Gauntlet USDC Core
Risk reportEthereum0x8eb6…d458
Risk
Depositing into Gauntlet USDC Core means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.
Left to right, a deeper collateral crash. Hover any point for the scenarios that drive the loss — only a smart-contract bug reaches a total loss.
Collateral and oracle exposure
Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.
Driven by AA_FalconXUSDC $237,177 · weETH $146,754 · LBTC $87,630 · other $63,720 · −100% $5.39m modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling
AA_FalconXUSDCHybrid$2.61m41% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $578,573$3.19m50% of vault$2.61m41% of vault$578,573separate path
What it's made of
AA_FalconXUSDC is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (Idle Tranches exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.
- → USDC77% LLTV0x52ea…93fc
If it breaks
vault −30%
weETHMarketRedStone / Chainlink$1.61m25% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $249,592$1.86m29% of vault$1.61m25% of vault$249,592separate path
What it's made of
weETH mixes exchange-rate/NAV (weETH/ETH exchange rate, Dummy feed with 12 decimals) with market-rate (ETH / USD) — insulated from weETH/ETH exchange rate, Dummy feed with 12 decimals market deviation, but exposed to ETH / USD.
- → USDC86% LLTV0x5635…6a68RedStone
- → USDC77% LLTV0xa3a7…8411Chainlink
If it breaks
vault −30%
tBTCHybridChainlink$700,92511% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $104,341$805,26513% of vault$700,92511% of vault$104,341separate path
What it's made of
tBTC is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg ((unnamed feed), (unnamed feed)) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.
- → USDC77% LLTV0x57bf…ca5bChainlink
If it breaks
vault −30%
LBTCMarketRedStone / Chainlink$471,0117% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $50,203$521,2148% of vault$471,0117% of vault$50,203separate path
What it's made of
LBTC is priced via Redstone Price Feed × BTC / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (RedStone + Chainlink).
- → USDC86% LLTV0xdcc0…29dbRedStone / Chainlink
If it breaks
vault −30%+5 markets with no current position
Oracle dependencies
2 feeds · 2 control pointsUp to$982,709drainable if these feeds are mispriced · 15% of vault
Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.
- Chainlink / RedStone·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC, LBTC, weETH, stcUSD, tBTC0x21f7…73ca$404,136 · 6% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised
- RedStone / Chainlink·a 2/3 Safe multisigprices LBTC, weETH, stcUSD0x6906…4472$299,795 · 5% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised
- Unidentified feeds· vendor and on-chain control not resolvedprices AA_FalconXUSDC$578,573 · 9% of vaultmispriceable if these feeds lie
- On-chain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices syrupUSDC$0.0029 · <1% of vaultmispriceable only via the issuing contract
Loss scenarios
Each row is a distinct failure. Possible loss is the share of your deposit at the selected collateral drop; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong — a conditional loss if it happens, not a likelihood. Price-scaling rows move with the drop selector; the rest are fixed. Enter a deposit to see the dollar figures as your own. Open a row for conditions, mitigations, and the math.
| Full-deposit & protocol-level(2) | |||||
| 100% | $6.37m | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| 8% | $535,282 | up to $5.39m | Instant | ||
| Price-driven collateral stress(1) | |||||
| 8% | $535,282 | up to $5.39m | Instant | ||
| Oracle & liquidation failures(4) | |||||
| 8% | $535,282 | up to $5.39m | Instant | ||
| 8% | $534,765 | up to $5.39m | Instant | ||
| 7% | $447,135 | up to $4.92m | Instant | ||
| — | — | up to $982,709 | Instant | ||
| Vault role & allocator(4) | |||||
| — | — | Full deposit | 3 days | ||
| — | — | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| — | — | up to $3.19m | 3 days | ||
| — | — | $0 | Instant | ||
Trust and control
The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.
Vault operators
The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.
Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land
Allocators2 · 1 contract · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant
Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.
- single key (EOA)0xcc14…6acb
- contract0xfd32…c75d
Audits
- Certora· 15 Dec, 2025report
- Blackthorn· 4 Dec, 2025report
- Spearbit· 4 Dec, 2025report
- Blackthorn· 15 Sep, 2025report
Governance & control
Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.
Dependencies that can affect your deposit
10 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.
Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).
No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.