Yearn Degen USDC

Risk reportKatana0xa2d3…b692

Risk

Depositing into Yearn Degen USDC means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

38%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 17% of deposit

Driven by stcUSD −30% 12% · vbWBTC −30% 5% · vbETH −30% <1% · other <1% · −100% 90% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

stcUSDMarketChainlink64%of vault · bad debt · $734,421.42Oracle exposure 7%

70%of vault · $811,267.1264%of vault · $734,421.427%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ vbUSDC86% LLTV0x832a…6f7aChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$84,858.893 vaultsToken:0x8888…8888Allocation: 70% of the vault · $811,267.12

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 12% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $811,267.12 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 7% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

vbWBTCMarketChainlink25%of vault · bad debt · $294,106.59Oracle exposure 3%

28%of vault · $327,717.5325%of vault · $294,106.593%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

vbWBTC uses Chainlink market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseChainlink market-rate feed pathQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ vbUSDC86% LLTV0xb60f…040eChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$2.5m17 vaultsToken:0x0913…cf52Allocation: 28% of the vault · $327,717.53

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 5% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $327,717.53 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

vbETHMarketChainlink0.7%of vault · bad debt · $7,917.34Oracle exposure 0.1%

0.8%of vault · $8,794.510.7%of vault · $7,917.340.1%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

vbETH uses Chainlink market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseChainlink market-rate feed pathQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ vbUSDC86% LLTV0xd423…bf47Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$102,955.4717 vaultsToken:0xee7d…ab62Allocation: 0.8% of the vault · $8,794.51

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $8,794.51 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

siUSDMarketChainlink0.2%of vault · bad debt · $2,398.56Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.2%of vault · $2,691.380.2%of vault · $2,398.56<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ vbUSDC86% LLTV0x0483…0837Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$292.371 vaultsToken:0x6894…f92dAllocation: 0.2% of the vault · $2,691.38

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2,691.38 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

avKATHybridChainlink0.1%of vault · bad debt · $937.03Oracle exposure 0.1%

0.1%of vault · $1,575.940.1%of vault · $937.030.1%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(composite)

avKAT is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg rather than a direct market-rate feed.

BaseExchange-rate/NAV pricing legQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ vbUSDC63% LLTV0xe8ba…d981Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$64,237.088 vaultsToken:0x7231…fcebAllocation: 0.1% of the vault · $1,575.94

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1,575.94 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

KATMarketChainlink0.1%of vault · bad debt · $854.92Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.1%of vault · $949.840.1%of vault · $854.92<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ vbUSDC63% LLTV0xf436…8800Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$2557 vaultsToken:0x7f1f…dc2dAllocation: 0.1% of the vault · $949.84

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $949.84 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+1 market with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to10%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $112,360.44

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink / RedStone·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices siUSD, stcUSD, KAT, vbWBTC, avKAT, weETH, vbETH0x0787…333410% of vault · $112,360.44drainable if it is compromised

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure, and every loss is a share of your deposit — the same percentage whatever you deposited. Loss is that share at a −30% collateral crash, the standard stress; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong, a conditional loss if it happens rather than a likelihood. Open a row for the loss at every crash depth, the dollar amounts, conditions, and the math.

12 scenarios · 10 with no time to exit · loss as % of deposit


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	17%	up to 90%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	17%	up to 90%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(6)
	17%	up to 90%	Instant
	17%	up to 90%	Instant
	17%	up to 90%	Instant
	—	up to 10%	Instant
	<1%	up to <1%	Instant
	0%	up to <1%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Curator change queued

The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.

set force deallocate penalty— applies in 4 days; time to exit first

Owner4-of-7 multisig0x518c…0149

Curator2-of-3 multisig0x90d0…6b51

Sentinels1 · 1 multisigSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

3-of-5 multisig0xe6ad…7162

Allocators2 · 2 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0x50b7…a8fa
single key (EOA)0x75a1…780d

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0x18b8…5d7c

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 254,036.33

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

10 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated Aug 13, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql