Yearn OG USDC

Risk reportBase0xef41…5d03

Risk

Depositing into Yearn OG USDC means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

18%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to <1% of deposit

Driven by cbXRP −30% <1% · cbETH −30% <1% · YFI −30% <1% · −100% 89% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

cbXRPMarketChainlink85%of vault · bad debt · $1.53mOracle exposure 10%

95%of vault · $1.71m85%of vault · $1.53m10%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbXRP is priced via XRP / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseXRP / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDC63% LLTV0x031b…0fdeChainlink
→ USDC77% LLTV0x031b…0fdeChainlink

Room to grow: $1.71m of $5.5m cap (31% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$4.81m12 vaultsToken:0xcb58…a4afAllocation: 95% of the vault · $1.71m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $1.71m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 10% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbDOGEMarketChainlink3%of vault · bad debt · $46,322.75Oracle exposure 0.5%

3%of vault · $54,830.553%of vault · $46,322.750.5%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbDOGE is priced via DOGE / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseDOGE / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0xa9d3…91b2Chainlink

Room to grow: $54,830.55 of $999,898.15 cap (5% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$229,512.848 vaultsToken:0xcbd0…b510Allocation: 3% of the vault · $54,830.55

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $54,830.55 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.5% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbLTCMarketChainlink1.0%of vault · bad debt · $17,370.7Oracle exposure 0.3%

1%of vault · $21,901.691.0%of vault · $17,370.70.3%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbLTC is priced via LTC / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseLTC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0x47f9…a00dChainlink

Room to grow: $21,901.69 of $999,898.15 cap (2% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$75,252.548 vaultsToken:0xcb17…445fAllocation: 1% of the vault · $21,901.69

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $21,901.69 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbETHMarketChainlink0.2%of vault · bad debt · $2,755.06Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.2%of vault · $3,057.70.2%of vault · $2,755.06<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbETH is priced via CBETH / ETH × ETH / USD, quoted in USDC / USD — 3-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseCBETH / ETHMarketChainlinkETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDC77% LLTV0x97ff…8295Chainlink
→ USDC86% LLTV0xb40d…cd96Chainlink

Room to grow: $3,057.7 of $20m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$76.12m59 vaultsToken:0x2ae3…ec22Allocation: 0.2% of the vault · $3,057.7

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $3,057.7 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

YFIMarketChainlink<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $825.46Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.1%of vault · $914.63<0.1%of vault · $825.46<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0x61c5…3198Chainlink

Room to grow: $914.63 of $199,979.63 cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$2,312.353 vaultsToken:0x9eaf…b239Allocation: 0.1% of the vault · $914.63

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $914.63 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+4 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to11%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $197,527.34

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink / RedStone·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbXRP, WETH, cbBTC, cbETH, cbDOGE, cbLTC, superOETHb, LBTC, YFI0xf0db…5b1b11% of vault · $197,527.34drainable if it is compromised

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure, and every loss is a share of your deposit — the same percentage whatever you deposited. Loss is that share at a −30% collateral crash, the standard stress; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong, a conditional loss if it happens rather than a likelihood. Open a row for the loss at every crash depth, the dollar amounts, conditions, and the math.

11 scenarios · 9 with no time to exit · loss as % of deposit


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	<1%	up to 89%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	<1%	up to 89%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(4)
	<1%	up to 89%	Instant
	<1%	up to 89%	Instant
	—	up to 11%	Instant
	<1%	up to <1%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(4)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days
	—	up to <1%	Instant

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner4-of-7 multisig0xfeae…e36f

Curator2-of-3 multisig0x90d0…6b51

Guardian3-of-5 multisig0xbfaa…b02e

Allocators4 · 2 contracts · 2 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

contract0xffb8…0862
contract0xa090…0467
single key (EOA)0x75a1…780d
single key (EOA)0x50b7…a8fa

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.56m

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

11 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated Sep 4, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql