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Steakhouse High Yield USDC Edition

Risk reportBase0xbeef…8845

Risk

Depositing into Steakhouse High Yield USDC Edition means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

38%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 19% of deposit

Driven by USDe −30% 12% · mGLO −30% 4% · cbBTC −30% 3% · other <1% · −100% 88% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

USDeHybridChainlink49%of vault · bad debt · $227.64mOracle exposure 7%

56%of vault · $257.85m49%of vault · $227.64m7%separate path

What it's made of

USDe token page

Hybrid· Chainlink(managed)

USDe uses a deviation/timelock managed oracle over Chainlink price-source leg(s), not a direct raw market-rate feed.

BaseDeviation/timelock managed oracle wrapperQuoteChainlink underlying price-source leg(s)

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0xf4b1…9a47Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$42.14m4 vaultsToken:0x5d3a…ef34Allocation: 56% of the vault · $257.85m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 12% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $257.85m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 7% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

mGLOHybrid18%of vault · bad debt · $80.89mOracle exposure 2%

20%of vault · $90.23m18%of vault · $80.89m2%separate path

What it's made of

mGLO token page

Hybrid(composite)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDC92% LLTV0xbfa7…c5be
→ USDC92% LLTV0x182e…a109

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$10.1m8 vaultsToken:0xfcc9…2584Allocation: 20% of the vault · $90.23m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 4% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $90.23m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbBTCMarketChainlink17%of vault · bad debt · $77.15mOracle exposure 3%

20%of vault · $91.15m17%of vault · $77.15m3%separate path

What it's made of

cbBTC token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbBTC is priced via BTC / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x663b…39b9Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$346.36m52 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: 20% of the vault · $91.15m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 3% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $91.15m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbXRPMarketChainlink3%of vault · bad debt · $13.59mOracle exposure 0.5%

3%of vault · $16.04m3%of vault · $13.59m0.5%separate path

What it's made of

cbXRP token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbXRP is priced via XRP / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseXRP / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0x031b…0fdeChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$10m15 vaultsToken:0xcb58…a4afAllocation: 3% of the vault · $16.04m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $16.04m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.5% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbETHMarketChainlink0.5%of vault · bad debt · $2.47mOracle exposure 0.1%

0.6%of vault · $2.93m0.5%of vault · $2.47m0.1%separate path

What it's made of

cbETH token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbETH is priced via CBETH / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseCBETH / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0x97ff…8295Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$33.87m44 vaultsToken:0x2ae3…ec22Allocation: 0.6% of the vault · $2.93m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2.93m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbZECMarketChainlink0.4%of vault · bad debt · $1.87mOracle exposure 0.1%

0.5%of vault · $2.14m0.4%of vault · $1.87m0.1%separate path

What it's made of

cbZEC token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0xa3cb…a272Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$486,1809 vaultsToken:0xb200…b2ecAllocation: 0.5% of the vault · $2.14m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2.14m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

JitoSOLHybridChainlink0.1%of vault · bad debt · $304,201Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.1%of vault · $338,8140.1%of vault · $304,201<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

JitoSOL token page

Hybrid· Chainlink(managed)

JitoSOL uses a deviation/timelock managed oracle over Chainlink price-source leg(s), not a direct raw market-rate feed.

BaseDeviation/timelock managed oracle wrapperQuoteChainlink underlying price-source leg(s)

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0x78f7…be1cChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$548,7929 vaultsToken:0x97be…34deAllocation: 0.1% of the vault · $338,814

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $338,814 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbHYPEMarketChainlink<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $77,594Oracle exposure <0.1%

<0.1%of vault · $85,823<0.1%of vault · $77,594<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

cbHYPE token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0x7fad…4bffChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$75,7038 vaultsToken:0xb200…479eAllocation: <0.1% of the vault · $85,823

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $85,823 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+2 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed1 control point

Up to12%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $56.79m

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbXRP, cbBTC, cbETH, cbZEC, cbHYPE, sUSDe, PAXG, USDe, JitoSOL0xf0db…5b1b10% of vault · $47.45mdrainable if it is compromised
Unidentified feeds· vendor and onchain control not resolvedprices mGLO2% of vault · $9.34mmispriceable if these feeds lie


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	19%	up to 88%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	19%	up to 88%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(6)
	19%	up to 88%	Instant
	19%	up to 87%	Instant
	19%	up to 84%	Instant
	7%	up to 56%	Instant
	12%	up to 49%	Instant
	—	up to 12%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Curator change queued

The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.

raise a market's supply cap ×2— applies in 7 hours; time to exit first

Ownercontract0x639b…c5d6

Curator3-of-9 multisig0x827e…ecdb

Sentinels21 contract1 EOASafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

contract0x639b…c5d6
single key (EOA)0x9e0f…eaf5

Allocators71 multisig3 contracts3 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

1-of-7 multisig0x0000…9da8
contract0x1be9…0e36
contract0xaed2…e412
single key (EOA)0xbbf1…bceb
contract0xbeef…beef
single key (EOA)0xfc58…d827
single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting TokenMORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 34min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Steakhouse High Yield USDC Edition

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle