SIRLOINUSDCRisk · Base
Risk
Depositing into SIRLOINUSDC means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.
Left to right, a deeper collateral crash. Hover any point for the scenarios that drive the loss — only a smart-contract bug reaches a total loss.
Collateral & oracles
Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.
Driven by USDe $24.44m · sUSDe $0.0016 · −100% $104.04m modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling
USDeHybridChainlink$104.03m90% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $12.09m$116.12m100% of vault$104.03m90% of vault$12.09mseparate path
USDe uses a deviation/timelock managed oracle over Chainlink price-source leg(s), not a direct raw market-rate feed.
- → USDC92% LLTV0xf4b1…9a47Chainlink
cbXRPMarketChainlink$7,336<0.1% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $975.96$8,312<0.1% of vault$7,336<0.1% of vault$975.96separate path
cbXRP is priced via XRP / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).
- → USDC63% LLTV0x031b…0fdeChainlink
JitoSOLHybridChainlink$2,932<0.1% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $305.68$3,237<0.1% of vault$2,932<0.1% of vault$305.68separate path
JitoSOL uses a deviation/timelock managed oracle over Chainlink price-source leg(s), not a direct raw market-rate feed.
- → USDC63% LLTV0x78f7…be1cChainlink
+3 markets with no current position
Oracle dependencies
1 feed · 1 control pointUp to$12.09mdrainable if these feeds are mispriced · 10% of vault
Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.
- Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbXRP, cbBTC, cbETH, sUSDe, USDe, JitoSOL0xf0db…5b1b$12.09m · 10% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised
How you could lose money
Each row is a distinct failure. Possible loss is the share of your deposit at the selected collateral drop; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong — a conditional loss if it happens, not a likelihood. Price-scaling rows move with the drop selector; the rest are fixed. Enter a deposit to see the dollar figures as your own. Open a row for conditions, mitigations, and the math.
| Full-deposit & protocol-level(2) | |||||
| 100% | $116.12m | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| 21% | $24.44m | up to $104.04m | Instant | ||
| Price-driven collateral stress(1) | |||||
| 21% | $24.44m | up to $104.04m | Instant | ||
| Oracle & liquidation failures(5) | |||||
| 21% | $24.44m | up to $104.04m | Instant | ||
| 21% | $24.44m | up to $104.04m | Instant | ||
| 21% | $24.44m | up to $104.03m | Instant | ||
| 21% | $24.44m | up to $104.03m | Instant | ||
| — | — | up to $12.09m | Instant | ||
| Vault role & allocator(3) | |||||
| — | — | Full deposit | 3 days | ||
| — | — | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| — | — | up to $58.06m | 3 days | ||
Who you're trusting
The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.
The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.
Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land
Allocators3 · 1 multisig · 1 contract · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant
Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.
- 1-of-6 multisig0x0000…9da8
- contract0x1be9…0e36
- single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a
- Certora· 15 Dec, 2025report
- Blackthorn· 4 Dec, 2025report
- Spearbit· 4 Dec, 2025report
- Blackthorn· 15 Sep, 2025report
Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.
Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).
No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.