Gauntlet USDC Prime
Risk reportEthereum0x8c10…a3d0
Risk
Depositing into Gauntlet USDC Prime means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.
Left to right, a deeper collateral crash. Hover any point for the scenarios that drive the loss — only a smart-contract bug reaches a total loss.
Collateral and oracle exposure
Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.
Driven by WBTC $11.76m · cbBTC $1.07m · wstETH $395,563.27 · other $327,077.28 · −100% $72.82m modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling
WBTCMarketChainlink$63.2m79% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $6.64m$69.84m87% of vault$63.2m79% of vault$6.64mseparate path
WBTCMarketChainlink$63.2m79% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $6.64mWhat it's made of
WBTC uses a deviation/timelock managed oracle over Chainlink price-source leg(s), not a direct raw market-rate feed.
- → USDC86% LLTV0xdddd…6b83Chainlink
- → USDC86% LLTV0xf156…0cf4Chainlink
If it breaks
vault −30%cbBTCMarketChainlink$5.73m7% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $602,737.35$6.34m8% of vault$5.73m7% of vault$602,737.35separate path
cbBTCMarketChainlink$5.73m7% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $602,737.35What it's made of
cbBTC uses a deviation/timelock managed oracle over Chainlink price-source leg(s), not a direct raw market-rate feed.
- → USDC86% LLTV0xa6d6…182aChainlink
- → USDC86% LLTV0x9f98…34d2Chainlink
If it breaks
vault −30%wstETHMarketChainlink$2.13m3% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $223,497.57$2.35m3% of vault$2.13m3% of vault$223,497.57separate path
wstETHMarketChainlink$2.13m3% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $223,497.57What it's made of
wstETH is priced via Custom price feed for wstETH / ETH, quoted in USDC / ETH — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).
- → USDC86% LLTV0xe087…9f9fChainlink
- → USDC86% LLTV0x48f7…40e2Chainlink
If it breaks
vault −30%WETHMarketChainlink$1.76m2% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $184,729.49$1.94m2% of vault$1.76m2% of vault$184,729.49separate path
WETHMarketChainlink$1.76m2% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $184,729.49What it's made of
WETH is priced via ETH / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).
- → USDC86% LLTV0x0f94…4580Chainlink
If it breaks
vault −30%Oracle dependencies
1 feed · 1 control pointUp to$7.65mdrainable if these feeds are mispriced · 10% of vault
Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.
- Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC, wstETH, WETH0x21f7…73ca$7.65m · 10% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised
Loss scenarios
Each row is a distinct failure. Possible loss is the share of your deposit at the selected collateral drop; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong — a conditional loss if it happens, not a likelihood. Price-scaling rows move with the drop selector; the rest are fixed. Enter a deposit to see the dollar figures as your own. Open a row for conditions, mitigations, and the math.
| Full-deposit & protocol-level(2) | |||||
| 100% | $80.46m | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| 17% | $13.55m | up to $72.82m | Instant | ||
| Price-driven collateral stress(1) | |||||
| 17% | $13.55m | up to $72.82m | Instant | ||
| Oracle & liquidation failures(4) | |||||
| 17% | $13.55m | up to $72.82m | Instant | ||
| 17% | $13.46m | up to $72.36m | Instant | ||
| — | — | up to $7.65m | Instant | ||
| <1% | $85,931.53 | up to $461,881.99 | Instant | ||
| Vault role & allocator(3) | |||||
| — | — | Full deposit | 3 days | ||
| — | — | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| — | — | up to $40.23m | 3 days | ||
Trust and control
The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.
Vault operators
The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.
Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land
Sentinels3 · 1 multisig · 2 EOAsSafety role · veto only
Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.
- single key (EOA)0x41a5…1eed
- 3-of-7 multisig0x7084…84cd
- single key (EOA)0xaffc…13c0
Allocators3 · 1 multisig · 2 EOAsReaches deposit · instant
Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.
- single key (EOA)0x1aad…6363
- 3-of-7 multisig0x9e33…0585
- single key (EOA)0xa690…da21
Audits
- Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
- Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
- Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
- Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report
Governance & control
Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.
MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2Dependencies that can affect your deposit
8 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.
Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).
No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.