Gauntlet LRT Core

Risk reportEthereum0x4881…0658

Risk

Depositing into Gauntlet LRT Core means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

$1.2mrealistic worst · −50% collateral crashup to $2.81mSmart-contract bug · extreme only

−10%−30%−50%extreme

Left to right, a deeper collateral crash. Hover any point for the scenarios that drive the loss — only a smart-contract bug reaches a total loss.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest 15 Dec, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropvault-wide · no liquidations · stress estimate

−30%est. bad debt up to $673,806

tap a preset or drag

Driven by wstETH $455,096 · weETH $217,271 · WBTC $1,438 · other $1.19 · −100% $2.5m modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

wstETHHybridChainlink$1.66m59% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $215,621

$1.87m67% of vault$1.66m59% of vault$215,621separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(exchange-rate)

wstETH is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (wstETH/stETH exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BasewstETH/stETH exchange rateExchange rate

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ WETH97% LLTV0xbd60…71d8
→ WETH95% LLTV0x2a01…ad72Chainlink

Room to grow: $1.87m of $279.75m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$803.11m163 vaultsToken:0x7f39…2ca0Allocation: $1.87m · 67% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $455,096Uses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $1.87m · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $215,621 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

weETHHybrid$838,04430% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $74,326

$912,37032% of vault$838,04430% of vault$74,326separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(exchange-rate)

weETH is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (weETH/ETH exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BaseweETH/ETH exchange rateExchange rate

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ WETH95% LLTV0xbdd2…8a72

Room to grow: $912,370 of $14.92m cap (6% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$342.76m106 vaultsToken:0xcd5f…b7eeAllocation: $912,370 · 32% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $217,271Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $912,370 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $74,326 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WBTCMarketChainlink$6,1200.2% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $633.1

$6,7530.2% of vault$6,1200.2% of vault$633.1separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

WBTC is priced via BTC / ETH — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseBTC / ETHMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 200bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ WETH92% LLTV0xc29b…e663Chainlink

Room to grow: $6,753 of $37.3m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$409.56m144 vaultsToken:0x2260…c599Allocation: $6,753 · 0.2% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $1,438Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $6,753 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $633.1 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbBTCMarketChainlink$5.09<0.1% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $2.74

$7.83<0.1% of vault$5.09<0.1% of vault$2.74separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ WETH92% LLTV0x8f65…f5d4Chainlink

Room to grow: $7.83 of $9.32m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$259.18m148 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: $7.83 · <0.1% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $1.19Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $7.83 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $2.74 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

Unallocatednot lent into any market — no collateral exposure$17,134 · 0.6%

$17,1340.6% of vault——

+1 market with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed · 1 control point

Up to$290,583drainable if these feeds are mispriced · 10% of vault

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink / RedStone·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC, LBTC, wstETH0x21f7…73ca$216,257 · 8% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised
On-chain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices weETH$74,326 · 3% of vaultmispriceable only via the issuing contract

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure. Possible loss is the share of your deposit at the selected collateral drop; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong — a conditional loss if it happens, not a likelihood. Price-scaling rows move with the drop selector; the rest are fixed. Enter a deposit to see the dollar figures as your own. Open a row for conditions, mitigations, and the math.

11 scenarios · 9 with no time to exit

Collateral drop


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	$2.81m	Full deposit	Instant
	24%	$673,806	up to $2.5m	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	24%	$673,806	up to $2.5m	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(4)
	24%	$673,806	up to $2.5m	Instant
	24%	$667,592	up to $2.48m	Instant
	24%	$666,152	up to $2.47m	Instant
	—	—	up to $290,583	Instant
Vault role & allocator(4)
	—	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	—	up to $2.5m	Instant
	—	—	up to $1.41m	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner4-of-7 multisig0xc684…faec

Curator3-of-7 multisig0x9e33…0585

Guardian3-of-7 multisig0x7084…84cd

Allocators2 · 1 contract · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0x1a97…c282
contract0xfd32…c75d

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· 15 Dec, 2025report
Blackthorn· 4 Dec, 2025report
Spearbit· 4 Dec, 2025report
Blackthorn· 15 Sep, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer3-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 254,036

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

10 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 20 Jul, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql