Gauntlet USDC Core
Risk reportEthereum0x8eb6…d458
Risk
Depositing into Gauntlet USDC Core means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.
Collateral and oracle exposure
Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.
Driven by AA_FalconXUSDC −30% 4% · LBTC −30% 3% · cbBTC −30% 2% · other 2% · −100% 91% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling
AA_FalconXUSDCHybrid45%of vault · bad debt · $2.6mOracle exposure 5%50%of vault · $2.91m45%of vault · $2.6m5%separate path
What it's made of
AA_FalconXUSDC is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (Idle Tranches exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.
- → USDC77% LLTV0x52ea…93fc
If it breaks
−30% default
LBTCMarketRedStone / Chainlink16%of vault · bad debt · $942,422.83Oracle exposure 1.0%17%of vault · $999,835.7416%of vault · $942,422.831.0%separate path
What it's made of
LBTC is priced via Redstone Price Feed × BTC / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (RedStone + Chainlink).
- → USDC86% LLTV0xdcc0…29dbRedStone / Chainlink
If it breaks
−30% default
cbBTCMarketChainlink12%of vault · bad debt · $724,318.31Oracle exposure 1%14%of vault · $802,283.8512%of vault · $724,318.311%separate path
What it's made of
cbBTC is priced via BTC / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).
- → USDC86% LLTV0xa6d6…182aChainlink
If it breaks
−30% default
tBTCHybridChainlink11%of vault · bad debt · $618,912.37Oracle exposure 1%12%of vault · $686,904.7311%of vault · $618,912.371%separate path
What it's made of
tBTC is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg ((unnamed feed), (unnamed feed)) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.
- → USDC77% LLTV0x57bf…ca5bChainlink
If it breaks
−30% default
weETHMarketChainlink / RedStone6%of vault · bad debt · $363,069.89Oracle exposure 0.7%7%of vault · $403,090.086%of vault · $363,069.890.7%separate path
What it's made of
weETH is priced via Redstone Price Feed — market-rate feed (RedStone).
- → USDC77% LLTV0xa3a7…8411Chainlink
- → USDC86% LLTV0x5635…6a68RedStone
If it breaks
−30% default
syrupUSDCHybrid0.3%of vault · bad debt · $16,533.49Oracle exposure <0.1%0.3%of vault · $18,376.150.3%of vault · $16,533.49<0.1%separate path
What it's made of
syrupUSDC is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (ERC4626 vault share-rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.
- → USDC92% LLTV0x8003…90cc
If it breaks
−30% default
WBTCMarketChainlink<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $81.47Oracle exposure <0.1%<0.1%of vault · $90.2<0.1%of vault · $81.47<0.1%separate path
What it's made of
WBTC is priced via WBTC / BTC × BTC / USD, quoted in USDC / USD — 3-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).
- → USDC86% LLTV0xdddd…6b83Chainlink
If it breaks
−30% default+2 markets with no current position
Oracle dependencies
2 feeds · 2 control pointsUp to9%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $550,892.43
Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.
- Chainlink / RedStone·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC, LBTC, weETH, stcUSD, tBTC0x21f7…73ca4% of vault · $243,399.75drainable if it is compromised
- RedStone / Chainlink·a 2/3 Safe multisigprices LBTC, weETH, stcUSD0x6906…44722% of vault · $97,433.12drainable if it is compromised
- Unidentified feeds· vendor and on-chain control not resolvedprices AA_FalconXUSDC5% of vault · $305,650.01mispriceable if these feeds lie
- On-chain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices syrupUSDC<1% of vault · $1,842.66mispriceable only via the issuing contract
Loss scenarios
Each row is a distinct failure, and every loss is a share of your deposit — the same percentage whatever you deposited. Loss is that share at a −30% collateral crash, the standard stress; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong, a conditional loss if it happens rather than a likelihood. Open a row for the loss at every crash depth, the dollar amounts, conditions, and the math.
| Full-deposit & protocol-level(2) | ||||
| 100% | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| 11% | up to 91% | Instant | ||
| Price-driven collateral stress(1) | ||||
| 11% | up to 91% | Instant | ||
| Oracle & liquidation failures(5) | ||||
| 11% | up to 91% | Instant | ||
| 11% | up to 90% | Instant | ||
| 7% | up to 68% | Instant | ||
| 6% | up to 61% | Instant | ||
| — | up to 9% | Instant | ||
| Vault role & allocator(4) | ||||
| — | Full deposit | 3 days | ||
| — | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| — | up to 50% | 3 days | ||
| — | 0% | Instant | ||
Trust and control
The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.
Vault operators
The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.
Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land
Allocators2 · 1 contract · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant
Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.
- single key (EOA)0xcc14…6acb
- contract0xfd32…c75d
Audits
- Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
- Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
- Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
- Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report
Governance & control
Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.
Dependencies that can affect your deposit
10 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.
Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).
No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.