Gauntlet USDC Core (Arbitrum) Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 17% of deposit

Driven by WBTC −30% 13% · sUSDS −30% 3% · wstETH −30% 2% · −100% 90% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

WBTCMarketChainlink68%of vault · bad debt · $251,494Oracle exposure 7%

76%of vault · $279,19468%of vault · $251,4947%separate path

What it's made of

WBTC token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

WBTC uses Chainlink market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseChainlink market-rate feed pathQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x8819…14d9Chainlink

Room to grow: $279,194 of $15m cap (2% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$48.47m12 vaultsToken:0x2f2a…5b0fAllocation: 76% of the vault · $279,194

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 13% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $279,194 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 7% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChainlink12%of vault · bad debt · $44,727Oracle exposure 1%

13%of vault · $49,72812%of vault · $44,7271%separate path

What it's made of

wstETH token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

wstETH uses Chainlink market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseChainlink market-rate feed pathQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x8e02…ae31Chainlink

Room to grow: $49,728 of $20m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$59.58m12 vaultsToken:0x5979…0529Allocation: 13% of the vault · $49,728

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $49,728 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

sUSDSHardcodedChainlink10%of vault · bad debt · $36,642Oracle exposure 1%

11%of vault · $40,65310%of vault · $36,6421%separate path

What it's made of

sUSDS token page

Hardcoded· Chainlink(aggregator)

Price is fixed and won't move on a real depeg — divergence accrues as bad debt.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC95% LLTV0x52cc…7124Chainlink

Room to grow: $40,653 of $15m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$17,56110 vaultsToken:0xddb4…7610Allocation: 11% of the vault · $40,653

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 3% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $40,653 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+2 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed1 control point

Up to10%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $36,713

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices wstETH, syrupUSDC, WBTC, sUSDS, PT-USDai-18JUN20260x2f3b…d3c59% of vault · $32,702drainable if it is compromised

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure, and every loss is a share of your deposit — the same percentage whatever you deposited. Loss is that share at a −30% collateral crash, the standard stress; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong, a conditional loss if it happens rather than a likelihood. Open a row for the loss at every crash depth, the dollar amounts, conditions, and the math.

13 scenarios · 11 with no time to exit · loss as % of deposit


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	17%	up to 90%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	17%	up to 90%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(6)
	17%	up to 90%	Instant
	17%	up to 90%	Instant
	17%	up to 90%	Instant
	1%	up to 11%	Instant
	—	up to 10%	Instant
	3%	up to 10%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(4)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days
	—	0%	Instant

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner4-of-7 multisig0x5a4e…d4d0

Curator3-of-7 multisig0x9e33…0585

Guardian3-of-7 multisig0x7084…84cd

Allocators21 contract1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0xed4d…ab64
contract0x7695…355e

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xfd35…d9b2

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting TokenMORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

10 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.