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Felix USDC

Risk reportHyperliquid L10x8a86…ea27

Risk

Depositing into Felix USDC means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

27%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 6% of deposit

Driven by WHYPE −30% 3% · kHYPE −30% 3% · UBTC −30% <1% · other <1% · −100% 83% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

kHYPEMarketRedStone44%of vault · bad debt · $1.77mOracle exposure 8%

53%of vault · $2.11m44%of vault · $1.77m8%separate path

What it's made of

kHYPE token page

Market· RedStone(aggregator)

kHYPE is priced from a fundamental/NAV feed (RedStone), not a raw market-rate feed.

BaseRedStone fundamental/NAV feed pathQuoteRedStone quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDC77% LLTV0x3939…5283RedStone
→ USDC63% LLTV0xe876…8469RedStone

Room to grow: $2.11m of $64.99m cap (3% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$35.41m18 vaultsToken:0xfd73…296dAllocation: 53% of the vault · $2.11m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 3% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $2.11m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 8% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WHYPEMarketRedStone33%of vault · bad debt · $1.31mOracle exposure 5%

38%of vault · $1.52m33%of vault · $1.31m5%separate path

What it's made of

WHYPE token page

Market· RedStone(aggregator)

WHYPE uses RedStone market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseRedStone market-rate feed pathQuoteRedStone quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDC77% LLTV0x194f…4f31RedStone
→ USDC63% LLTV0x194f…4f31RedStone

Room to grow: $1.52m of $22m cap (7% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$10.96m19 vaultsToken:0x5555…5555Allocation: 38% of the vault · $1.52m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 3% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $1.52m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 5% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

UBTCMarketRedStone3%of vault · bad debt · $112,315Oracle exposure 0.6%

3%of vault · $134,7063%of vault · $112,3150.6%separate path

What it's made of

UBTC token page

Market· RedStone(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0x6df6…1c29RedStone

Room to grow: $134,706 of $12m cap (1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$2.35m14 vaultsToken:0x9fdb…3463Allocation: 3% of the vault · $134,706

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.3% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $134,706 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.6% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstHYPEHybridRedStone3%of vault · bad debt · $107,951Oracle exposure 3%

5%of vault · $207,9143%of vault · $107,9513%separate path

What it's made of

wstHYPE token page

Hybrid· RedStone(aggregator, composite)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDC77% LLTV0xf2cb…eb61RedStone
→ USDC77% LLTV0x7f95…92acRedStone

Room to grow: $207,914 of $2m cap (10% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$21.97m11 vaultsToken:0x94e8…cf38Allocation: 5% of the vault · $207,914

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.2% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $207,914 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-kHYPE-19MAR2026HybridRedStone0.2%of vault · bad debt · $7,470Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.2%of vault · $8,6140.2%of vault · $7,470<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

PT-kHYPE-19MAR2026 token page

Hybrid· RedStone(composite)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0x3420…c8a9RedStone

Room to grow: $7,469 of $2m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1,1443 vaultsToken:0xea84…c9f5Allocation: 0.2% of the vault · $8,614

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $8,614 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-kHYPE-24SEP2026HybridRedStone0.1%of vault · bad debt · $3,959Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.1%of vault · $4,4640.1%of vault · $3,959<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

PT-kHYPE-24SEP2026 token page

Hybrid· RedStone(composite)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0x50c9…5ac9RedStone

Room to grow: $4,464 of $999,923 cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.27m7 vaultsToken:0x50fc…7391Allocation: 0.1% of the vault · $4,464

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $4,464 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

Oracle dependencies

1 feed1 control point

Up to17%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $667,484

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

RedStone·a 2/3 Safe multisigprices wstHYPE, UBTC, kHYPE, WHYPE, PT-kHYPE-19MAR2026, PT-kHYPE-24SEP20260xce77…30cf17% of vault · $667,484drainable if it is compromised


Full-deposit & protocol-level(3)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	6%	up to 83%	Instant
	6%	up to 83%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	6%	up to 83%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	6%	up to 67%	Instant
	6%	up to 67%	Instant
	6%	up to 24%	Instant
	<1%	up to 18%	Instant
	—	up to 17%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(4)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days
	—	0%	Instant

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Curator change queued

The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.

raise a market's supply cap ×4— applies now; no time to exit first

Owner4-of-6 multisig0x4a82…0b3a

Curator1-of-3 multisig0x18e4…f979

Guardiannone appointed

Allocators11 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0xdd00…8f6c

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0x34ed…acba

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting Token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 14min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Felix USDC

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle