⌘K

Hyperithm USDC Apex

Risk reportArbitrum0x4b6f…f027

Risk

Depositing into Hyperithm USDC Apex means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

36%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 16% of deposit

Driven by WBTC −30% 8% · wstETH −30% 5% · sUSDS −30% 2% · other 1% · −100% 84% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

WBTCMarketChainlink43%of vault · bad debt · $147,741Oracle exposure 5%

48%of vault · $165,13443%of vault · $147,7415%separate path

What it's made of

WBTC token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

WBTC uses Chainlink market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseChainlink market-rate feed pathQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x8819…14d9Chainlink

Room to grow: $165,134 of $19.99m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$41.73m11 vaultsToken:0x2f2a…5b0fAllocation: 48% of the vault · $165,134

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 8% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $165,134 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 5% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChainlink27%of vault · bad debt · $93,920Oracle exposure 3%

31%of vault · $105,04227%of vault · $93,9203%separate path

What it's made of

wstETH token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

wstETH uses Chainlink market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseChainlink market-rate feed pathQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x8e02…ae31Chainlink

Room to grow: $105,042 of $19.99m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$47.33m11 vaultsToken:0x5979…0529Allocation: 31% of the vault · $105,042

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 5% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $105,042 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

sUSDSHardcodedChainlink7%of vault · bad debt · $23,616Oracle exposure 0.8%

8%of vault · $26,2277%of vault · $23,6160.8%separate path

What it's made of

sUSDS token page

Hardcoded· Chainlink(aggregator)

Price is fixed and won't move on a real depeg — divergence accrues as bad debt.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC95% LLTV0x52cc…7124Chainlink

Room to grow: $26,227 of $19.99m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$29,1129 vaultsToken:0xddb4…7610Allocation: 8% of the vault · $26,227

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $26,227 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.8% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

WETHMarketChainlink5%of vault · bad debt · $17,285Oracle exposure 0.6%

6%of vault · $19,2375%of vault · $17,2850.6%separate path

What it's made of

WETH token page

Market· Chainlink(aggregator)

WETH uses Chainlink market-rate aggregator feed(s).

BaseChainlink market-rate feed pathQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x282f…71a2Chainlink

Room to grow: $19,237 of $19.99m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$18.29m10 vaultsToken:0x82af…bab1Allocation: 6% of the vault · $19,237

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.9% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $19,237 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.6% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

syrupUSDCHybridChainlink2%of vault · bad debt · $5,273Oracle exposure <0.1%

2%of vault · $5,2732%of vault · $5,273<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

syrupUSDC token page

Hybrid· Chainlink(aggregator)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x8f30…7009Chainlink

Room to grow: $5,273 of $29.99m cap (<1% used)Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$314,2736 vaultsToken:0x41ca…42b5Allocation: 2% of the vault · $5,273

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.4% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $5,273 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

Unallocated (incl. $21,091 idle)not lent into any market — no collateral exposure6% · $21,125

6%of vault · $21,125——

+1 market with no current position

Oracle dependencies

1 feed1 control point

Up to10%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $33,080

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices wstETH, syrupUSDC, WBTC, WETH, sUSDS0x2f3b…d3c59% of vault · $30,468drainable if it is compromised


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	16%	up to 84%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	16%	up to 84%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	16%	up to 84%	Instant
	16%	up to 84%	Instant
	16%	up to 84%	Instant
	—	up to 10%	Instant
	2%	up to 8%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(4)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days
	—	0%	Instant

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner2-of-3 multisig0xee7e…18c8

Curatorsingle key (EOA)0x7517…a325

Guardiannone appointed

Allocators21 contract1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

contract0x7695…355e
single key (EOA)0x345e…3c5f

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xfd35…d9b2

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting TokenMORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

11 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 28min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Hyperithm USDC Apex

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle