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3F x Steakhouse USDC

Risk reportEthereum0xbeef…183d

Risk

Depositing into 3F x Steakhouse USDC means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

41%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 23% of deposit

Driven by wFalconX −30% 10% · wUSCC −30% 9% · wJAAA −30% 4% · other <1% · −100% 87% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

wFalconXHybrid43%of vault · bad debt · $6.72mOracle exposure 8%

51%of vault · $7.94m43%of vault · $6.72m8%separate path

What it's made of

wFalconX token page

Hybrid(composite)

AA_FalconXUSDC is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (Idle Tranches exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BaseIdle Tranches exchange rateExchange rate

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x52ea…93fc

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$4.76m12 vaultsToken:0x4614…8644Allocation: 51% of the vault · $7.94m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 10% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $7.94m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 8% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wUSCCMarketChainlink30%of vault · bad debt · $4.67mOracle exposure 3%

34%of vault · $5.21m30%of vault · $4.67m3%separate path

What it's made of

wUSCC token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC98% LLTV0x6806…3cabChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$536,7552 vaultsToken:0xf458…b7d9Allocation: 34% of the vault · $5.21m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 9% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $5.21m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wJAAAHybridChronicle13%of vault · bad debt · $2mOracle exposure 1%

14%of vault · $2.23m13%of vault · $2m1%separate path

What it's made of

wJAAA token page

Hybrid· Chronicle(aggregator)

wJAAA is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg ((unnamed feed)) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

Base(unnamed feed)NAV

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC98% LLTV0x2e4e…d886Chronicle

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$220,8272 vaultsToken:0x86b4…ebfeAllocation: 14% of the vault · $2.23m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 4% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2.23m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wmGLOHybrid0.8%of vault · bad debt · $127,863Oracle exposure 0.1%

0.9%of vault · $140,7110.8%of vault · $127,8630.1%separate path

What it's made of

wmGLO token page

Hybrid(composite)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0xc00c…cfcb

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$12,8502 vaultsToken:0xb8d6…b5e8Allocation: 0.9% of the vault · $140,711

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $140,711 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+5 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

2 feeds1 control point

Up to13%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $1.99m

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC, wstETH, WETH, wUSCC0x21f7…73ca3% of vault · $536,700drainable if it is compromised
Chronicle· onchain control not resolvedprices wJAAA, ACRDX1% of vault · $220,804mispriceable if this feed lies
Unidentified feeds· vendor and onchain control not resolvedprices wFalconX, wmGLO8% of vault · $1.23mmispriceable if these feeds lie


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	23%	up to 87%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	23%	up to 87%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	23%	up to 87%	Instant
	23%	up to 87%	Instant
	1%	up to 14%	Instant
	4%	up to 13%	Instant
	—	up to 13%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner2-of-2 multisig0x433d…5c12

Curator3-of-9 multisig0x827e…ecdb

Sentinels11 contractSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

contract0x655c…cadb

Allocators81 multisig4 contracts3 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

1-of-7 multisig0x0000…9da8
contract0x00b8…1e27
contract0x9bdc…241f
single key (EOA)0xbbf1…bceb
contract0xbeef…beef
contract0xaad8…35e7
single key (EOA)0xfc58…d827
single key (EOA)0xfeed…3c9a

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner6-of-1012 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 991,904.24

Voting TokenMORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 29min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

3F x Steakhouse USDC

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle