Steakhouse High Yield USDC Edition

Risk reportBase0xbeef…8845

Risk

Depositing into Steakhouse High Yield USDC Edition means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

40%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 20% of deposit

Driven by USDe −30% 19% · mGLO −30% 1% · cbBTC −30% <1% · other <1% · −100% 90% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

USDeHybridChainlink80%of vault · bad debt · $308.61mOracle exposure 9%

89%of vault · $342.88m80%of vault · $308.61m9%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(managed)

USDe uses a deviation/timelock managed oracle over Chainlink price-source leg(s), not a direct raw market-rate feed.

BaseDeviation/timelock managed oracle wrapperQuoteChainlink underlying price-source leg(s)

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0xf4b1…9a47Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$34.26m4 vaultsToken:0x5d3a…ef34Allocation: 89% of the vault · $342.88m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 19% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $342.88m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 9% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

mGLOHybrid5%of vault · bad debt · $21.1mOracle exposure 0.6%

6%of vault · $23.44m5%of vault · $21.1m0.6%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(composite)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x182e…a109

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$2.42m6 vaultsToken:0xfcc9…2584Allocation: 6% of the vault · $23.44m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $23.44m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.6% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbXRPMarketChainlink3%of vault · bad debt · $12.01mOracle exposure 0.4%

3%of vault · $13.46m3%of vault · $12.01m0.4%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbXRP is priced via XRP / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseXRP / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0x031b…0fdeChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$5.82m12 vaultsToken:0xcb58…a4afAllocation: 3% of the vault · $13.46m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $13.46m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbBTCMarketChainlink1%of vault · bad debt · $4.03mOracle exposure 0.1%

1%of vault · $4.49m1%of vault · $4.03m0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbBTC is priced via BTC / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x663b…39b9Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$192.54m64 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: 1% of the vault · $4.49m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $4.49m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbETHMarketChainlink0.3%of vault · bad debt · $1.07mOracle exposure <0.1%

0.3%of vault · $1.19m0.3%of vault · $1.07m<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbETH is priced via CBETH / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseCBETH / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0x97ff…8295Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$74.18m59 vaultsToken:0x2ae3…ec22Allocation: 0.3% of the vault · $1.19m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.19m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

JitoSOLHybridChainlink0.1%of vault · bad debt · $241,062.63Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.1%of vault · $269,603.480.1%of vault · $241,062.63<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(managed)

JitoSOL uses a deviation/timelock managed oracle over Chainlink price-source leg(s), not a direct raw market-rate feed.

BaseDeviation/timelock managed oracle wrapperQuoteChainlink underlying price-source leg(s)

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0x78f7…be1cChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$231,052.656 vaultsToken:0x97be…34deAllocation: 0.1% of the vault · $269,603.48

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $269,603.48 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

reUSDAUM / rate<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $0.97Oracle exposure <0.1%

<0.1%of vault · $1.08<0.1%of vault · $0.97<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

AUM / rate(exchange-rate)

Priced off an exchange rate / AUM — insulated from spot depegs, but exposed to rate-provider corruption.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x04c1…9bc0

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$127,509.524 vaultsToken:0x7d21…cfeaAllocation: <0.1% of the vault · $1.08

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.08 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+1 market with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to10%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $38.67m

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbXRP, cbBTC, cbETH, sUSDe, USDe, JitoSOL0xf0db…5b1b9% of vault · $36.33mdrainable if it is compromised
Unidentified feeds· vendor and on-chain control not resolvedprices mGLO<1% of vault · $2.34mmispriceable if these feeds lie
On-chain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices reUSD<1% of vault · $0.11mispriceable only via the issuing contract


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	20%	up to 90%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	20%	up to 90%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(6)
	20%	up to 90%	Instant
	20%	up to 90%	Instant
	9%	up to 89%	Instant
	20%	up to 87%	Instant
	19%	up to 80%	Instant
	—	up to 10%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Curator change queued

The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.

raise a market's supply cap ×4— applies now; no time to exit first

Ownercontract0x639b…c5d6

Curator2-of-6 multisig0x827e…ecdb

Sentinels2 · 1 contract · 1 EOASafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

contract0x639b…c5d6
single key (EOA)0x9e0f…eaf5

Allocators3 · 1 multisig · 1 contract · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

1-of-6 multisig0x0000…9da8
contract0x1be9…0e36
single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.56m

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated Sep 10, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Steakhouse High Yield USDC Edition

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle