RockawayX USDC Yield

Risk reportEthereum0xe018…1965

Risk

Depositing into RockawayX USDC Yield means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

40%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 20% of deposit

Driven by PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 −30% 11% · wFalconX −30% 5% · mF-ONE −30% 2% · other 3% · −100% 89% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026HybridPTMarket rate46%of vault · bad debt · $8.85mOracle exposure 6%

52%of vault · $9.98m46%of vault · $8.85m6%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(composite)PTMarket rate

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 PT is priced by a Pendle market-rate oracle.

BaseOjo PT Feed Pendle Chainlink-compatible OracleNAV

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x217d…51f0

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$8.23m15 vaultsToken:0xecfa…3957Allocation: 52% of the vault · $9.98m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 11% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $9.98m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 6% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wFalconXHybrid23%of vault · bad debt · $4.31mOracle exposure 3%

25%of vault · $4.81m23%of vault · $4.31m3%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(composite)

AA_FalconXUSDC is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (Idle Tranches exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BaseIdle Tranches exchange rateExchange rate

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x52ea…93fc

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$2.3m8 vaultsToken:0x4614…8644Allocation: 25% of the vault · $4.81m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 5% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $4.81m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

mF-ONEMarket7%of vault · bad debt · $1.34mOracle exposure 0.8%

8%of vault · $1.49m7%of vault · $1.34m0.8%separate path

What it's made of

Market(composite)

mF-ONE is priced via mF-ONE/USD Discounted — market-rate feed.

BasemF-ONE/USD DiscountedMarket

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x0cb1…eb78

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$2.37m13 vaultsToken:0x238a…66baAllocation: 8% of the vault · $1.49m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.49m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.8% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PSTMarketChainlink7%of vault · bad debt · $1.26mOracle exposure 0.7%

7%of vault · $1.4m7%of vault · $1.26m0.7%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xa565…8ac0Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.8m4 vaultsToken:0x22ae…d4c7Allocation: 7% of the vault · $1.4m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.4m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.7% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

strUSDMarketRedStone / Chainlink6%of vault · bad debt · $1.23mOracle exposure 0.6%

7%of vault · $1.35m6%of vault · $1.23m0.6%separate path

What it's made of

Market· RedStone / Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x1506…a6a4RedStone / Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$723,989.453 vaultsToken:0x2808…5815Allocation: 7% of the vault · $1.35m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.35m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.6% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-strUSD-26NOV2026HybridRedStone / Chainlink0.4%of vault · bad debt · $79,991.54Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.5%of vault · $87,991.220.4%of vault · $79,991.54<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· RedStone / Chainlink(composite)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xdb6e…776dRedStone / Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$133,001.693 vaultsToken:0x7429…998fAllocation: 0.5% of the vault · $87,991.22

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $87,991.22 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PRIMEHybridChainlink<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $1,112.26Oracle exposure <0.1%

<0.1%of vault · $1,231.47<0.1%of vault · $1,112.26<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(aggregator)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x999e…119aChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$18.81m12 vaultsToken:0x19eb…f7f6Allocation: <0.1% of the vault · $1,231.47

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1,231.47 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wsrUSDHybridChronicle<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $129.06Oracle exposure <0.1%

<0.1%of vault · $142.94<0.1%of vault · $129.06<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chronicle(composite, managed)

wsrUSD uses a composite oracle path; verified external provider(s): Chronicle.

BaseComposite base price pathQuoteChronicle quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x938d…da15Chronicle

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.51m9 vaultsToken:0xd3fd…3094Allocation: <0.1% of the vault · $142.94

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $142.94 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+7 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

3 feeds · 3 control points

Up to11%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $2.04m

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink / RedStone·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices PRIME, PT-strUSD-26NOV2026, stcUSD, PST, savUSD, stUSDS, strUSD0x21f7…73ca1% of vault · $266,004.87drainable if it is compromised
RedStone / Chainlink·a 2/3 Safe multisigprices PT-strUSD-26NOV2026, stcUSD, strUSD0x6906…4472<1% of vault · $126,377.57drainable if it is compromised
Chronicle·a control contractprices wsrUSD0x40c3…172a<1% of vault · $13.88drainable if it is compromised
Unidentified feeds· vendor and on-chain control not resolvedprices PT-reUSD-10DEC2026, wFalconX, mF-ONE9% of vault · $1.78mmispriceable if these feeds lie

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure, and every loss is a share of your deposit — the same percentage whatever you deposited. Loss is that share at a −30% collateral crash, the standard stress; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong, a conditional loss if it happens rather than a likelihood. Open a row for the loss at every crash depth, the dollar amounts, conditions, and the math.

11 scenarios · 9 with no time to exit · loss as % of deposit


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	20%	up to 89%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	20%	up to 89%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	20%	up to 89%	Instant
	20%	up to 89%	Instant
	6%	up to 52%	Instant
	11%	up to 46%	Instant
	—	up to 11%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Curator change queued

The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.

increase timelock— applies now; no time to exit first

Owner3-of-7 multisig0xbbac…f918

Curator3-of-7 multisig0xbbac…f918

Sentinels1 · 1 multisigSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

1-of-4 multisig0x040e…3a47

Allocators4 · 4 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0x1cda…ba02
single key (EOA)0xbda6…f9e5
single key (EOA)0xdf75…334b
single key (EOA)0xac85…3a49

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 254,036.33

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

10 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated Aug 15, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql