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RockawayX USDC Yield

Risk reportEthereum0xe018…1965

Risk

Depositing into RockawayX USDC Yield means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

38%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 19% of deposit

Driven by PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 −30% 10% · strUSD −30% 4% · siUSD −30% 2% · other 3% · −100% 86% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026HybridPTMarket rate42%of vault · bad debt · $8.79mOracle exposure 6%

47%of vault · $9.98m42%of vault · $8.79m6%separate path

What it's made of

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 token page

Hybrid(composite)PTMarket rate

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 PT is priced by a Pendle market-rate oracle.

BaseOjo PT Feed Pendle Chainlink-compatible OracleNAV

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x217d…51f0

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$17.63m22 vaultsToken:0xecfa…3957Allocation: 47% of the vault · $9.98m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 10% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $9.98m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 6% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

strUSDMarketRedStone / Chainlink21%of vault · bad debt · $4.44mOracle exposure 3%

24%of vault · $4.99m21%of vault · $4.44m3%separate path

What it's made of

strUSD token page

Market· RedStone / Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x1506…a6a4RedStone / Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.64m3 vaultsToken:0x2808…5815Allocation: 24% of the vault · $4.99m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 4% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $4.99m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

siUSDHybrid10%of vault · bad debt · $2.09mOracle exposure 2%

12%of vault · $2.46m10%of vault · $2.09m2%separate path

What it's made of

siUSD token page

Hybrid(composite)

siUSD is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (Chainlink-formatted InfiniFi RT Oracle, Dummy feed with 12 decimals, ERC4626 vault share-rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BaseChainlink-formatted InfiniFi RT OracleNAVQuoteDummy feed with 12 decimalsNAVBaseERC4626 vault share-rateVault

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0xd2cc…fa6d

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.32m17 vaultsToken:0xdbdc…9bcbAllocation: 12% of the vault · $2.46m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2.46m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

fxSAVEHybrideOracle9%of vault · bad debt · $1.9mOracle exposure 3%

12%of vault · $2.49m9%of vault · $1.9m3%separate path

What it's made of

fxSAVE token page

Hybrid· eOracle(composite)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x1693…4440eOracle

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$7.8m7 vaultsToken:0x7743…fc39Allocation: 12% of the vault · $2.49m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2.49m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-strUSD-26NOV2026HybridRedStone / Chainlink2%of vault · bad debt · $355,330Oracle exposure 0.4%

2%of vault · $440,8662%of vault · $355,3300.4%separate path

What it's made of

PT-strUSD-26NOV2026 token page

Hybrid· RedStone / Chainlink(composite)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xdb6e…776dRedStone / Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$161,6873 vaultsToken:0x7429…998fAllocation: 2% of the vault · $440,866

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.3% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $440,866 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

etrUSDMarketRedStone / Chainlink2%of vault · bad debt · $337,032Oracle exposure 0.3%

2%of vault · $409,3182%of vault · $337,0320.3%separate path

What it's made of

etrUSD token page

Market· RedStone / Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xf731…4dcfRedStone / Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$352,2593 vaultsToken:0x6f20…592dAllocation: 2% of the vault · $409,318

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.3% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $409,318 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PRIMEHybridChainlink1%of vault · bad debt · $235,062Oracle exposure 0.1%

1%of vault · $258,6371%of vault · $235,0620.1%separate path

What it's made of

PRIME token page

Hybrid· Chainlink(aggregator)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x999e…119aChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$21.04m14 vaultsToken:0x19eb…f7f6Allocation: 1% of the vault · $258,637

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $258,637 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

mF-ONEMarket0.2%of vault · bad debt · $42,263Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.2%of vault · $48,3910.2%of vault · $42,263<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

mF-ONE token page

Market(composite)

mF-ONE is priced via mF-ONE/USD Discounted — market-rate feed.

BasemF-ONE/USD DiscountedMarket

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x0cb1…eb78

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$2.87m14 vaultsToken:0x238a…66baAllocation: 0.2% of the vault · $48,391

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $48,391 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+9 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

4 feeds4 control points

Up to14%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $2.88m

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

RedStone / Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices etrUSD, PRIME, PT-strUSD-26NOV2026, stcUSD, PST, savUSD, oTFY, stUSDS, strUSD0x21f7…73ca3% of vault · $730,392drainable if it is compromised
RedStone / Chainlink·a 2/3 Safe multisigprices etrUSD, PT-strUSD-26NOV2026, stcUSD, oTFY, strUSD0x6906…44723% of vault · $706,817drainable if it is compromised
eOracle·a control contractprices fxSAVE0x9b54…dda43% of vault · $590,685drainable if it is compromised
Chronicle·a control contractprices wsrUSD0x40c3…172a<1% of vault · $0.70drainable if it is compromised
Unidentified feeds· vendor and onchain control not resolvedprices PT-reUSD-10DEC2026, siUSD, mF-ONE7% of vault · $1.56mmispriceable if these feeds lie
Onchain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices syrupUSDC<1% of vault · $0.000000097mispriceable only via the issuing contract


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	19%	up to 86%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	19%	up to 86%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	19%	up to 86%	Instant
	19%	up to 86%	Instant
	7%	up to 60%	Instant
	12%	up to 53%	Instant
	—	up to 14%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Curator changes queued

The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.

increase timelock— applies now; no time to exit first
raise a market's supply cap ×2— applies in 2 days; time to exit first

Owner4-of-8 multisig0xbbac…f918

Curator4-of-8 multisig0xbbac…f918

Sentinels11 multisigSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

1-of-4 multisig0x040e…3a47

Allocators44 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0x1cda…ba02
single key (EOA)0xbda6…f9e5
single key (EOA)0xdf75…334b
single key (EOA)0xac85…3a49

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner6-of-1012 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting Token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

10 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 58min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

RockawayX USDC Yield

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle