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Steakhouse High Yield USDT

Risk reportEthereum0xbeef…deb7

Risk

Depositing into Steakhouse High Yield USDT means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

37%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 18% of deposit

Driven by sUSDS −30% 5% · WBTC −30% 4% · cbBTC −30% 3% · other 5% · −100% 84% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

WBTCMarketChainlink22%of vault · bad debt · $379,086Oracle exposure 4%

26%of vault · $448,35922%of vault · $379,0864%separate path

What it's made of

WBTC token page

Market· Chainlink(managed, aggregator)

WBTC is priced via WBTC / BTC × BTC / USD, quoted in USDT / USD — 3-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseWBTC / BTCMarketBTC / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDT / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 24hDeviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDT86% LLTV0xf156…0cf4Chainlink
→ USDT86% LLTV0x008b…e1efChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$391.38m90 vaultsToken:0x2260…c599Allocation: 26% of the vault · $448,359

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 4% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $448,359 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

sUSDSHybridChainlink20%of vault · bad debt · $335,920Oracle exposure 3%

23%of vault · $394,13320%of vault · $335,9203%separate path

What it's made of

sUSDS token page

Hybrid· Chainlink(aggregator)

sUSDS mixes exchange-rate/NAV (ERC4626 vault share-rate) with market-rate (DAI / USD, USDT / USD) — insulated from ERC4626 vault share-rate market deviation, but exposed to DAI / USD, USDT / USD.

BaseDAI / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDT / USDMarketChainlinkBaseERC4626 vault share-rateVault

Heartbeat 24hDeviation 25bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDT97% LLTV0x0c42…4c79Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$8.77m23 vaultsToken:0xa393…7fbdAllocation: 23% of the vault · $394,133

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 5% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $394,133 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbBTCMarketChainlink19%of vault · bad debt · $318,336Oracle exposure 3%

22%of vault · $377,05119%of vault · $318,3363%separate path

What it's made of

cbBTC token page

Market· Chainlink(composite, aggregator, managed)

cbBTC is priced via BTC / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 1hDeviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDT86% LLTV0x9f98…34d2Chainlink
→ USDT86% LLTV0x0e05…38acChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$448.27m102 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: 22% of the vault · $377,051

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 3% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $377,051 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChainlink10%of vault · bad debt · $164,257Oracle exposure 2%

11%of vault · $193,10510%of vault · $164,2572%separate path

What it's made of

wstETH token page

Market· Chainlink(composite)

wstETH is priced via Custom price feed for wstETH / ETH × ETH / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseCustom price feed for wstETH / ETHMarketETH / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDT86% LLTV0x95db…6992Chainlink
→ USDT86% LLTV0xe087…9f9fChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$837.98m108 vaultsToken:0x7f39…2ca0Allocation: 11% of the vault · $193,105

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $193,105 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

reUSDHybrid7%of vault · bad debt · $123,576Oracle exposure 2%

9%of vault · $156,5727%of vault · $123,5762%separate path

What it's made of

reUSD token page

Hybrid(exchange-rate)

reUSD is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (reUSD/USD exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BasereUSD/USD exchange rateExchange rate

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDT92% LLTV0xa66a…4e70

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.24m21 vaultsToken:0x5086…0c72Allocation: 9% of the vault · $156,572

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $156,572 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

weETHHybridChainlink5%of vault · bad debt · $77,973Oracle exposure 0.8%

5%of vault · $91,6425%of vault · $77,9730.8%separate path

What it's made of

weETH token page

Hybrid· Chainlink(aggregator)

weETH mixes exchange-rate/NAV (weETH / ETH) with market-rate (ETH / USD, USDT / USD) — insulated from weETH / ETH market deviation, but exposed to ETH / USD, USDT / USD.

BaseweETH / ETHExchange rateChainlinkETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDT / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 24hDeviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDT86% LLTV0x631b…0f87Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$369.36m51 vaultsToken:0xcd5f…b7eeAllocation: 5% of the vault · $91,642

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.9% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $91,642 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.8% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

sUSDeMarketRedStone / Chainlink2%of vault · bad debt · $35,920Oracle exposure 0.4%

2%of vault · $42,5782%of vault · $35,9200.4%separate path

What it's made of

sUSDe token page

Market· RedStone / Chainlink(aggregator)

sUSDe is priced via RedStone Price Feed for sUSDe, quoted in USDT / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (RedStone + Chainlink).

BaseRedStone Price Feed for sUSDeMarketRedStoneQuoteUSDT / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDT92% LLTV0xe47e…bd99RedStone / Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$46.11m19 vaultsToken:0x9d39…3497Allocation: 2% of the vault · $42,578

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.5% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $42,578 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

syrupUSDTHybrid<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $284.59Oracle exposure <0.1%

<0.1%of vault · $316.21<0.1%of vault · $284.59<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

syrupUSDT token page

Hybrid(exchange-rate)

syrupUSDT is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (ERC4626 vault share-rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BaseERC4626 vault share-rateVault

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDT92% LLTV0x34e5…e997

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$8,9806 vaultsToken:0x356b…ba7dAllocation: <0.1% of the vault · $316.21

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $316.21 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+12 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

2 feeds2 control points

Up to16%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $268,404

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink / RedStone·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC, wstETH, TSLAon, FLHYon, sUSDe, weETH, stcUSD, sUSDS, PT-srUSDe-25JUN2026, PT-USDG-24SEP2026, PT-USDG-28MAY20260x21f7…73ca14% of vault · $235,376drainable if it is compromised
RedStone / Chainlink·a 2/3 Safe multisigprices PT-cUSD-23JUL2026, sUSDe, stcUSD, PT-stcUSD-23JUL20260x6906…4472<1% of vault · $6,658drainable if it is compromised
Onchain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices reUSD, syrupUSDT2% of vault · $33,028mispriceable only via the issuing contract
Unidentified feeds· vendor and onchain control not resolvedprices PT-reUSD-25JUN2026<1% of vault · $0.000000042mispriceable if these feeds lie


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	18%	up to 84%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	18%	up to 84%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	18%	up to 84%	Instant
	13%	up to 82%	Instant
	17%	up to 77%	Instant
	15%	up to 69%	Instant
	—	up to 16%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Curator change queued

The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.

raise a market's supply cap ×4— applies now; no time to exit first

Ownercontract0x4d7b…f71d

Curator3-of-9 multisig0x827e…ecdb

Sentinels11 contractSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

contract0x4d7b…f71d

Allocators71 multisig3 contracts3 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

1-of-7 multisig0x0000…9da8
contract0x00b8…1e27
single key (EOA)0xbbf1…bceb
contract0xbeef…beef
contract0xaad8…35e7
single key (EOA)0xfc58…d827
single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner6-of-1012 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting Token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

10 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 20min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Steakhouse High Yield USDT

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle