Steakhouse USDC

Risk reportEthereum0xbeef…64cb

Risk

Depositing into Steakhouse USDC means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

38%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 7-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 18% of deposit

Driven by cbBTC −30% 8% · steakEURCV −30% 4% · WBTC −30% 4% · other 2% · −100% 90% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

cbBTCMarketChainlink45%of vault · bad debt · $30.38mOracle exposure 5%

50%of vault · $33.69m45%of vault · $30.38m5%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(managed, aggregator)

cbBTC is priced via BTC / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 1h · Deviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDC86% LLTV0x9f98…34d2Chainlink
→ USDC86% LLTV0xa6d6…182aChainlink

Room to grow: $33.69m of $2b cap (2% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$407.3m153 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: 50% of the vault · $33.69m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 8% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $33.69m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 5% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WBTCMarketChainlink19%of vault · bad debt · $13.03mOracle exposure 2%

21%of vault · $14.45m19%of vault · $13.03m2%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator, managed)

WBTC uses a deviation/timelock managed oracle over Chainlink price-source leg(s), not a direct raw market-rate feed.

BaseWBTC / BTCMarketChainlinkBTC / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDC86% LLTV0xdddd…6b83Chainlink
→ USDC86% LLTV0xf156…0cf4Chainlink

Room to grow: $14.45m of $399.95m cap (4% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$415.82m140 vaultsToken:0x2260…c599Allocation: 21% of the vault · $14.45m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 4% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $14.45m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

steakEURCVMarketChainlink15%of vault · bad debt · $10.48mOracle exposure 2%

17%of vault · $11.63m15%of vault · $10.48m2%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0xf3ef…b0f6Chainlink

Room to grow: $11.38m of $25m cap (46% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.25m3 vaultsToken:0xbeef…db2fAllocation: 17% of the vault · $11.63m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 4% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $11.63m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChainlink10%of vault · bad debt · $6.77mOracle exposure 1%

11%of vault · $7.5m10%of vault · $6.77m1%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(composite)

wstETH is priced via Custom price feed for wstETH / ETH, quoted in USDC / ETH — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseCustom price feed for wstETH / ETHMarketQuoteUSDC / ETHMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 100bps

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDC86% LLTV0xe087…9f9fChainlink
→ USDC86% LLTV0x48f7…40e2Chainlink

Room to grow: $7.5m of $399.95m cap (2% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$995.5m162 vaultsToken:0x7f39…2ca0Allocation: 11% of the vault · $7.5m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $7.5m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WETHMarketChainlink0.7%of vault · bad debt · $460,289.75Oracle exposure 0.1%

0.8%of vault · $510,875.50.7%of vault · $460,289.750.1%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

WETH is priced via ETH / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseETH / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x0f94…4580Chainlink

Room to grow: $510,875.5 of $199.98m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.742b89 vaultsToken:0xc02a…6cc2Allocation: 0.8% of the vault · $510,875.5

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $510,875.5 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

weETHHybridChainlink<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $9,882.1Oracle exposure <0.1%

<0.1%of vault · $10,917.34<0.1%of vault · $9,882.1<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(composite)

weETH mixes exchange-rate/NAV (weETH/ETH exchange rate, Dummy feed with 12 decimals) with market-rate (ETH / USD) — insulated from weETH/ETH exchange rate, Dummy feed with 12 decimals market deviation, but exposed to ETH / USD.

BaseweETH/ETH exchange rateExchange rateETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteDummy feed with 12 decimalsNAV

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDC86% LLTV0xa3a7…8411Chainlink
→ USDC77% LLTV0xa3a7…8411Chainlink

Room to grow: $10,917.34 of $119.99m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$176.67m102 vaultsToken:0xcd5f…b7eeAllocation: <0.1% of the vault · $10,917.34

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $10,917.34 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

FLHYonHybridChainlink<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $40.03Oracle exposure <0.1%

<0.1%of vault · $44.4<0.1%of vault · $40.03<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(managed)

FLHYon uses a deviation/timelock managed oracle over Chainlink price-source leg(s), not a direct raw market-rate feed.

BaseDeviation/timelock managed oracle wrapperQuoteChainlink underlying price-source leg(s)

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xd703…49d1Chainlink

Room to grow: $44.4 of $10m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$5.829 vaultsToken:0x54c1…ef24Allocation: <0.1% of the vault · $44.4

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $44.4 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to10%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $6.67m

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC, wstETH, FLHYon, WETH, weETH, steakEURCV0x21f7…73ca10% of vault · $6.67mdrainable if it is compromised


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	18%	up to 90%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	18%	up to 90%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	18%	up to 90%	Instant
	17%	up to 88%	Instant
	—	up to 10%	Instant
	<1%	up to <1%	Instant
	<1%	up to <1%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(4)
	—	Full deposit	7 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 82%	Instant
	—	up to 50%	7 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 7 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner5-of-10 multisig0x0a0e…f8dd

Curator2-of-7 multisig0x827e…ecdb

Guardiancontract0xaa05…c03d

Allocators6 · 1 multisig · 2 contracts · 3 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0x7a17…4e8d
single key (EOA)0xfc58…d827
1-of-7 multisig0x0000…9da8
contract0x9e91…f9e1
single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a
contract0xfd32…c75d

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.56m

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated Sep 11, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Steakhouse USDC

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle