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Galaxy USDC Enhanced

Risk reportEthereum0xd95f…8d96

Risk

Depositing into Galaxy USDC Enhanced means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

38%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 18% of deposit

Driven by PST −30% 8% · cbBTC −30% 6% · reUSD −30% 3% · other 1% · −100% 90% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

PSTMarketChainlink41%of vault · bad debt · $3.89mOracle exposure 4%

45%of vault · $4.3m41%of vault · $3.89m4%separate path

What it's made of

PST token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xa565…8ac0Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$11.9m13 vaultsToken:0x22ae…d4c7Allocation: 45% of the vault · $4.3m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 8% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $4.3m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbBTCMarketChainlink33%of vault · bad debt · $3.12mOracle exposure 3%

36%of vault · $3.44m33%of vault · $3.12m3%separate path

What it's made of

cbBTC token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbBTC is priced via BTC / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 1hDeviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xa6d6…182aChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$299.65m104 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: 36% of the vault · $3.44m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 6% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $3.44m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

reUSDHybrid11%of vault · bad debt · $1.05mOracle exposure 2%

13%of vault · $1.21m11%of vault · $1.05m2%separate path

What it's made of

reUSD token page

Hybrid(exchange-rate)

reUSD is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (reUSD/USD exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BasereUSD/USD exchange rateExchange rate

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0xa66a…4e70

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.2m21 vaultsToken:0x5086…0c72Allocation: 13% of the vault · $1.21m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 3% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.21m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-USDat-14JAN2027Unclassified5%of vault · bad debt · $464,697Oracle exposure 0.4%

5%of vault · $502,9715%of vault · $464,6970.4%separate path

What it's made of

PT-USDat-14JAN2027 token page

Unclassified(managed)

Oracle design not classified (long-tail market).

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x034f…2dad

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.32m10 vaultsToken:0xba96…314fAllocation: 5% of the vault · $502,971

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $502,971 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

LBTCMarketRedStone / Chainlink0.6%of vault · bad debt · $54,217Oracle exposure 0.1%

0.6%of vault · $59,8150.6%of vault · $54,2170.1%separate path

What it's made of

LBTC token page

Market· RedStone / Chainlink(aggregator)

LBTC is priced via Redstone Price Feed × BTC / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (RedStone + Chainlink).

BaseRedstone Price FeedMarketRedStoneBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 1hDeviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xdcc0…29dbRedStone / Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$289,24117 vaultsToken:0x8236…4494Allocation: 0.6% of the vault · $59,815

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $59,815 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+3 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

2 feeds2 control points

Up to10%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $927,641

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink / RedStone·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, LBTC, PRIME, weETH, PST0x21f7…73ca8% of vault · $729,469drainable if it is compromised
RedStone / Chainlink·a 2/3 Safe multisigprices LBTC0x6906…4472<1% of vault · $5,598drainable if it is compromised
Onchain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices reUSD2% of vault · $159,899mispriceable only via the issuing contract
Unidentified feeds· vendor and onchain control not resolvedprices PT-USDat-14JAN2027<1% of vault · $38,273mispriceable if these feeds lie


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	18%	up to 90%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	18%	up to 90%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	18%	up to 90%	Instant
	18%	up to 90%	Instant
	2%	up to 13%	Instant
	3%	up to 11%	Instant
	—	up to 10%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Ownersingle key (EOA)0x42d5…419d

Curatorsingle key (EOA)0xa130…86f1

Sentinels11 EOASafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

single key (EOA)0xb4b1…aee0

Allocators22 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0x2034…e64b
single key (EOA)0xd1fc…3171

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner6-of-1012 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting TokenMORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 24min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Galaxy USDC Enhanced

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle