Steakhouse USDC

Risk reportBase0xbeef…8183

Risk

Depositing into Steakhouse USDC means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

$67.34mrealistic worst · −50% collateral crashup to $179.64mSmart-contract bug · extreme only

−10%−30%−50%extreme

Left to right, a deeper collateral crash. Hover any point for the scenarios that drive the loss — only a smart-contract bug reaches a total loss.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 7-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropvault-wide · no liquidations · stress estimate

−30%est. bad debt up to $29.92m

tap a preset or drag

Driven by cbBTC $29.67m · cbETH $110,551.48 · WETH $91,042.48 · other $49,886.77 · −100% $160.89m modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

cbBTCMarketChainlink$159.48m89% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $17.96m

$177.44m99% of vault$159.48m89% of vault$17.96mseparate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbBTC is priced via BTC / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x663b…39b9Chainlink

Room to grow: $177.44m of $999.89m cap (18% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$174.1m74 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: $177.44m · 99% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $29.67mUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $177.44m · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $17.96m drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbETHMarketChainlink$653,938.180.4% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $73,882.8

$727,820.980.4% of vault$653,938.180.4% of vault$73,882.8separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbETH is priced via CBETH / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseCBETH / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDC86% LLTV0xb40d…cd96Chainlink
→ USDC77% LLTV0x97ff…8295Chainlink

Room to grow: $727,820.98 of $249.97m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$16.11m67 vaultsToken:0x2ae3…ec22Allocation: $727,820.98 · 0.4% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $110,551.48Uses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $727,820.98 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $73,882.8 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WETHMarketChainlink$489,353.320.3% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $55,799.86

$545,153.180.3% of vault$489,353.320.3% of vault$55,799.86separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

WETH is priced via ETH / USD, quoted in USDC / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xfea2…afe4Chainlink

Room to grow: $545,153.18 of $199.98m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$51.74m54 vaultsToken:0x4200…0006Allocation: $545,153.18 · 0.3% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $91,042.48Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $545,153.18 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $55,799.86 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChainlink$268,141.390.1% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $29,914.88

$298,056.270.2% of vault$268,141.390.1% of vault$29,914.88separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

wstETH is priced via WSTETH / ETH × ETH / USD, quoted in USDC / USD — 3-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseWSTETH / ETHMarketChainlinkETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xd7a1…289aChainlink

Room to grow: $298,056.27 of $49.99m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$41.47m59 vaultsToken:0xc1cb…e452Allocation: $298,056.27 · 0.2% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $49,886.77Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $298,056.27 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $29,914.88 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to$18.12mdrainable if these feeds are mispriced · 10% of vault

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices wstETH, WETH, cbBTC, cbETH0xf0db…5b1b$18.12m · 10% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure. Possible loss is the share of your deposit at the selected collateral drop; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong — a conditional loss if it happens, not a likelihood. Price-scaling rows move with the drop selector; the rest are fixed. Enter a deposit to see the dollar figures as your own. Open a row for conditions, mitigations, and the math.

11 scenarios · 9 with no time to exit

Collateral drop


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	$179.64m	Full deposit	Instant
	17%	$29.92m	up to $160.89m	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	17%	$29.92m	up to $160.89m	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(4)
	17%	$29.92m	up to $160.89m	Instant
	17%	$29.92m	up to $160.89m	Instant
	17%	$29.91m	up to $160.77m	Instant
	—	—	up to $18.12m	Instant
Vault role & allocator(4)
	—	—	Full deposit	7 days
	—	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	—	up to $160.89m	Instant
	—	—	up to $89.82m	7 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 7 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner5-of-9 multisig0x0a0e…f8dd

Curator2-of-6 multisig0x827e…ecdb

Guardiansingle key (EOA)0x9e0f…eaf5

Allocators4 · 1 multisig · 2 contracts · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

contract0x08bb…1b00
contract0xa090…0467
1-of-6 multisig0x0000…9da8
single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer3-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 254,036.33

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

10 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated Jul 28, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql