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Kabu USDC

Risk reportEthereum0x5421…e3f4

Risk

Depositing into Kabu USDC means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

22%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 7-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 4% of deposit

Driven by wstETH −30% 3% · UNI −30% <1% · −100% 87% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

ONDOMarketAPI329%of vault · bad debt · $414,731Oracle exposure 5%

34%of vault · $480,47429%of vault · $414,7315%separate path

What it's made of

ONDO token page

Market· API3(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0x77cc…bd63API3

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$67,8062 vaultsToken:0xfaba…9be3Allocation: 34% of the vault · $480,474

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $480,474 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 5% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

MORPHOMarketAPI326%of vault · bad debt · $368,131Oracle exposure 4%

30%of vault · $427,36126%of vault · $368,1314%separate path

What it's made of

MORPHO token page

Market· API3(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0xeecd…6a2eAPI3

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$74,5523 vaultsToken:0x58d9…c2b2Allocation: 30% of the vault · $427,361

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $427,361 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

wstETHMarketChainlink19%of vault · bad debt · $265,532Oracle exposure 3%

21%of vault · $304,34519%of vault · $265,5323%separate path

What it's made of

wstETH token page

Market· Chainlink(composite)

wstETH is priced via Custom price feed for wstETH / ETH, quoted in USDC / ETH — 2-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).

BaseCustom price feed for wstETH / ETHMarketQuoteUSDC / ETHMarketChainlink

Heartbeat 24hDeviation 100bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x48f7…40e2Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$410.62m106 vaultsToken:0x7f39…2ca0Allocation: 21% of the vault · $304,345

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 3% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $304,345 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

SYRUPMarketAPI310%of vault · bad debt · $137,728Oracle exposure 2%

11%of vault · $159,59210%of vault · $137,7282%separate path

What it's made of

SYRUP token page

Market· API3(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0x7f5a…ce96API3

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$23,0092 vaultsToken:0x643c…2d66Allocation: 11% of the vault · $159,592

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $159,592 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

UNIMarketAPI32%of vault · bad debt · $30,921Oracle exposure 0.2%

2%of vault · $34,0302%of vault · $30,9210.2%separate path

What it's made of

UNI token page

Market· API3(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0xa4c9…8ddbAPI3

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$921,4772 vaultsToken:0x1f98…f984Allocation: 2% of the vault · $34,030

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $34,030 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

ENAMarketAPI30.6%of vault · bad debt · $8,015Oracle exposure 0.1%

0.6%of vault · $8,7810.6%of vault · $8,0150.1%separate path

What it's made of

ENA token page

Market· API3(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0x80ce…22d1API3

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$766.582 vaultsToken:0x57e1…6061Allocation: 0.6% of the vault · $8,781

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $8,781 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

COMPMarketAPI30.1%of vault · bad debt · $920.10Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.1%of vault · $1,0700.1%of vault · $920.10<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

COMP token page

Market· API3(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0x1e96…5f53API3

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$150.101 vaultsToken:0xc00e…6888Allocation: 0.1% of the vault · $1,070

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1,070 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

FLUIDMarketAPI3<0.1%of vault · bad debt · $310.99Oracle exposure <0.1%

<0.1%of vault · $344.95<0.1%of vault · $310.99<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

FLUID token page

Market· API3(aggregator)

Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC63% LLTV0x5158…d306API3

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$33.971 vaultsToken:0x6f40…03ebAllocation: <0.1% of the vault · $344.95

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:no modeled bad debtUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $344.95 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+1 market with no current position

Oracle dependencies

2 feeds2 control points

Up to13%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $189,759

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

API3·a 4/8 Safe multisigprices BAL, EIGEN, ENA, FLUID, MORPHO, COMP, ONDO, UNI, SYRUP0x2aae…c9e811% of vault · $150,946drainable if it is compromised
Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices wstETH0x21f7…73ca3% of vault · $38,813drainable if it is compromised


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	4%	up to 87%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	4%	up to 87%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(3)
	4%	up to 87%	Instant
	4%	up to 21%	Instant
	—	up to 13%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	7 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	7 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 7 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner3-of-5 multisig0xbbe0…13da

Curator3-of-5 multisig0x24db…32f0

Sentinels11 multisigSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

1-of-4 multisig0x5a9a…77c2

Allocators21 contract1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

contract0x00b8…1e27
single key (EOA)0x935c…1287

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner6-of-1012 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 991,904.24

Voting TokenMORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

8 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 26min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Kabu USDC

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle