Bitget x Steakhouse USDT

Risk reportArbitrum0xbeef…492f

Risk

Depositing into Bitget x Steakhouse USDT means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

36%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 7-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 17% of deposit

Driven by weETH −30% 6% · WBTC −30% 3% · wstETH −30% 2% · other 6% · −100% 86% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

weETHHybridChainlink33%of vault · bad debt · $1.57mOracle exposure 5%

38%of vault · $1.81m33%of vault · $1.57m5%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(composite, managed)

weETH uses a composite oracle path; verified external provider(s): Chainlink.

BaseComposite base price pathQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDT086% LLTV0xff13…0a8aChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$19.68m28 vaultsToken:0x3575…4dbeAllocation: 38% of the vault · $1.81m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 6% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.81m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 5% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WBTCMarketChainlink14%of vault · bad debt · $665,794.33Oracle exposure 2%

16%of vault · $762,706.5514%of vault · $665,794.332%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

WBTC uses Chainlink market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseChainlink market-rate feed pathQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDT086% LLTV0xedca…1612Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$63.52m37 vaultsToken:0x2f2a…5b0fAllocation: 16% of the vault · $762,706.55

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 3% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $762,706.55 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChainlink13%of vault · bad debt · $636,230.83Oracle exposure 2%

16%of vault · $751,033.213%of vault · $636,230.832%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDT086% LLTV0x979e…fd82Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$69.18m36 vaultsToken:0x5979…0529Allocation: 16% of the vault · $751,033.2

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $751,033.2 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WETHMarketChainlink12%of vault · bad debt · $571,585.93Oracle exposure 2%

14%of vault · $673,450.5712%of vault · $571,585.932%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

WETH uses Chainlink market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseChainlink market-rate feed pathQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDT086% LLTV0x282f…71a2Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$70.61m35 vaultsToken:0x82af…bab1Allocation: 14% of the vault · $673,450.57

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $673,450.57 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wsrUSDMarketChronicle / Chainlink10%of vault · bad debt · $482,740.14Oracle exposure 2%

12%of vault · $575,168.9410%of vault · $482,740.142%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chronicle / Chainlink(aggregator)

wsrUSD uses Chronicle + Chainlink market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseChronicle + Chainlink market-rate feed pathQuoteChronicle + Chainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDT092% LLTV0xab81…e0d4Chronicle / Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$92,427.564 vaultsToken:0x4809…d75dAllocation: 12% of the vault · $575,168.94

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $575,168.94 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

sUSDSHardcodedChainlink3%of vault · bad debt · $150,484.17Oracle exposure 0.6%

4%of vault · $177,554.463%of vault · $150,484.170.6%separate path

What it's made of

Hardcoded· Chainlink(composite, managed)

sUSDS uses a composite oracle path; verified external provider(s): Chainlink.

BaseComposite base price pathQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDT095% LLTV0x0611…51d7Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$42,064.4511 vaultsToken:0xddb4…7610Allocation: 4% of the vault · $177,554.46

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.8% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $177,554.46 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.6% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

syrupUSDCHybridChainlink0.3%of vault · bad debt · $14,601.57Oracle exposure 0.1%

0.4%of vault · $17,972.320.3%of vault · $14,601.570.1%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(aggregator)

syrupUSDC is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg rather than a direct market-rate feed.

BaseExchange-rate/NAV pricing legQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDT092% LLTV0x8ced…6d7bChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$314,552.710 vaultsToken:0x41ca…42b5Allocation: 0.4% of the vault · $17,972.32

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $17,972.32 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

XAUt0MarketChainlink0.3%of vault · bad debt · $14,045.01Oracle exposure 0.1%

0.4%of vault · $16,855.070.3%of vault · $14,045.010.1%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDT077% LLTV0xade5…896eChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$11,588.395 vaultsToken:0x4046…7159Allocation: 0.4% of the vault · $16,855.07

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $16,855.07 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+3 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

2 feeds · 2 control points

Up to14%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $679,499.78

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink / Chronicle·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices wstETH, syrupUSDC, wsrUSD, XAUt0, WBTC, sUSDe, siUSD, weETH, sUSDS, WETH, PT-USDai-18JUN2026, PT-USDai-19FEB20260x2f3b…d3c514% of vault · $652,428.35drainable if it is compromised
Chronicle / Chainlink·a control contractprices wsrUSD, siUSD0x371a…da5b2% of vault · $92,428.8drainable if it is compromised
On-chain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices bitgetUSDC<1% of vault · $1.13mispriceable only via the issuing contract

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure, and every loss is a share of your deposit — the same percentage whatever you deposited. Loss is that share at a −30% collateral crash, the standard stress; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong, a conditional loss if it happens rather than a likelihood. Open a row for the loss at every crash depth, the dollar amounts, conditions, and the math.

12 scenarios · 10 with no time to exit · loss as % of deposit


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	17%	up to 86%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	17%	up to 86%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(6)
	17%	up to 86%	Instant
	17%	up to 86%	Instant
	17%	up to 86%	Instant
	6%	up to 42%	Instant
	7%	up to 36%	Instant
	—	up to 14%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	7 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	7 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 7 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Ownercontract0xca9f…f5ee

Curator2-of-7 multisig0x827e…ecdb

Sentinels1 · 1 contractSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

contract0x438c…493e

Allocators3 · 1 multisig · 1 contract · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

1-of-6 multisig0x0000…9da8
contract0x2570…f462
single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xfd35…d9b2

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 254,036.33

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

10 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated Aug 15, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql