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sky.money USDT Savings

Risk reportEthereum0x23f5…1e11

Risk

Depositing into sky.money USDT Savings means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)
How much could be lost?
$27.91mrealistic worst · −50% collateral crashup to $64.41mSmart-contract bug · extreme only
−10%−30%−50%extreme

Left to right, a deeper collateral crash. Hover any point for the scenarios that drive the loss — only a smart-contract bug reaches a total loss.

Can I exit?
Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning
What backs it?
No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss
Track record
No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest 15 Dec, 2025

Collateral & oracles

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropvault-wide · no liquidations · stress estimate
−30%est. bad debt up to $15.9m
tap a preset or drag

−100% $57.91m modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

sUSDSsUSDSHybrid$57.91mbad debtOracle exposure $6.49m
What it's made of
Hybrid· Chainlink(aggregator)

sUSDS mixes exchange-rate/NAV (ERC4626 vault share-rate) with market-rate (DAI / USD, USDT / USD) — insulated from ERC4626 vault share-rate market deviation, but exposed to DAI / USD, USDT / USD.

BaseDAI / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDT / USDMarketChainlinkBaseERC4626 vault share-rateVault
Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 25bps
Markets this collateral backs · 1
  • USDT97% LLTV0x0c42…4c79Chainlink
Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$7.31m20 vaultsToken:0xa393…7fbdAllocation: $64.41m · 100% of the vault
If it breaksvault −30%
At −30%:est. bad debt up to $15.9mUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $64.41m · inherits vault-wide stressOracle exposure: up to $6.49m drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to$6.49mdrainable if these feeds are mispriced · 10% of vault

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

  • Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices sUSDS0x21f7…73ca$6.49m · 10% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised
Updated 10 Jul, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql