RockawayX USDC Yield

Risk reportEthereum0xe018…1965

Risk

Depositing into RockawayX USDC Yield means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

$7.06mrealistic worst · −50% collateral crashup to $18.39mSmart-contract bug · extreme only

−10%−30%−50%extreme

Left to right, a deeper collateral crash. Hover any point for the scenarios that drive the loss — only a smart-contract bug reaches a total loss.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest 15 Dec, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropvault-wide · no liquidations · stress estimate

−30%est. bad debt up to $3.45m

tap a preset or drag

Driven by PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 $2.04m · stUSDS $724,205 · wFalconX $545,512 · other $138,867 · −100% $16.09m modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026HybridPTMarket rate$8.68m47% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $1.3m

$9.98m54% of vault$8.68m47% of vault$1.3mseparate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(composite)PTMarket rate

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 PT is priced by a Pendle market-rate oracle.

BaseOjo PT Feed Pendle Chainlink-compatible OracleNAV

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x217d…51f0

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$4.6m14 vaultsToken:0xecfa…3957Allocation: $9.98m · 54% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $2.04mUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $9.98m · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $1.3m drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

stUSDSHybridChainlink$3.89m21% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $593,891

$4.49m24% of vault$3.89m21% of vault$593,891separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(aggregator)

stUSDS mixes exchange-rate/NAV (ERC4626 vault share-rate) with market-rate (USDS / USD, USDC / USD) — insulated from ERC4626 vault share-rate market deviation, but exposed to USDS / USD, USDC / USD.

BaseUSDS / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDC / USDMarketChainlinkBaseERC4626 vault share-rateVault

Heartbeat 23h · Deviation 30bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xba3d…9dd0Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$3.32m11 vaultsToken:0x99cd…eeb9Allocation: $4.49m · 24% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $724,205Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $4.49m · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $593,891 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wFalconXHybrid$2.32m13% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $252,064

$2.57m14% of vault$2.32m13% of vault$252,064separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(composite)

AA_FalconXUSDC is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (Idle Tranches exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BaseIdle Tranches exchange rateExchange rate

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x52ea…93fc

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.05m7 vaultsToken:0x4614…8644Allocation: $2.57m · 14% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $545,512Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2.57m · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $252,064 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

AA_FalconXUSDCHybrid$873,7525% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $126,322

$1m5% of vault$873,7525% of vault$126,322separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(composite)

AA_FalconXUSDC is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (Idle Tranches exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BaseIdle Tranches exchange rateExchange rate

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0x52ea…93fc

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$5.82m15 vaultsToken:0xc26a…f99cAllocation: $1m · 5% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $79,432Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1m · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $126,322 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PRIMEHybridChainlink$317,8662% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $31,046

$348,9122% of vault$317,8662% of vault$31,046separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(aggregator)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x999e…119aChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$11.83m10 vaultsToken:0x19eb…f7f6Allocation: $348,912 · 2% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $59,138Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $348,912 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $31,046 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wsrUSDHybridChronicle$1,265<0.1% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $123.76

$1,389<0.1% of vault$1,265<0.1% of vault$123.76separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chronicle(composite, managed)

wsrUSD uses a composite oracle path; verified external provider(s): Chronicle.

BaseComposite base price pathQuoteChronicle quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x938d…da15Chronicle

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.69m13 vaultsToken:0xd3fd…3094Allocation: $1,389 · <0.1% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $297.22Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1,389 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $123.76 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+5 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

2 feeds · 2 control points

Up to$2.3mdrainable if these feeds are mispriced · 13% of vault

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink / RedStone·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices PRIME, stcUSD, savUSD, stUSDS0x21f7…73ca$624,937 · 3% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised
Chronicle·a control contractprices wsrUSD0x40c3…172a$123.76 · <1% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised
Unidentified feeds· vendor and on-chain control not resolvedprices PT-reUSD-10DEC2026, wFalconX, AA_FalconXUSDC$1.68m · 9% of vaultmispriceable if these feeds lie

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure. Possible loss is the share of your deposit at the selected collateral drop; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong — a conditional loss if it happens, not a likelihood. Price-scaling rows move with the drop selector; the rest are fixed. Enter a deposit to see the dollar figures as your own. Open a row for conditions, mitigations, and the math.

10 scenarios · 8 with no time to exit

Collateral drop


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	$18.39m	Full deposit	Instant
	19%	$3.45m	up to $16.09m	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	19%	$3.45m	up to $16.09m	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(4)
	19%	$3.45m	up to $16.09m	Instant
	19%	$3.45m	up to $16.09m	Instant
	16%	$2.9m	up to $13.76m	Instant
	—	—	up to $2.3m	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	—	up to $9.19m	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Curator change queued

The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.

raise a market's supply cap ×9— applies in 2 days; time to exit first

Owner3-of-7 multisig0xbbac…f918

Curator3-of-7 multisig0xbbac…f918

Sentinels1 · 1 multisigSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

1-of-4 multisig0x040e…3a47

Allocators4 · 4 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0x1cda…ba02
single key (EOA)0xbda6…f9e5
single key (EOA)0xdf75…334b
single key (EOA)0xac85…3a49

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· 15 Dec, 2025report
Blackthorn· 4 Dec, 2025report
Spearbit· 4 Dec, 2025report
Blackthorn· 15 Sep, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer3-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 254,036

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

10 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 21 Jul, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql