Steakhouse High Yield USDC v1.1

Risk reportBase0xbeef…878f

Risk

Depositing into Steakhouse High Yield USDC v1.1 means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

$938,721realistic worst · −50% collateral crashup to $2.6mSmart-contract bug · extreme only

−10%−30%−50%extreme

Left to right, a deeper collateral crash. Hover any point for the scenarios that drive the loss — only a smart-contract bug reaches a total loss.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest 15 Dec, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropvault-wide · no liquidations · stress estimate

−30%est. bad debt up to $412,557

tap a preset or drag

Driven by cbBTC $240,277 · USDe $144,467 · WETH $24,309 · other $3,504 · −100% $2.34m modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

cbBTCMarketChainlink$1.29m50% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $152,425

$1.44m55% of vault$1.29m50% of vault$152,425separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbBTC is priced via BTC / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x663b…39b9Chainlink

Room to grow: $1.44m of $1.005b cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$196.31m73 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: $1.44m · 55% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $240,277Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.44m · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $152,425 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

USDeHybridChainlink$614,82424% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $72,539

$687,36326% of vault$614,82424% of vault$72,539separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(managed)

USDe uses a deviation/timelock managed oracle over Chainlink price-source leg(s), not a direct raw market-rate feed.

BaseDeviation/timelock managed oracle wrapperQuoteChainlink underlying price-source leg(s)

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0xf4b1…9a47Chainlink

Room to grow: $687,363 of $5.02m cap (14% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$26m4 vaultsToken:0x5d3a…ef34Allocation: $687,363 · 26% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $144,467Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $687,363 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $72,539 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

JitoSOLHybridChainlink$175,3947% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $19,272

$194,6667% of vault$175,3947% of vault$19,272separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(managed)

JitoSOL uses a deviation/timelock managed oracle over Chainlink price-source leg(s), not a direct raw market-rate feed.

BaseDeviation/timelock managed oracle wrapperQuoteChainlink underlying price-source leg(s)

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0x78f7…be1cChainlink

Room to grow: $194,666 of $1m cap (19% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$53,6115 vaultsToken:0x97be…34deAllocation: $194,666 · 7% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $194,666 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $19,272 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WETHMarketChainlink$130,6615% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $15,421

$146,0826% of vault$130,6615% of vault$15,421separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

WETH is priced via ETH / USD, quoted in USDC / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xfea2…afe4Chainlink

Room to grow: $146,082 of $10.05m cap (1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$63.89m53 vaultsToken:0x4200…0006Allocation: $146,082 · 6% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $24,309Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $146,082 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $15,421 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbDOGEMarketChainlink$60,0752% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $9,111

$69,1863% of vault$60,0752% of vault$9,111separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbDOGE is priced via DOGE / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseDOGE / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0xa9d3…91b2Chainlink

Room to grow: $69,186 of $5.02m cap (1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$298,3498 vaultsToken:0xcbd0…b510Allocation: $69,186 · 3% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $69,186 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $9,111 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbETHMarketChainlink$24,7151.0% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $2,928

$27,6421% of vault$24,7151.0% of vault$2,928separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbETH is priced via CBETH / ETH × ETH / USD, quoted in USDC / USD — 3-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseCBETH / ETHMarketChainlinkETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDC77% LLTV0x97ff…8295Chainlink
→ USDC86% LLTV0xb40d…cd96Chainlink

Room to grow: $27,642 of $110.54m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$18.36m67 vaultsToken:0x2ae3…ec22Allocation: $27,642 · 1% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $2,936Uses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $27,642 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $2,928 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

SOLMarketChainlink$14,2990.6% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $1,866

$16,1640.6% of vault$14,2990.6% of vault$1,866separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

SOL is priced via SOL / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseSOL / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0xe972…5dc7Chainlink

Room to grow: $16,164 of $20.1m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$435,6255 vaultsToken:0x3119…cf82Allocation: $16,164 · 0.6% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $16,164 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $1,866 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbADAMarketChainlink$10,9860.4% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $1,600

$12,5860.5% of vault$10,9860.4% of vault$1,600separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbADA is priced via ADA / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseADA / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDC63% LLTV0x35d8…e45fChainlink
→ USDC77% LLTV0x35d8…e45fChainlink

Room to grow: $12,586 of $13.06m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$324,1468 vaultsToken:0xcbad…7b8cAllocation: $12,586 · 0.5% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $12,586 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $1,600 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+7 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

2 feeds · 2 control points

Up to$277,006drainable if these feeds are mispriced · 11% of vault

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink / RedStone·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices wstETH, cbXRP, WETH, weETH, cbBTC, cbETH, cbADA, AERO, PT-USDai-18JUN2026-(ARB), cbLTC, SOL, USDe, cbDOGE, LBTC, JitoSOL0xf0db…5b1b$277,006 · 11% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised
RedStone / Chainlink·a 2/3 Safe multisigprices LBTC0x9b73…22b6$5.96 · <1% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure. Possible loss is the share of your deposit at the selected collateral drop; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong — a conditional loss if it happens, not a likelihood. Price-scaling rows move with the drop selector; the rest are fixed. Enter a deposit to see the dollar figures as your own. Open a row for conditions, mitigations, and the math.

12 scenarios · 10 with no time to exit

Collateral drop


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	$2.6m	Full deposit	Instant
	16%	$412,557	up to $2.34m	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	16%	$412,557	up to $2.34m	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	16%	$412,557	up to $2.34m	Instant
	16%	$411,208	up to $2.33m	Instant
	16%	$412,557	up to $2.06m	Instant
	6%	$144,478	up to $790,287	Instant
	—	—	up to $277,006	Instant
Vault role & allocator(4)
	—	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	—	up to $1.64m	Instant
	—	—	up to $1.3m	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner5-of-9 multisig0x0a0e…f8dd

Curator2-of-6 multisig0x827e…ecdb

Guardiancontract0xf894…621c

Allocators4 · 1 multisig · 2 contracts · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

1-of-6 multisig0x0000…9da8
contract0x08bb…1b00
contract0xa090…0467
single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· 15 Dec, 2025report
Blackthorn· 4 Dec, 2025report
Spearbit· 4 Dec, 2025report
Blackthorn· 15 Sep, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer3-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 254,036

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

12 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 19 Jul, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql