Gauntlet EURC Balanced

Risk reportBase0x94af…778d

Risk

Depositing into Gauntlet EURC Balanced means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

36%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 16% of deposit

Driven by cbBTC −30% 13% · wstETH −30% 2% · cbETH −30% <1% · other <1% · −100% 86% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

cbBTCMarketChainlink72%of vault · bad debt · $911,266Oracle exposure 12%

84%of vault · $1.06m72%of vault · $911,26612%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbBTC is priced via BTC / USD, quoted in EUR / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteEUR / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ EURC86% LLTV0xa857…d799Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$244.97m51 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: 84% of the vault · $1.06m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 13% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.06m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 12% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChainlink12%of vault · bad debt · $147,714Oracle exposure 2%

14%of vault · $173,61412%of vault · $147,7142%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

wstETH is priced via WSTETH / ETH × ETH / USD, quoted in EUR / USD — 3-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseWSTETH / ETHMarketChainlinkETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteEUR / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ EURC86% LLTV0xa541…54f4Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$30.85m33 vaultsToken:0xc1cb…e452Allocation: 14% of the vault · $173,614

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $173,614 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbETHHybridChainlink2%of vault · bad debt · $19,124Oracle exposure 0.2%

2%of vault · $22,0082%of vault · $19,1240.2%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(aggregator)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ EURC86% LLTV0x8c87…fe2fChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$37.25m44 vaultsToken:0x2ae3…ec22Allocation: 2% of the vault · $22,008

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.3% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $22,008 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WETHMarketChainlink0.6%of vault · bad debt · $7,238Oracle exposure 0.1%

0.6%of vault · $8,1190.6%of vault · $7,2380.1%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ EURC86% LLTV0xe1bb…4b37Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$62.65m33 vaultsToken:0x4200…0006Allocation: 0.6% of the vault · $8,119

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $8,119 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to14%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $177,648

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices wstETH, WETH, cbBTC, cbETH0xf0db…5b1b14% of vault · $177,648drainable if it is compromised


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	16%	up to 86%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	16%	up to 86%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	16%	up to 86%	Instant
	16%	up to 86%	Instant
	16%	up to 86%	Instant
	—	up to 14%	Instant
	<1%	up to 2%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Curator change queued

The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.

raise a market's supply cap ×4— applies in 3 days; time to exit first

Owner4-of-6 multisig0x5a4e…d4d0

Curator3-of-7 multisig0x9e33…0585

Sentinels2 · 1 multisig · 1 EOASafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

3-of-7 multisig0x7084…84cd
single key (EOA)0xdb92…1dca

Allocators2 · 1 multisig · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

3-of-7 multisig0x9e33…0585
single key (EOA)0xf9ce…f7ed

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 17min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Gauntlet EURC Balanced

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle