⌘K

Grove x Steakhouse High Yield AUSD

Risk reportMonad0x3284…476d

Risk

Depositing into Grove x Steakhouse High Yield AUSD means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

25%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 14-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 10% of deposit

Driven by WETH −30% 3% · wstETH −30% 2% · WBTC −30% 2% · other 2% · −100% 63% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

WMONMarketChronicle23%of vault · bad debt · $21,010Oracle exposure 2%

24%of vault · $22,62823%of vault · $21,0102%separate path

What it's made of

WMON token page

Market· Chronicle(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ AUSD77% LLTV0x409b…02efChronicle

Room to grow: $22,628 of $19.98m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$623,6406 vaultsToken:0x3bd3…433aAllocation: 24% of the vault · $22,628

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $22,628 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WETHMarketChronicle16%of vault · bad debt · $14,436Oracle exposure 13%

29%of vault · $26,63216%of vault · $14,43613%separate path

What it's made of

WETH token page

Market· Chronicle(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ AUSD86% LLTV0xd8a9…76a3Chronicle

Room to grow: $26,632 of $49.94m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$69,4277 vaultsToken:0xee8c…1242Allocation: 29% of the vault · $26,632

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 3% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $26,632 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 13% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChronicle13%of vault · bad debt · $11,704Oracle exposure 11%

23%of vault · $21,58113%of vault · $11,70411%separate path

What it's made of

wstETH token page

Market· Chronicle(aggregator)

wstETH uses Chronicle market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseChronicle market-rate feed pathQuoteChronicle quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ AUSD86% LLTV0xe6e7…a2c4Chronicle

Room to grow: $21,581 of $19.98m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$8.87m9 vaultsToken:0x10ae…5417Allocation: 23% of the vault · $21,581

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $21,581 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 11% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WBTCMarketChronicle12%of vault · bad debt · $11,077Oracle exposure 9%

21%of vault · $19,66912%of vault · $11,0779%separate path

What it's made of

WBTC token page

Market· Chronicle(aggregator)

WBTC uses Chronicle market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseChronicle market-rate feed pathQuoteChronicle quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ AUSD86% LLTV0xda77…c73cChronicle

Room to grow: $19,669 of $49.94m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$170,8887 vaultsToken:0x0555…2b9cAllocation: 21% of the vault · $19,669

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $19,669 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 9% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

Unallocatednot lent into any market — no collateral exposure3% · $2,349

3%of vault · $2,349——

+1 market with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed1 control point

Up to35%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $32,283

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chronicle·a control contractprices WMON, wstETH, WETH, WBTC0xb3bf…47b035% of vault · $32,283drainable if it is compromised


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	10%	up to 63%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	10%	up to 63%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(3)
	10%	up to 63%	Instant
	10%	up to 63%	Instant
	—	up to 35%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(4)
	—	Full deposit	14 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	14 days
	—	up to 46%	Instant

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 14 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner5-of-10 multisig0x0a0e…f8dd

Curator3-of-9 multisig0x827e…ecdb

Guardian3-of-9 multisig0x827e…ecdb

Allocators71 multisig3 contracts3 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

contract0xbeef…beef
single key (EOA)0x7a17…4e8d
single key (EOA)0xfc58…d827
1-of-7 multisig0x0000…9da8
contract0xed13…e9c3
contract0xfd70…7302
single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xe27f…e558

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting TokenMORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 56min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Grove x Steakhouse High Yield AUSD

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle