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Moonwell Flagship USDC

Risk reportBase0xc125…a2ca

Risk

Depositing into Moonwell Flagship USDC means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

38%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 4-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 17% of deposit

Driven by WETH −30% 16% · wstETH −30% <1% · cbBTC −30% <1% · other <1% · −100% 90% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

WETHMarketChainlink86%of vault · bad debt · $2.16mOracle exposure 9%

96%of vault · $2.39m86%of vault · $2.16m9%separate path

What it's made of

WETH token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

WETH is priced via ETH / USD, quoted in USDC / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xfea2…afe4Chainlink

Room to grow: $2.39m of $49.99m cap (5% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$41.98m34 vaultsToken:0x4200…0006Allocation: 96% of the vault · $2.39m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 16% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2.39m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 9% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChainlink4%of vault · bad debt · $97,552Oracle exposure 0.4%

4%of vault · $108,0424%of vault · $97,5520.4%separate path

What it's made of

wstETH token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

wstETH is priced via WSTETH / ETH × ETH / USD, quoted in USDC / USD — 3-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseWSTETH / ETHMarketChainlinkETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xd7a1…289aChainlink

Room to grow: $108,042 of $29.99m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$25.73m34 vaultsToken:0xc1cb…e452Allocation: 4% of the vault · $108,042

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.7% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $108,042 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbBTCMarketChainlink0.1%of vault · bad debt · $1,712Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.1%of vault · $1,8980.1%of vault · $1,712<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

cbBTC token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbBTC is priced via BTC / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x663b…39b9Chainlink

Room to grow: $1,898 of $99.98m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$193.8m53 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: 0.1% of the vault · $1,898

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1,898 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbETHMarketChainlink<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $32.76Oracle exposure <0.1%

<0.1%of vault · $36.31<0.1%of vault · $32.76<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

cbETH token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbETH is priced via CBETH / ETH × ETH / USD, quoted in USDC / USD — 3-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseCBETH / ETHMarketChainlinkETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xb40d…cd96Chainlink

Room to grow: $36.31 of $49.99m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$15.28m44 vaultsToken:0x2ae3…ec22Allocation: <0.1% of the vault · $36.31

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $36.31 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

Oracle dependencies

1 feed1 control point

Up to10%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $242,414

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices wstETH, WETH, cbBTC, cbETH0xf0db…5b1b10% of vault · $242,414drainable if it is compromised


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	17%	up to 90%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	17%	up to 90%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(4)
	17%	up to 90%	Instant
	17%	up to 90%	Instant
	17%	up to 90%	Instant
	—	up to 10%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(4)
	—	Full deposit	4 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 90%	Instant
	—	up to 50%	4 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 4 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Curator change queued

The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.

change safety config— applies now; no time to exit first

Ownercontract0x8b62…7d51

Curator2-of-4 multisig0x08ed…fc05

Guardian3-of-5 multisig0xb9d4…ab38

Allocators11 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0x09f9…eadc

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting TokenMORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

10 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

1 reading could not be refreshed this run.

Updated 29min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Moonwell Flagship USDC

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle