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3F x Steakhouse USDC

Risk reportEthereum0xbeef…183d

Risk

Depositing into 3F x Steakhouse USDC means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

43%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 24% of deposit

Driven by wUSCC −30% 14% · wFalconX −30% 6% · wJAAA −30% 4% · other <1% · −100% 90% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

wUSCCMarketChainlink49%of vault · bad debt · $7.05mOracle exposure 5%

54%of vault · $7.83m49%of vault · $7.05m5%separate path

What it's made of

wUSCC token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC98% LLTV0x6806…3cabChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$773,3442 vaultsToken:0xf458…b7d9Allocation: 54% of the vault · $7.83m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 14% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $7.83m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 5% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wFalconXHybrid26%of vault · bad debt · $3.83mOracle exposure 3%

29%of vault · $4.26m26%of vault · $3.83m3%separate path

What it's made of

wFalconX token page

Hybrid(composite)

AA_FalconXUSDC is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (Idle Tranches exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BaseIdle Tranches exchange rateExchange rate

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x52ea…93fc

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$2.82m12 vaultsToken:0x4614…8644Allocation: 29% of the vault · $4.26m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 6% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $4.26m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wJAAAHybridChronicle15%of vault · bad debt · $2.19mOracle exposure 2%

17%of vault · $2.43m15%of vault · $2.19m2%separate path

What it's made of

wJAAA token page

Hybrid· Chronicle(aggregator)

wJAAA is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg ((unnamed feed)) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

Base(unnamed feed)NAV

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC98% LLTV0x2e4e…d886Chronicle

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$236,2532 vaultsToken:0x86b4…ebfeAllocation: 17% of the vault · $2.43m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 4% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2.43m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbBTCMarketChainlink0.1%of vault · bad debt · $18,801Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.1%of vault · $20,8320.1%of vault · $18,801<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

cbBTC token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator, managed)

cbBTC uses a deviation/timelock managed oracle over Chainlink price-source leg(s), not a direct raw market-rate feed.

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDC86% LLTV0xa6d6…182aChainlink
→ USDC86% LLTV0x9f98…34d2Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$449.92m102 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: 0.1% of the vault · $20,832

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $20,832 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+4 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

2 feeds1 control point

Up to10%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $1.44m

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC, wstETH, WETH, wUSCC0x21f7…73ca5% of vault · $779,784drainable if it is compromised
Chronicle· onchain control not resolvedprices wJAAA, ACRDX2% of vault · $239,932mispriceable if this feed lies
Unidentified feeds· vendor and onchain control not resolvedprices wFalconX3% of vault · $422,922mispriceable if these feeds lie


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	24%	up to 90%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	24%	up to 90%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	24%	up to 90%	Instant
	24%	up to 90%	Instant
	2%	up to 17%	Instant
	4%	up to 15%	Instant
	—	up to 10%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Curator change queued

The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.

raise a market's supply cap ×4— applies in 3 days; time to exit first

Owner2-of-2 multisig0x433d…5c12

Curator3-of-9 multisig0x827e…ecdb

Sentinels11 contractSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

contract0x655c…cadb

Allocators81 multisig4 contracts3 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

1-of-7 multisig0x0000…9da8
contract0x00b8…1e27
contract0x9bdc…241f
single key (EOA)0xbbf1…bceb
contract0xbeef…beef
contract0xaad8…35e7
single key (EOA)0xfc58…d827
single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner6-of-1012 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting Token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 14min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

3F x Steakhouse USDC

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle