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RockawayX USDC Yield

Risk reportEthereum0xe018…1965

Risk

Depositing into RockawayX USDC Yield means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

41%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 21% of deposit

Driven by PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 −30% 18% · fxSAVE −30% 1% · strUSD −30% <1% · other 1% · −100% 91% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026HybridPTMarket rate75%of vault · bad debt · $28.95mOracle exposure 8%

83%of vault · $31.99m75%of vault · $28.95m8%separate path

What it's made of

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 token page

Hybrid(composite)PTMarket rate

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 PT is priced by a Pendle market-rate oracle.

BaseOjo PT Feed Pendle Chainlink-compatible OracleNAV

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x217d…51f0

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$15.76m22 vaultsToken:0xecfa…3957Allocation: 83% of the vault · $31.99m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 18% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $31.99m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 8% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

fxSAVEHybrideOracle5%of vault · bad debt · $2.09mOracle exposure 0.5%

6%of vault · $2.27m5%of vault · $2.09m0.5%separate path

What it's made of

fxSAVE token page

Hybrid· eOracle(composite)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x1693…4440eOracle

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$2.2m7 vaultsToken:0x7743…fc39Allocation: 6% of the vault · $2.27m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2.27m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.5% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

strUSDMarketRedStone / Chainlink5%of vault · bad debt · $1.94mOracle exposure 0.5%

6%of vault · $2.14m5%of vault · $1.94m0.5%separate path

What it's made of

strUSD token page

Market· RedStone / Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x1506…a6a4RedStone / Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.23m3 vaultsToken:0x2808…5815Allocation: 6% of the vault · $2.14m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.9% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2.14m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.5% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

USPCMarketChainlink4%of vault · bad debt · $1.36mOracle exposure 0.4%

4%of vault · $1.5m4%of vault · $1.36m0.4%separate path

What it's made of

USPC token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0xbd74…4539Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.46m4 vaultsToken:0xbf4e…1a19Allocation: 4% of the vault · $1.5m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.8% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.5m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-strUSD-26NOV2026HybridRedStone / Chainlink1%of vault · bad debt · $390,681Oracle exposure 0.1%

1%of vault · $431,1241%of vault · $390,6810.1%separate path

What it's made of

PT-strUSD-26NOV2026 token page

Hybrid· RedStone / Chainlink(composite)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xdb6e…776dRedStone / Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$69,2303 vaultsToken:0x7429…998fAllocation: 1% of the vault · $431,124

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $431,124 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

etrUSDMarketRedStone / Chainlink0.3%of vault · bad debt · $97,777Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.3%of vault · $107,6690.3%of vault · $97,777<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

etrUSD token page

Market· RedStone / Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xf731…4dcfRedStone / Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$174,9493 vaultsToken:0x6f20…592dAllocation: 0.3% of the vault · $107,669

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $107,669 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-siUSD-7JAN2027Hybrid0.2%of vault · bad debt · $90,544Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.3%of vault · $99,9870.2%of vault · $90,544<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

PT-siUSD-7JAN2027 token page

Hybrid(composite)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xf9c1…7570

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$474,0515 vaultsToken:0x7654…5fd1Allocation: 0.3% of the vault · $99,987

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $99,987 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+13 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

3 feeds3 control points

Up to9%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $3.62m

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

RedStone / Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices etrUSD, PRIME, PT-strUSD-26NOV2026, stcUSD, PST, savUSD, oTFY, stUSDS, strUSD, USPC0x21f7…73ca1% of vault · $389,300drainable if it is compromised
RedStone / Chainlink·a 2/3 Safe multisigprices etrUSD, PT-strUSD-26NOV2026, stcUSD, oTFY, strUSD0x6906…4472<1% of vault · $251,825drainable if it is compromised
eOracle·a control contractprices fxSAVE0x9b54…dda4<1% of vault · $180,686drainable if it is compromised
Unidentified feeds· vendor and onchain control not resolvedprices PT-reUSD-10DEC2026, PT-siUSD-7JAN20278% of vault · $3.05mmispriceable if these feeds lie
Onchain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices syrupUSDC<1% of vault · $0.000000097mispriceable only via the issuing contract


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	21%	up to 91%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	21%	up to 91%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	21%	up to 91%	Instant
	21%	up to 91%	Instant
	8%	up to 83%	Instant
	18%	up to 75%	Instant
	—	up to 9%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Curator change queued

The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.

increase timelock— applies now; no time to exit first

Owner4-of-8 multisig0xbbac…f918

Curator4-of-8 multisig0xbbac…f918

Sentinels11 multisigSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

1-of-4 multisig0x040e…3a47

Allocators44 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0x1cda…ba02
single key (EOA)0xbda6…f9e5
single key (EOA)0xdf75…334b
single key (EOA)0xac85…3a49

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner6-of-1012 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting TokenMORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

10 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 43min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

RockawayX USDC Yield

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle