Spark Blue Chip USDT Vault

Risk reportEthereum0xb0c4…5b91

Risk

Depositing into Spark Blue Chip USDT Vault means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

34%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 10-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 16% of deposit

Driven by wstETH −30% 8% · WBTC −30% 5% · sUSDS −30% 2% · other <1% · −100% 80% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

wstETHMarketChainlink44%of vault · bad debt · $15.37mOracle exposure 11%

55%of vault · $19.21m44%of vault · $15.37m11%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(composite)

wstETH is priced via Custom price feed for wstETH / ETH, quoted in USDT / ETH — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseCustom price feed for wstETH / ETHMarketQuoteUSDT / ETHMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 100bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDT86% LLTV0x95db…6992Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$769.99m165 vaultsToken:0x7f39…2ca0Allocation: 55% of the vault · $19.21m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 8% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $19.21m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 11% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WBTCMarketChainlink25%of vault · bad debt · $8.84mOracle exposure 7%

32%of vault · $11.18m25%of vault · $8.84m7%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

WBTC is priced via WBTC / BTC × BTC / USD, quoted in USDT / USD — 3-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseWBTC / BTCMarketBTC / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDT / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDT86% LLTV0x008b…e1efChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$367.91m147 vaultsToken:0x2260…c599Allocation: 32% of the vault · $11.18m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 5% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $11.18m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 7% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

sUSDSHybridChainlink9%of vault · bad debt · $3.11mOracle exposure 2%

11%of vault · $3.77m9%of vault · $3.11m2%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(aggregator)

sUSDS mixes exchange-rate/NAV (ERC4626 vault share-rate) with market-rate (DAI / USD, USDT / USD) — insulated from ERC4626 vault share-rate market deviation, but exposed to DAI / USD, USDT / USD.

BaseDAI / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDT / USDMarketChainlinkBaseERC4626 vault share-rateVault

Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 25bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDT97% LLTV0x0c42…4c79Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$10.89m22 vaultsToken:0xa393…7fbdAllocation: 11% of the vault · $3.77m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $3.77m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbBTCMarketChainlink2%of vault · bad debt · $551,680.77Oracle exposure 0.4%

2%of vault · $696,823.662%of vault · $551,680.770.4%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbBTC is priced via BTC / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 1h · Deviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDT86% LLTV0x0e05…38acChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$277.95m149 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: 2% of the vault · $696,823.66

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.3% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $696,823.66 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to20%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $6.99m

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC, wstETH, sUSDS0x21f7…73ca20% of vault · $6.99mdrainable if it is compromised

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure, and every loss is a share of your deposit — the same percentage whatever you deposited. Loss is that share at a −30% collateral crash, the standard stress; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong, a conditional loss if it happens rather than a likelihood. Open a row for the loss at every crash depth, the dollar amounts, conditions, and the math.

11 scenarios · 9 with no time to exit · loss as % of deposit


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	16%	up to 80%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	16%	up to 80%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	16%	up to 80%	Instant
	16%	up to 80%	Instant
	—	up to 20%	Instant
	2%	up to 11%	Instant
	2%	up to 9%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	10 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	10 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 10 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Ownercontract0x3300…f8c4

Curator3-of-5 multisig0x0f96…46a3

Sentinels1 · 1 multisigSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

3-of-5 multisig0xf574…908b

Allocators1 · 1 contractReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

contract0xe5c6…f699

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 254,036.33

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

8 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated Aug 17, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql