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Hyperithm USDC Apex

Risk reportEthereum0x0932…9e2f

Risk

Depositing into Hyperithm USDC Apex means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

39%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 18% of deposit

Driven by PT-USDat-14JAN2027 −30% 13% · PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 −30% 4% · mHyperBTC −30% 2% · other <1% · −100% 89% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

PT-USDat-14JAN2027Unclassified53%of vault · bad debt · $4mOracle exposure 6%

60%of vault · $4.47m53%of vault · $4m6%separate path

What it's made of

PT-USDat-14JAN2027 token page

Unclassified(managed)

Oracle design not classified (long-tail market).

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x034f…2dad

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.44m10 vaultsToken:0xba96…314fAllocation: 60% of the vault · $4.47m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 13% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $4.47m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 6% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026HybridPTMarket rate18%of vault · bad debt · $1.33mOracle exposure 2%

19%of vault · $1.45m18%of vault · $1.33m2%separate path

What it's made of

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 token page

Hybrid(composite)PTMarket rate

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 PT is priced by a Pendle market-rate oracle.

BaseOjo PT Feed Pendle Chainlink-compatible OracleNAV

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x217d…51f0

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$17.42m22 vaultsToken:0xecfa…3957Allocation: 19% of the vault · $1.45m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 4% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.45m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

mHyperBTCHybridChainlink18%of vault · bad debt · $1.33mOracle exposure 3%

20%of vault · $1.53m18%of vault · $1.33m3%separate path

What it's made of

mHyperBTC token page

Hybrid· Chainlink(composite, managed)

mHyperBTC uses a composite oracle path; verified external provider(s): Chainlink.

BaseComposite base price pathQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0xece5…a3c1Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$337,7523 vaultsToken:0xc849…3085Allocation: 20% of the vault · $1.53m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.53m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-sUSDat-14JAN2027Unclassified0.3%of vault · bad debt · $25,073Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.4%of vault · $28,8200.3%of vault · $25,073<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

PT-sUSDat-14JAN2027 token page

Unclassified(managed)

Oracle design not classified (long-tail market).

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0xf8d5…dc4d

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$3,7463 vaultsToken:0x0b98…0517Allocation: 0.4% of the vault · $28,820

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $28,820 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

mHYPERMarket0.2%of vault · bad debt · $15,402Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.2%of vault · $16,9250.2%of vault · $15,402<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

mHYPER token page

Market(composite)

mHYPER is priced via mHYPER/USD — market-rate feed.

BasemHYPER/USDMarket

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0xdabd…f1c0

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$38,7566 vaultsToken:0x9b55…91b9Allocation: 0.2% of the vault · $16,925

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $16,925 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

sUSDatHybrid0.1%of vault · bad debt · $4,073Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.1%of vault · $4,6810.1%of vault · $4,073<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

sUSDat token page

Hybrid(managed)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x5228…461d

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$95,2497 vaultsToken:0xd166…2df7Allocation: 0.1% of the vault · $4,681

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to <0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $4,681 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+32 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

2 feeds2 control points

Up to11%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $788,944

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink / RedStone / eOracle·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC, wstETH, PT-apxUSD-18JUN2026, mHyperBTC, PT-apyUSD-5NOV2026, stcUSD, PT-apxUSD-5NOV2026, stUSDS, PT-apyUSD-27AUG2026, PT-apyUSD-18JUN2026, PT-USDG-28MAY2026, PT-apxUSD-27AUG20260x21f7…73ca3% of vault · $195,916drainable if it is compromised
RedStone / Chainlink·a 2/3 Safe multisigprices PT-cUSD-23JUL2026, stcUSD, PT-srNUSD-28MAY2026, PT-sNUSD-4JUN2026, PT-stcUSD-23JUL2026, srNUSD0x6906…4472<1% of vault · $0.00000015drainable if it is compromised
Unidentified feeds· vendor and onchain control not resolvedprices PT-USDat-14JAN2027, PT-reUSD-10DEC2026, PT-sUSDat-14JAN2027, mHYPER, sUSDat, PT-sNUSD-5MAR20268% of vault · $593,028mispriceable if these feeds lie
Onchain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices jrUSDe<1% of vault · $0.00000095mispriceable only via the issuing contract


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	18%	up to 89%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	18%	up to 89%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	18%	up to 89%	Instant
	18%	up to 89%	Instant
	4%	up to 40%	Instant
	6%	up to 36%	Instant
	—	up to 11%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Owner2-of-3 multisig0xee7e…18c8

Curatorsingle key (EOA)0x7517…a325

Sentinels22 EOAsSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

single key (EOA)0x5d7a…3a7e
single key (EOA)0xc56e…40fd

Allocators21 contract1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

contract0x00b8…1e27
single key (EOA)0x9123…562f

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner6-of-1012 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 991,904.24

Voting TokenMORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 27min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Hyperithm USDC Apex

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle