Paypal USD Main

Risk reportEthereum0xb576…9fb2

Risk

Depositing into Paypal USD Main means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

37%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 17% of deposit

Driven by kBTC −30% 7% · syrupUSDC −30% 5% · weETH −30% 3% · other 3% · −100% 86% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

kBTCMarketChainlink39%of vault · bad debt · $121.43mOracle exposure 4%

43%of vault · $132.92m39%of vault · $121.43m4%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

kBTC is priced via BTC / USD, quoted in PYUSD / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlinkQuotePYUSD / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ PYUSD86% LLTV0x007d…cf18Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$23.76m7 vaultsToken:0x73e0…db98Allocation: 43% of the vault · $132.92m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 7% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $132.92m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

syrupUSDCHybridChainlink22%of vault · bad debt · $67.66mOracle exposure 3%

24%of vault · $75.8m22%of vault · $67.66m3%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(aggregator)

syrupUSDC mixes exchange-rate/NAV (ERC4626 vault share-rate) with market-rate (USDC / USD, PYUSD / USD) — insulated from ERC4626 vault share-rate market deviation, but exposed to USDC / USD, PYUSD / USD.

BaseUSDC / USDMarketChainlinkQuotePYUSD / USDMarketChainlinkBaseERC4626 vault share-rateVault

Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 30bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ PYUSD92% LLTV0xc804…7039Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$14.68m23 vaultsToken:0x80ac…cc0bAllocation: 24% of the vault · $75.8m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 5% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $75.8m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

weETHHybridChainlink14%of vault · bad debt · $44.26mOracle exposure 1%

15%of vault · $47.83m14%of vault · $44.26m1%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(aggregator)

weETH mixes exchange-rate/NAV (weETH / ETH) with market-rate (ETH / USD, PYUSD / USD) — insulated from weETH / ETH market deviation, but exposed to ETH / USD, PYUSD / USD.

BaseweETH / ETHExchange rateChainlinkETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuotePYUSD / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ PYUSD86% LLTV0x2218…ee11Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$431.52m110 vaultsToken:0xcd5f…b7eeAllocation: 15% of the vault · $47.83m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 3% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $47.83m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

sUSDeHybridChainlink7%of vault · bad debt · $20.68mOracle exposure 0.7%

7%of vault · $22.85m7%of vault · $20.68m0.7%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(aggregator)

sUSDe mixes exchange-rate/NAV (ERC4626 vault share-rate) with market-rate (USDe / USD, PYUSD / USD) — insulated from ERC4626 vault share-rate market deviation, but exposed to USDe / USD, PYUSD / USD.

BaseUSDe / USDMarketChainlinkQuotePYUSD / USDMarketChainlinkBaseERC4626 vault share-rateVault

Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ PYUSD92% LLTV0xe621…9e7eChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$225.53m79 vaultsToken:0x9d39…3497Allocation: 7% of the vault · $22.85m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $22.85m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.7% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

LBTCMarketRedStone / Chainlink3%of vault · bad debt · $10.15mOracle exposure 0.2%

3%of vault · $10.76m3%of vault · $10.15m0.2%separate path

What it's made of

Market· RedStone / Chainlink(aggregator)

LBTC is priced via Redstone Price Feed × BTC / USD, quoted in PYUSD / USD — 3-hop market-rate feeds (RedStone + Chainlink).

BaseRedstone Price FeedMarketRedStoneBTC / USDMarketChainlinkQuotePYUSD / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ PYUSD86% LLTV0x0aea…4b1fRedStone / Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$26.58m68 vaultsToken:0x8236…4494Allocation: 3% of the vault · $10.76m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.6% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $10.76m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChainlink1.0%of vault · bad debt · $3.08mOracle exposure 0.1%

1%of vault · $3.39m1.0%of vault · $3.08m0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(composite)

wstETH is priced via Custom price feed for wstETH / ETH × ETH / USD, quoted in PYUSD / USD — 3-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseCustom price feed for wstETH / ETHMarketETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuotePYUSD / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ PYUSD86% LLTV0x9f02…7916Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$880.38m166 vaultsToken:0x7f39…2ca0Allocation: 1% of the vault · $3.39m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $3.39m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbBTCMarketChainlink0.6%of vault · bad debt · $1.94mOracle exposure 0.1%

0.7%of vault · $2.19m0.6%of vault · $1.94m0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbBTC is priced via cbBTC / USD, quoted in PYUSD / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BasecbBTC / USDMarketChainlinkQuotePYUSD / USDMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 24h · Deviation 200bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ PYUSD86% LLTV0x7681…e9caChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$349.63m152 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: 0.7% of the vault · $2.19m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2.19m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WBTCMarketChainlink0.3%of vault · bad debt · $904,632.3Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.3%of vault · $993,733.670.3%of vault · $904,632.3<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

WBTC is priced via WBTC / BTC × BTC / USD, quoted in PYUSD / USD — 3-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseWBTC / BTCMarketChainlinkBTC / USDMarketChainlinkQuotePYUSD / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ PYUSD86% LLTV0x4124…dd1dChainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$396.72m148 vaultsToken:0x2260…c599Allocation: 0.3% of the vault · $993,733.67

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $993,733.67 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

Unallocated (incl. $15.67m idle)not lent into any market — no collateral exposure5% · $15.66m

5%of vault · $15.66m——

+2 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

2 feeds · 2 control points

Up to9%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $26.61m

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink / RedStone·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC, LBTC, wstETH, WETH, sUSDe, weETH, kBTC, syrupUSDC, PT-sUSDE-13AUG20260x21f7…73ca9% of vault · $26.61mdrainable if it is compromised
RedStone / Chainlink·a 2/3 Safe multisigprices LBTC0x6906…4472<1% of vault · $608,735.3drainable if it is compromised

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure, and every loss is a share of your deposit — the same percentage whatever you deposited. Loss is that share at a −30% collateral crash, the standard stress; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong, a conditional loss if it happens rather than a likelihood. Open a row for the loss at every crash depth, the dollar amounts, conditions, and the math.

11 scenarios · 9 with no time to exit · loss as % of deposit


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	17%	up to 86%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	17%	up to 86%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	17%	up to 86%	Instant
	17%	up to 86%	Instant
	4%	up to 47%	Instant
	9%	up to 42%	Instant
	—	up to 9%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner1-of-1 multisig0xe8c9…8008

Curator1-of-1 multisig0x9e39…aac0

Sentinels2 · 1 multisig · 1 EOASafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

single key (EOA)0x74d1…1618
1-of-1 multisig0x9e39…aac0

Allocators3 · 1 multisig · 2 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0x13de…90e1
1-of-1 multisig0x9e39…aac0
single key (EOA)0xc4ba…79d3

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 254,036.33

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

8 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated Aug 21, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql