STEAKUSDCRisk · Ethereum

Risk

Depositing into STEAKUSDC means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho Blue

ethereumVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

$34.06mrealistic worst · −50% collateral crashup to $94.88mSmart-contract bug · extreme only

−10%−30%−50%extreme

Left to right, a deeper collateral crash. Hover any point for the scenarios that drive the loss — only a smart-contract bug reaches a total loss.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 7-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest 15 Dec, 2025

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropvault-wide · no liquidations · stress estimate

−30%est. bad debt up to $15.05m

tap a preset or drag

Driven by cbBTC $12.52m · wstETH $1.25m · WBTC $1.15m · other $132,625 · −100% $81.6m modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

cbBTCMarketChainlink$67.28m71% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $11.01m

$78.29m83% of vault$67.28m71% of vault$11.01mseparate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(managed, aggregator)

cbBTC is priced via BTC / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 1h · Deviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDC86% LLTV0x9f98…34d2Chainlink
→ USDC86% LLTV0xa6d6…182aChainlink

Room to grow: $78.29m of $2b cap (4% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$287.86m147 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: $78.29m · 83% of the vault

If it breaksvault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $12.52mUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $78.29m · inherits vault-wide stressOracle exposure: up to $11.01m drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChainlink$6.73m7% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $1.06m

$7.79m8% of vault$6.73m7% of vault$1.06mseparate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(composite)

wstETH is priced via Custom price feed for wstETH / ETH, quoted in USDC / ETH — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseCustom price feed for wstETH / ETHMarketQuoteUSDC / ETHMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 100bps

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDC86% LLTV0xe087…9f9fChainlink
→ USDC86% LLTV0x48f7…40e2Chainlink

Room to grow: $7.79m of $399.94m cap (2% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$591.73m163 vaultsToken:0x7f39…2ca0Allocation: $7.79m · 8% of the vault

If it breaksvault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $1.25mUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $7.79m · inherits vault-wide stressOracle exposure: up to $1.06m drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WBTCMarketChainlink$6.16m6% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $983,246

$7.14m8% of vault$6.16m6% of vault$983,246separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator, managed)

WBTC uses a deviation/timelock managed oracle over Chainlink price-source leg(s), not a direct raw market-rate feed.

BaseWBTC / BTCMarketChainlinkBTC / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDC86% LLTV0xdddd…6b83Chainlink
→ USDC86% LLTV0xf156…0cf4Chainlink

Room to grow: $7.14m of $399.94m cap (2% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$431.75m144 vaultsToken:0x2260…c599Allocation: $7.14m · 8% of the vault

If it breaksvault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $1.15mUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $7.14m · inherits vault-wide stressOracle exposure: up to $983,246 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

weETHHybridChainlink$1.41m1% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $220,813

$1.63m2% of vault$1.41m1% of vault$220,813separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(composite)

weETH mixes exchange-rate/NAV (weETH/ETH exchange rate, Dummy feed with 12 decimals) with market-rate (ETH / USD) — insulated from weETH/ETH exchange rate, Dummy feed with 12 decimals market deviation, but exposed to ETH / USD.

BaseweETH/ETH exchange rateExchange rateETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteDummy feed with 12 decimalsNAV

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0xa3a7…8411Chainlink

Room to grow: $1.63m of $20m cap (8% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$290.73m105 vaultsToken:0xcd5f…b7eeAllocation: $1.63m · 2% of the vault

If it breaksvault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $128,528Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.63m · inherits vault-wide stressOracle exposure: up to $220,813 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WETHMarketChainlink$22,020<0.1% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $3,540

$25,561<0.1% of vault$22,020<0.1% of vault$3,540separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

WETH is priced via ETH / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseETH / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x0f94…4580Chainlink

Room to grow: $25,561 of $199.97m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.298b95 vaultsToken:0xc02a…6cc2Allocation: $25,561 · <0.1% of the vault

If it breaksvault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $4,097Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $25,561 · inherits vault-wide stressOracle exposure: up to $3,540 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+1 market with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to$13.28mdrainable if these feeds are mispriced · 14% of vault

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC, wstETH, WETH, weETH, steakEURCV0x21f7…73ca$13.28m · 14% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised

Each row is a distinct failure. Possible loss is the share of your deposit at the selected collateral drop; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong — a conditional loss if it happens, not a likelihood. Price-scaling rows move with the drop selector; the rest are fixed. Enter a deposit to see the dollar figures as your own. Open a row for conditions, mitigations, and the math.

11 scenarios · 9 with no time to exit

Collateral drop


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	$94.88m	Full deposit	Instant
	16%	$15.05m	up to $81.6m	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	16%	$15.05m	up to $81.6m	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(4)
	16%	$15.05m	up to $81.6m	Instant
	15%	$14.43m	up to $78.28m	Instant
	—	—	up to $13.28m	Instant
	<1%	$286,395	up to $2.26m	Instant
Vault role & allocator(4)
	—	—	Full deposit	7 days
	—	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	—	up to $81.6m	Instant
	—	—	up to $47.44m	7 days

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 7 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner5-of-10 multisig0x0a0e…f8dd

Curator2-of-6 multisig0x827e…ecdb

Guardiancontract0xaa05…c03d

Allocators4 · 1 multisig · 2 contracts · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

1-of-7 multisig0x0000…9da8
contract0x9e91…f9e1
single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a
contract0xfd32…c75d

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· 15 Dec, 2025report
Blackthorn· 4 Dec, 2025report
Spearbit· 4 Dec, 2025report
Blackthorn· 15 Sep, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer3-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 254,036

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit · 9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control — select one for its story

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 6 Jul, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

STEAKUSDCRisk · Ethereum

Risk

Collateral & oracles

Oracle dependencies

How you could lose money

Who you're trusting

Market Specific oracle