3F x Steakhouse USDC

Risk reportEthereum0xbeef…183d

Risk

Depositing into 3F x Steakhouse USDC means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

$4.98mrealistic worst · −50% collateral crashup to $11.84mSmart-contract bug · extreme only

−10%−30%−50%extreme

Left to right, a deeper collateral crash. Hover any point for the scenarios that drive the loss — only a smart-contract bug reaches a total loss.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest 15 Dec, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropvault-wide · no liquidations · stress estimate

−30%est. bad debt up to $2.7m

tap a preset or drag

Driven by wFalconX $1.49m · wJAAA $1.16m · WBTC $52,877 · other $685.85 · −100% $10.67m modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

wFalconXHybrid$6.33m53% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $687,113

$7.02m59% of vault$6.33m53% of vault$687,113separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(composite)

AA_FalconXUSDC is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (Idle Tranches exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BaseIdle Tranches exchange rateExchange rate

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x52ea…93fc

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.05m7 vaultsToken:0x4614…8644Allocation: $7.02m · 59% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $1.49mUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $7.02m · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $687,113 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wJAAAHybridChronicle$4.06m34% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $448,857

$4.5m38% of vault$4.06m34% of vault$448,857separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chronicle(aggregator)

wJAAA is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg ((unnamed feed)) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

Base(unnamed feed)NAV

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC98% LLTV0x2e4e…d886Chronicle

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$448,8602 vaultsToken:0x86b4…ebfeAllocation: $4.5m · 38% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $1.16mUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $4.5m · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $448,857 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WBTCMarketChainlink$284,2132% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $30,443

$314,6553% of vault$284,2132% of vault$30,443separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator, managed)

WBTC uses a deviation/timelock managed oracle over Chainlink price-source leg(s), not a direct raw market-rate feed.

BaseWBTC / BTCMarketChainlinkBTC / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDC86% LLTV0xdddd…6b83Chainlink
→ USDC86% LLTV0xf156…0cf4Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$415.48m144 vaultsToken:0x2260…c599Allocation: $314,655 · 3% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $52,877Uses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $314,655 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $30,443 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChainlink$2,805<0.1% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $300.2

$3,105<0.1% of vault$2,805<0.1% of vault$300.2separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(composite)

wstETH is priced via Custom price feed for wstETH / ETH, quoted in USDC / ETH — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseCustom price feed for wstETH / ETHMarketQuoteUSDC / ETHMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 100bps

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDC86% LLTV0xe087…9f9fChainlink
→ USDC86% LLTV0x48f7…40e2Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$823m163 vaultsToken:0x7f39…2ca0Allocation: $3,105 · <0.1% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $521.81Uses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $3,105 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $300.2 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WETHMarketChainlink$657<0.1% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $70.34

$727.34<0.1% of vault$657<0.1% of vault$70.34separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

WETH is priced via ETH / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseETH / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x0f94…4580Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.488b96 vaultsToken:0xc02a…6cc2Allocation: $727.34 · <0.1% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $122.23Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $727.34 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $70.34 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbBTCMarketChainlink$223.46<0.1% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $23.9

$247.36<0.1% of vault$223.46<0.1% of vault$23.9separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(managed, aggregator)

cbBTC is priced via BTC / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 1h · Deviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDC86% LLTV0x9f98…34d2Chainlink
→ USDC86% LLTV0xa6d6…182aChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$255.6m148 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: $247.36 · <0.1% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $41.57Uses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $247.36 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $23.9 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+2 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

2 feeds · 1 control point

Up to$1.17mdrainable if these feeds are mispriced · 10% of vault

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC, wstETH, WETH, wUSCC0x21f7…73ca$30,837 · <1% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised
Chronicle· on-chain control not resolvedprices wJAAA, ACRDX$448,857 · 4% of vaultmispriceable if this feed lies
Unidentified feeds· vendor and on-chain control not resolvedprices wFalconX$687,113 · 6% of vaultmispriceable if these feeds lie

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure. Possible loss is the share of your deposit at the selected collateral drop; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong — a conditional loss if it happens, not a likelihood. Price-scaling rows move with the drop selector; the rest are fixed. Enter a deposit to see the dollar figures as your own. Open a row for conditions, mitigations, and the math.

10 scenarios · 8 with no time to exit

Collateral drop


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	$11.84m	Full deposit	Instant
	23%	$2.7m	up to $10.67m	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	23%	$2.7m	up to $10.67m	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(4)
	23%	$2.7m	up to $10.67m	Instant
	23%	$2.7m	up to $10.67m	Instant
	10%	$1.16m	up to $4.06m	Instant
	—	—	up to $1.17m	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	—	up to $5.92m	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner2-of-2 multisig0x433d…5c12

Curator2-of-7 multisig0x827e…ecdb

Sentinels1 · 1 contractSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

contract0x655c…cadb

Allocators4 · 1 multisig · 2 contracts · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

1-of-7 multisig0x0000…9da8
contract0x9bdc…241f
contract0xaad8…35e7
single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· 15 Dec, 2025report
Blackthorn· 4 Dec, 2025report
Spearbit· 4 Dec, 2025report
Blackthorn· 15 Sep, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer3-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 254,036

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 21 Jul, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql