Risk
Depositing into Keyrock RLUSD means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.
Left to right, a deeper collateral crash. Hover any point for the scenarios that drive the loss — only a smart-contract bug reaches a total loss.
Collateral & oracles
Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.
Driven by syrupUSDC $339,874 · weETH $309,171 · kBTC $237,565 · other $83,932 · −100% $4.84m modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling
weETHHybridChainlink$1.66m31% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $178,899$1.84m34% of vault$1.66m31% of vault$178,899separate path
weETH mixes exchange-rate/NAV (weETH / ETH) with market-rate (ETH / USD, RLUSD / USD) — insulated from weETH / ETH market deviation, but exposed to ETH / USD, RLUSD / USD.
- → RLUSD86% LLTV0x6ab3…110bChainlink
syrupUSDCHybridChainlink$1.45m27% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $154,955$1.6m30% of vault$1.45m27% of vault$154,955separate path
syrupUSDC mixes exchange-rate/NAV (ERC4626 vault share-rate) with market-rate (USDC / USD, RLUSD / USD) — insulated from ERC4626 vault share-rate market deviation, but exposed to USDC / USD, RLUSD / USD.
- → RLUSD92% LLTV0xf766…c1b5Chainlink
kBTCMarketChainlink$1.28m24% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $123,895$1.4m26% of vault$1.28m24% of vault$123,895separate path
kBTC is priced via BTC / USD, quoted in RLUSD / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).
- → RLUSD86% LLTV0xbcc3…5ddbChainlink
cbBTCMarketChainlink$451,1328% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $49,171$500,3039% of vault$451,1328% of vault$49,171separate path
cbBTC is priced via cbBTC / USD, quoted in RLUSD / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).
- → RLUSD86% LLTV0x8b36…45bdChainlink
Oracle dependencies
1 feed · 1 control pointUp to$506,919drainable if these feeds are mispriced · 9% of vault
Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.
- Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, weETH, kBTC, syrupUSDC0x21f7…73ca$506,919 · 9% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised
How you could lose money
Each row is a distinct failure. Possible loss is the share of your deposit at the selected collateral drop; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong — a conditional loss if it happens, not a likelihood. Price-scaling rows move with the drop selector; the rest are fixed. Enter a deposit to see the dollar figures as your own. Open a row for conditions, mitigations, and the math.
| Full-deposit & protocol-level(2) | |||||
| 100% | $5.34m | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| 18% | $970,541 | up to $4.84m | Instant | ||
| Price-driven collateral stress(1) | |||||
| 18% | $970,541 | up to $4.84m | Instant | ||
| Oracle & liquidation failures(4) | |||||
| 18% | $970,541 | up to $4.84m | Instant | ||
| 18% | $970,541 | up to $4.84m | Instant | ||
| 12% | $649,045 | up to $3.11m | Instant | ||
| — | — | up to $506,919 | Instant | ||
| Vault role & allocator(3) | |||||
| — | — | Full deposit | 3 days | ||
| — | — | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| — | — | up to $2.67m | 3 days | ||
Who you're trusting
The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.
The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.
Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land
Sentinels1 · 1 EOASafety role · veto only
Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.
- single key (EOA)0xeab6…3408
Allocators1 · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant
Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.
- single key (EOA)0xba75…83fd
- Certora· 15 Dec, 2025report
- Blackthorn· 4 Dec, 2025report
- Spearbit· 4 Dec, 2025report
- Blackthorn· 15 Sep, 2025report
Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.
Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).
No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.