Galaxy WETH Quality

Risk reportEthereum0x1878…824f

Risk

Depositing into Galaxy WETH Quality means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

$7.89mrealistic worst · −50% collateral crashup to $19.36mSmart-contract bug · extreme only

−10%−30%−50%extreme

Left to right, a deeper collateral crash. Hover any point for the scenarios that drive the loss — only a smart-contract bug reaches a total loss.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest 15 Dec, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropvault-wide · no liquidations · stress estimate

−30%est. bad debt up to $4.33m

tap a preset or drag

Driven by wstETH $2.3m · weETH $2m · LsETH $35,958 · other $0.01 · −100% $16.77m modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

wstETHHybrid$8.86m46% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $1.23m

$10.09m52% of vault$8.86m46% of vault$1.23mseparate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(exchange-rate)

wstETH is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (wstETH/stETH exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BasewstETH/stETH exchange rateExchange rate

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ WETH95% LLTV0xbd60…71d8

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$818.57m163 vaultsToken:0x7f39…2ca0Allocation: $10.09m · 52% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $2.3mUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $10.09m · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $1.23m drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

weETHHybrid$7.72m40% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $1.15m

$8.88m46% of vault$7.72m40% of vault$1.15mseparate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(exchange-rate)

weETH is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (weETH/ETH exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BaseweETH/ETH exchange rateExchange rate

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ WETH95% LLTV0xbdd2…8a72

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$325.43m106 vaultsToken:0xcd5f…b7eeAllocation: $8.88m · 46% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $2mUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $8.88m · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $1.15m drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

LsETHMarketChainlink$193,2751.0% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $69,701

$262,9761% of vault$193,2751.0% of vault$69,701separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ WETH86% LLTV0x2250…4a43Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$70,4182 vaultsToken:0x8c1b…6549Allocation: $262,976 · 1% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $35,958Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $262,976 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $69,701 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

Unallocatednot lent into any market — no collateral exposure$130,584 · 0.7%

$130,5840.7% of vault——

+2 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to$2.45mdrainable if these feeds are mispriced · 13% of vault

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC, LsETH0x21f7…73ca$69,701 · <1% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised
On-chain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices wstETH, weETH$2.38m · 12% of vaultmispriceable only via the issuing contract

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure. Possible loss is the share of your deposit at the selected collateral drop; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong — a conditional loss if it happens, not a likelihood. Price-scaling rows move with the drop selector; the rest are fixed. Enter a deposit to see the dollar figures as your own. Open a row for conditions, mitigations, and the math.

10 scenarios · 8 with no time to exit

Collateral drop


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	$19.36m	Full deposit	Instant
	22%	$4.33m	up to $16.77m	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	22%	$4.33m	up to $16.77m	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(4)
	22%	$4.33m	up to $16.77m	Instant
	22%	$4.33m	up to $16.77m	Instant
	22%	$4.3m	up to $16.58m	Instant
	—	—	up to $2.45m	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	—	up to $9.68m	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Ownersingle key (EOA)0x42d5…419d

Curatorsingle key (EOA)0xa130…86f1

Sentinels1 · 1 EOASafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

single key (EOA)0xb4b1…aee0

Allocators2 · 2 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0x2034…e64b
single key (EOA)0xd1fc…3171

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· 15 Dec, 2025report
Blackthorn· 4 Dec, 2025report
Spearbit· 4 Dec, 2025report
Blackthorn· 15 Sep, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer3-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 254,036

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

8 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 21 Jul, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql