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Gauntlet USDC Frontier

Risk reportBase0x1dee…6765

Risk

Depositing into Gauntlet USDC Frontier means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

19%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 2% of deposit

Driven by cbBTC −30% 2% · cbETH −30% <1% · WETH −30% <1% · other <1% · −100% 86% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

cbXRPMarketChainlink51%of vault · bad debt · $2.49mOracle exposure 9%

60%of vault · $2.91m51%of vault · $2.49m9%separate path

What it's made of

cbXRP token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbXRP is priced via XRP / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseXRP / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0x031b…0fdeChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$9.13m15 vaultsToken:0xcb58…a4afAllocation: 60% of the vault · $2.91m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2.91m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 9% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbBTCMarketChainlink9%of vault · bad debt · $427,745Oracle exposure 1%

10%of vault · $499,8879%of vault · $427,7451%separate path

What it's made of

cbBTC token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbBTC is priced via BTC / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x663b…39b9Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$311.58m52 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: 10% of the vault · $499,887

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $499,887 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbDOGEMarketChainlink9%of vault · bad debt · $421,963Oracle exposure 2%

10%of vault · $501,4519%of vault · $421,9632%separate path

What it's made of

cbDOGE token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbDOGE is priced via DOGE / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseDOGE / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0xa9d3…91b2Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$417,04911 vaultsToken:0xcbd0…b510Allocation: 10% of the vault · $501,451

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $501,451 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbADAMarketChainlink9%of vault · bad debt · $418,173Oracle exposure 2%

10%of vault · $492,4649%of vault · $418,1732%separate path

What it's made of

cbADA token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbADA is priced via ADA / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseADA / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0x35d8…e45fChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$493,99410 vaultsToken:0xcbad…7b8cAllocation: 10% of the vault · $492,464

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $492,464 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

JitoSOLHybridChainlink6%of vault · bad debt · $272,189Oracle exposure 0.6%

6%of vault · $302,8246%of vault · $272,1890.6%separate path

What it's made of

JitoSOL token page

Hybrid· Chainlink(managed)

JitoSOL uses a deviation/timelock managed oracle over Chainlink price-source leg(s), not a direct raw market-rate feed.

BaseDeviation/timelock managed oracle wrapperQuoteChainlink underlying price-source leg(s)

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0x78f7…be1cChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$514,6159 vaultsToken:0x97be…34deAllocation: 6% of the vault · $302,824

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $302,824 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.6% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbZECMarketChainlink2%of vault · bad debt · $88,196Oracle exposure 0.2%

2%of vault · $99,8962%of vault · $88,1960.2%separate path

What it's made of

cbZEC token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0xa3cb…a272Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$438,9149 vaultsToken:0xb200…b2ecAllocation: 2% of the vault · $99,896

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $99,896 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbHYPEMarketChainlink1%of vault · bad debt · $65,877Oracle exposure 0.1%

1%of vault · $72,8881%of vault · $65,8770.1%separate path

What it's made of

cbHYPE token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0x7fad…4bffChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$80,4238 vaultsToken:0xb200…479eAllocation: 1% of the vault · $72,888

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $72,888 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

NVDAcMarketChainlink<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $1,146Oracle exposure <0.1%

<0.1%of vault · $1,267<0.1%of vault · $1,146<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

NVDAc token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0x4f69…3f84Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$274.163 vaultsToken:0xb200…108cAllocation: <0.1% of the vault · $1,267

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1,267 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+11 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

2 feeds2 control points

Up to14%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $694,099

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink / RedStone·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices wstETH, NVDAc, cbXRP, WETH, cbBTC, cbETH, cbADA, cbZEC, SPCXc, cbDOGE, cbHYPE, METAc, AAPLc, GOOGLc, LBTC, cbLTC, SOL, syrupUSDC, JitoSOL0xf0db…5b1b14% of vault · $694,099drainable if it is compromised
RedStone / Chainlink·a 2/3 Safe multisigprices LBTC0x9b73…22b6<1% of vault · $0.00018drainable if it is compromised
Onchain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices reUSD<1% of vault · $0.00045mispriceable only via the issuing contract


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	2%	up to 86%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	2%	up to 86%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(6)
	2%	up to 86%	Instant
	2%	up to 86%	Instant
	—	up to 14%	Instant
	2%	up to 9%	Instant
	<1%	up to 6%	Instant
	<1%	up to 6%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Curator change queued

The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.

raise a market's supply cap ×4— applies now; no time to exit first

Owner4-of-7 multisig0x5a4e…d4d0

Curator3-of-7 multisig0x9e33…0585

Sentinels21 multisig1 EOASafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

3-of-7 multisig0x7084…84cd
single key (EOA)0x8b58…f0dc

Allocators21 multisig1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

3-of-7 multisig0x9e33…0585
single key (EOA)0xa064…8698

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 991,904.24

Voting TokenMORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

10 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 31min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Gauntlet USDC Frontier

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle