yearn OG USDC V2

Risk reportBase0xe7d0…db42

Risk

Depositing into Yearn OG USDC V2 means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

19%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to <1% of deposit

Driven by superOETHb −30% <1% · YFI −30% <1% · cbBTC −30% <1% · −100% 88% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

cbXRPMarketChainlink75%of vault · bad debt · $259,367Oracle exposure 10%

85%of vault · $294,26175%of vault · $259,36710%separate path

What it's made of

cbXRP token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbXRP is priced via XRP / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseXRP / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDC63% LLTV0x031b…0fdeChainlink
→ USDC77% LLTV0x031b…0fdeChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$7.66m15 vaultsToken:0xcb58…a4afAllocation: 85% of the vault · $294,261

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $294,261 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 10% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

superOETHbMarketChainlink5%of vault · bad debt · $16,132Oracle exposure 0.5%

5%of vault · $17,9085%of vault · $16,1320.5%separate path

What it's made of

superOETHb token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

WETH is priced via ETH / USD, quoted in USDC / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0xfea2…afe4Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$78,5045 vaultsToken:0xdbfe…60a3Allocation: 5% of the vault · $17,908

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.4% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $17,908 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.5% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbDOGEMarketChainlink4%of vault · bad debt · $13,308Oracle exposure 0.6%

4%of vault · $15,5364%of vault · $13,3080.6%separate path

What it's made of

cbDOGE token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbDOGE is priced via DOGE / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseDOGE / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0xa9d3…91b2Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$400,89511 vaultsToken:0xcbd0…b510Allocation: 4% of the vault · $15,536

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $15,536 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.6% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

YFIMarketChainlink4%of vault · bad debt · $13,116Oracle exposure 0.4%

4%of vault · $14,5324%of vault · $13,1160.4%separate path

What it's made of

YFI token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0x61c5…3198Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$2,3423 vaultsToken:0x9eaf…b239Allocation: 4% of the vault · $14,532

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.3% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $14,532 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbLTCMarketChainlink1%of vault · bad debt · $5,032Oracle exposure 0.2%

2%of vault · $5,7791%of vault · $5,0320.2%separate path

What it's made of

cbLTC token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbLTC is priced via LTC / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseLTC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0x47f9…a00dChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$121,33311 vaultsToken:0xcb17…445fAllocation: 2% of the vault · $5,779

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $5,779 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+5 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed1 control point

Up to12%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $41,061

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink / RedStone·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbXRP, WETH, weETH, cbBTC, cbETH, cbDOGE, cbLTC, superOETHb, LBTC, YFI0xf0db…5b1b12% of vault · $41,061drainable if it is compromised


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	<1%	up to 88%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	<1%	up to 88%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(4)
	<1%	up to 88%	Instant
	<1%	up to 88%	Instant
	—	up to 12%	Instant
	<1%	up to 8%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner4-of-7 multisig0xfeae…e36f

Curator2-of-3 multisig0x90d0…6b51

Sentinels11 multisigSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

3-of-5 multisig0xbfaa…b02e

Allocators31 contract2 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0x50b7…a8fa
single key (EOA)0x75a1…780d
contract0xffb8…0862

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting TokenMORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

10 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

1 reading could not be refreshed this run.

Updated 11min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Yearn OG USDC V2

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle