Galaxy USDC Enhanced

Risk reportEthereum0xd95f…8d96

Risk

Depositing into Galaxy USDC Enhanced means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

38%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 17% of deposit

Driven by PST −30% 5% · cbBTC −30% 5% · reUSD −30% 3% · other 4% · −100% 90% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

PSTMarketChainlink27%of vault · bad debt · $2.19mOracle exposure 3%

30%of vault · $2.42m27%of vault · $2.19m3%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xa565…8ac0Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.82m4 vaultsToken:0x22ae…d4c7Allocation: 30% of the vault · $2.42m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 5% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2.42m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbBTCMarketChainlink26%of vault · bad debt · $2.06mOracle exposure 3%

28%of vault · $2.28m26%of vault · $2.06m3%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbBTC is priced via BTC / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 1h · Deviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xa6d6…182aChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$306.44m151 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: 28% of the vault · $2.28m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 5% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2.28m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

reUSDHybrid13%of vault · bad debt · $1.07mOracle exposure 1%

15%of vault · $1.18m13%of vault · $1.07m1%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(exchange-rate)

reUSD is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (reUSD/USD exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BasereUSD/USD exchange rateExchange rate

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0xa66a…4e70

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$5.44m18 vaultsToken:0x5086…0c72Allocation: 15% of the vault · $1.18m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 3% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.18m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-USDat-27AUG2026HybridPTManaged11%of vault · bad debt · $896,833.95Oracle exposure 1%

12%of vault · $995,375.9111%of vault · $896,833.951%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(managed)PTManaged

PT-USDat-27AUG2026 uses an operator-managed oracle with deviation/timelock bounds; no verified external price-source provider was found.

BaseDeviation/timelock managed oracle wrapperQuoteNo independent quote feed identified

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0xda25…64cd

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$333,887.437 vaultsToken:0x1d69…1e08Allocation: 12% of the vault · $995,375.91

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 3% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $995,375.91 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

weETHHybridChainlink10%of vault · bad debt · $793,329.87Oracle exposure 1%

11%of vault · $895,111.8610%of vault · $793,329.871%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(composite)

weETH mixes exchange-rate/NAV (weETH/ETH exchange rate, Dummy feed with 12 decimals) with market-rate (ETH / USD) — insulated from weETH/ETH exchange rate, Dummy feed with 12 decimals market deviation, but exposed to ETH / USD.

BaseweETH/ETH exchange rateExchange rateETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteDummy feed with 12 decimalsNAV

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0xa3a7…8411Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$417.14m110 vaultsToken:0xcd5f…b7eeAllocation: 11% of the vault · $895,111.86

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.9% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $895,111.86 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

LBTCMarketRedStone / Chainlink2%of vault · bad debt · $167,056.5Oracle exposure 0.5%

3%of vault · $205,301.612%of vault · $167,056.50.5%separate path

What it's made of

Market· RedStone / Chainlink(aggregator)

LBTC is priced via Redstone Price Feed × BTC / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (RedStone + Chainlink).

BaseRedstone Price FeedMarketRedStoneBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 1h · Deviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xdcc0…29dbRedStone / Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$25.79m68 vaultsToken:0x8236…4494Allocation: 3% of the vault · $205,301.61

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.4% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $205,301.61 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.5% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PRIMEHybridChainlink0.4%of vault · bad debt · $35,380.58Oracle exposure 0.1%

0.6%of vault · $46,492.10.4%of vault · $35,380.580.1%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(aggregator)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x999e…119aChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$20.27m12 vaultsToken:0x19eb…f7f6Allocation: 0.6% of the vault · $46,492.1

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $46,492.1 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

Oracle dependencies

2 feeds · 2 control points

Up to10%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $810,921.03

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink / RedStone·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, LBTC, PRIME, weETH, PST0x21f7…73ca8% of vault · $605,245.07drainable if it is compromised
RedStone / Chainlink·a 2/3 Safe multisigprices LBTC0x6906…4472<1% of vault · $38,245.11drainable if it is compromised
On-chain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices reUSD1% of vault · $107,134.01mispriceable only via the issuing contract
Unidentified feeds· vendor and on-chain control not resolvedprices PT-USDat-27AUG20261% of vault · $98,541.95mispriceable if these feeds lie

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure, and every loss is a share of your deposit — the same percentage whatever you deposited. Loss is that share at a −30% collateral crash, the standard stress; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong, a conditional loss if it happens rather than a likelihood. Open a row for the loss at every crash depth, the dollar amounts, conditions, and the math.

11 scenarios · 9 with no time to exit · loss as % of deposit


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	17%	up to 90%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	17%	up to 90%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	17%	up to 90%	Instant
	17%	up to 90%	Instant
	4%	up to 39%	Instant
	7%	up to 35%	Instant
	—	up to 10%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Ownersingle key (EOA)0x42d5…419d

Curatorsingle key (EOA)0xa130…86f1

Sentinels1 · 1 EOASafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

single key (EOA)0xb4b1…aee0

Allocators2 · 2 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0x2034…e64b
single key (EOA)0xd1fc…3171

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 254,036.33

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated Aug 20, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql