Gauntlet USDC Core

Risk reportBase0xc0c5…eb12

Risk

Depositing into Gauntlet USDC Core means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

37%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 16% of deposit

Driven by cbBTC −30% 15% · WETH −30% <1% · LBTC −30% <1% · other <1% · −100% 90% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

cbBTCMarketChainlink81%of vault · bad debt · $1.49mOracle exposure 9%

90%of vault · $1.66m81%of vault · $1.49m9%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbBTC is priced via BTC / USD — market-rate feed (Chainlink).

BaseBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x663b…39b9Chainlink

Room to grow: $1.66m of $199.99m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$196.1m51 vaultsToken:0xcbb7…33bfAllocation: 90% of the vault · $1.66m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 15% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.66m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 9% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

cbETHMarketChainlink3%of vault · bad debt · $62,629Oracle exposure 0.4%

4%of vault · $69,4983%of vault · $62,6290.4%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

cbETH mixes exchange-rate/NAV (cbETH-ETH Exchange Rate) with market-rate (ETH / USD, USDC / USD) — insulated from cbETH-ETH Exchange Rate market deviation, but exposed to ETH / USD, USDC / USD.

BasecbETH-ETH Exchange RateExchange rateChainlinkETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 3

→ USDC77% LLTV0x97ff…8295Chainlink
→ USDC86% LLTV0xb40d…cd96Chainlink
→ USDC86% LLTV0x4756…9425Chainlink

Room to grow: $69,498 of $40m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$20.39m43 vaultsToken:0x2ae3…ec22Allocation: 4% of the vault · $69,498

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.3% of depositUses 3 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $69,498 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WETHMarketChainlink3%of vault · bad debt · $49,057Oracle exposure 0.3%

3%of vault · $54,3293%of vault · $49,0570.3%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

WETH is priced via ETH / USD, quoted in USDC / USD — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xfea2…afe4Chainlink

Room to grow: $54,329 of $20m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$58.4m33 vaultsToken:0x4200…0006Allocation: 3% of the vault · $54,329

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.5% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $54,329 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

LBTCHybridRedStone / Chainlink2%of vault · bad debt · $42,848Oracle exposure 0.2%

3%of vault · $47,4042%of vault · $42,8480.2%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· RedStone / Chainlink(aggregator)

LBTC mixes exchange-rate/NAV (RedStone Price Feed for LBTC_FUNDAMENTAL) with market-rate (BTC / USD) — insulated from RedStone Price Feed for LBTC_FUNDAMENTAL market deviation, but exposed to BTC / USD.

BaseRedStone Price Feed for LBTC_FUNDAMENTALNAVRedStoneBTC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x6e87…8e4fRedStone / Chainlink

Room to grow: $47,404 of $8m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$3.74m12 vaultsToken:0xecac…11c1Allocation: 3% of the vault · $47,404

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.4% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $47,404 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

weETHHybridChainlink0.7%of vault · bad debt · $12,630Oracle exposure 0.1%

0.8%of vault · $13,9980.7%of vault · $12,6300.1%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(aggregator)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0xaacb…fab0Chainlink

Room to grow: $13,998 of $499,977 cap (3% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$16.42m11 vaultsToken:0x04c0…150aAllocation: 0.8% of the vault · $13,998

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $13,998 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChainlink0.4%of vault · bad debt · $8,172Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.5%of vault · $9,0380.4%of vault · $8,172<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

wstETH is priced via WSTETH / ETH × ETH / USD, quoted in USDC / USD — 3-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseWSTETH / ETHMarketChainlinkETH / USDMarketChainlinkQuoteUSDC / USDMarketChainlink

Markets this collateral backs · 2

→ USDC86% LLTV0x957e…ce5fChainlink
→ USDC86% LLTV0xd7a1…289aChainlink

Room to grow: $9,038 of $15m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$31.98m34 vaultsToken:0xc1cb…e452Allocation: 0.5% of the vault · $9,038

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.1% of depositUses 2 market LLTV curves · capped at allocation $9,038 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

Oracle dependencies

2 feeds · 2 control points

Up to10%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $183,725

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink / RedStone·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices wstETH, WETH, weETH, cbBTC, cbETH, LBTC0xf0db…5b1b10% of vault · $183,725drainable if it is compromised
RedStone / Chainlink·a 2/3 Safe multisigprices LBTC0x9b73…22b6<1% of vault · $4,555drainable if it is compromised


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	16%	up to 90%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	16%	up to 90%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(6)
	16%	up to 90%	Instant
	16%	up to 90%	Instant
	16%	up to 90%	Instant
	—	up to 10%	Instant
	<1%	up to 3%	Instant
	<1%	up to 3%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(4)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days
	—	0%	Instant

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner4-of-7 multisig0x5a4e…d4d0

Curator3-of-7 multisig0x9e33…0585

Guardian3-of-7 multisig0x7084…84cd

Allocators2 · 1 contract · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

contract0xa090…0467
single key (EOA)0xc12d…099c

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

11 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated Sep 29, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Gauntlet USDC Core

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle