Risk
Depositing into Steakhouse High Yield USDC means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.
Left to right, a deeper collateral crash. Hover any point for the scenarios that drive the loss — only a smart-contract bug reaches a total loss.
Collateral & oracles
Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.
Driven by LBTC $39,257 · vbETH $23,911 · vbWBTC $6,269 · −100% $373,223 modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling
LBTCMarketChainlink$211,00616% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $195,395$406,40231% of vault$211,00616% of vault$195,395separate path
LBTCMarketChainlink$211,00616% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $195,395LBTC uses Chainlink market-rate aggregator feed(s).
- → vbUSDC86% LLTV0xcc13…a40dChainlink
vbETHMarketChainlink$128,52010% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $68,883$197,40315% of vault$128,52010% of vault$68,883separate path
vbETHMarketChainlink$128,52010% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $68,883vbETH uses Chainlink market-rate aggregator feed(s).
- → vbUSDC86% LLTV0xd423…bf47Chainlink
vbWBTCMarketChainlink$33,6973% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $18,107$51,8054% of vault$33,6973% of vault$18,107separate path
vbWBTCMarketChainlink$33,6973% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $18,107vbWBTC uses Chainlink market-rate aggregator feed(s).
- → vbUSDC86% LLTV0xb60f…040eChainlink
+1 market with no current position
Oracle dependencies
1 feed · 1 control pointUp to$282,386drainable if these feeds are mispriced · 22% of vault
Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.
- Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices LBTC, vbWBTC, vbETH0x0787…3334$282,386 · 22% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised
How you could lose money
Each row is a distinct failure. Possible loss is the share of your deposit at the selected collateral drop; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong — a conditional loss if it happens, not a likelihood. Price-scaling rows move with the drop selector; the rest are fixed. Enter a deposit to see the dollar figures as your own. Open a row for conditions, mitigations, and the math.
| Full-deposit & protocol-level(2) | |||||
| 100% | $1.31m | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| 5% | $69,437 | up to $373,223 | Instant | ||
| Price-driven collateral stress(1) | |||||
| 5% | $69,437 | up to $373,223 | Instant | ||
| Oracle & liquidation failures(4) | |||||
| 5% | $69,437 | up to $373,223 | Instant | ||
| 5% | $69,437 | up to $373,223 | Instant | ||
| 5% | $69,437 | up to $373,223 | Instant | ||
| — | — | up to $282,386 | Instant | ||
| Vault role & allocator(3) | |||||
| — | — | Full deposit | 3 days | ||
| — | — | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| — | — | up to $653,969 | 3 days | ||
Who you're trusting
The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.
The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.
Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land
Sentinels1 · 1 contractSafety role · veto only
Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.
- contract0xcd84…1017
Allocators3 · 1 multisig · 1 contract · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant
Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.
- 1-of-3 multisig0x0000…9da8
- contract0xce97…91ff
- single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a
- Certora· 15 Dec, 2025report
- Blackthorn· 4 Dec, 2025report
- Spearbit· 4 Dec, 2025report
- Blackthorn· 15 Sep, 2025report
Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.
MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).
No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.