Flowdesk Confidential High Yield USDT

Risk reportEthereum0xb48c…bd7e

Risk

Depositing into Flowdesk Confidential High Yield USDT means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

35%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 18% of deposit

Driven by PT-USDat-14JAN2027 −30% 10% · sUSDai −30% 8% · PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 −30% <1% · other <1% · −100% 78% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

PT-USDat-14JAN2027HybridChainlink41%of vault · bad debt · $4.51mOracle exposure 3%

45%of vault · $4.87m41%of vault · $4.51m3%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(composite)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDT92% LLTV0x1f74…c26cChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$607,321.117 vaultsToken:0xba96…314fAllocation: 45% of the vault · $4.87m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 10% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $4.87m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

sUSDaiMarketChainlink33%of vault · bad debt · $3.58mOracle exposure 18%

51%of vault · $5.56m33%of vault · $3.58m18%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDT92% LLTV0xf47f…3558Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$8.8m6 vaultsToken:0x0b2b…5ef9Allocation: 51% of the vault · $5.56m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 8% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $5.56m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 18% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026HybridPTMarket rate2%of vault · bad debt · $229,680.13Oracle exposure 0.5%

3%of vault · $288,127.12%of vault · $229,680.130.5%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(composite)PTMarket rate

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 PT is priced by a Pendle market-rate oracle.

BaseOjo PT Feed Pendle Chainlink-compatible OracleNAV

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDT92% LLTV0x217d…51f0

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$21.54m17 vaultsToken:0xecfa…3957Allocation: 3% of the vault · $288,127.1

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.5% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $288,127.1 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.5% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChainlink0.4%of vault · bad debt · $46,925.67Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.5%of vault · $51,685.110.4%of vault · $46,925.67<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(composite)

wstETH is priced via Custom price feed for wstETH / ETH, quoted in USDT / ETH — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseCustom price feed for wstETH / ETHMarketQuoteUSDT / ETHMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 100bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDT86% LLTV0x95db…6992Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.493b105 vaultsToken:0x7f39…2ca0Allocation: 0.5% of the vault · $51,685.11

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $51,685.11 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbBTCHybridChainlink0.4%of vault · bad debt · $40,719.07Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.4%of vault · $44,806.240.4%of vault · $40,719.07<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(composite, managed)

cbBTC uses a composite oracle path; verified external provider(s): Chainlink.

BaseComposite base price pathQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDT86% LLTV0x9f98…34d2Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$482.92m101 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: 0.4% of the vault · $44,806.24

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $44,806.24 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

XAUtMarketChainlink0.4%of vault · bad debt · $38,371.12Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.4%of vault · $42,317.150.4%of vault · $38,371.12<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

XAUt is priced via XAU / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseXAU / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 30bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDT77% LLTV0xc7d1…d9dcChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$41.98m10 vaultsToken:0x6874…2f38Allocation: 0.4% of the vault · $42,317.15

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $42,317.15 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to22%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $2.42m

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, wstETH, sUSDai, PT-USDat-14JAN2027, XAUt0x21f7…73ca22% of vault · $2.36mdrainable if it is compromised
Unidentified feeds· vendor and on-chain control not resolvedprices PT-reUSD-10DEC2026<1% of vault · $58,446.97mispriceable if these feeds lie


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	18%	up to 78%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	18%	up to 78%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	18%	up to 78%	Instant
	18%	up to 78%	Instant
	—	up to 22%	Instant
	<1%	up to 3%	Instant
	<1%	up to 2%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Ownersingle key (EOA)0x96a9…a660

Curatorsingle key (EOA)0x20e8…e350

Sentinels3 · 1 contract · 2 EOAsSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

contract0x0000…0d2a
single key (EOA)0x69d4…b534
single key (EOA)0xd6dd…af5f

Allocators2 · 1 contract · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

contract0x00b8…1e27
single key (EOA)0x02fd…0466

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner6-of-1012 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

8 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated Sep 26, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Flowdesk Confidential High Yield USDT

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle