Hyperithm USDC Apex

Risk reportEthereum0x0932…9e2f

Risk

Depositing into Hyperithm USDC Apex means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

$4.16mrealistic worst · −50% collateral crashup to $10.99mSmart-contract bug · extreme only

−10%−30%−50%extreme

Left to right, a deeper collateral crash. Hover any point for the scenarios that drive the loss — only a smart-contract bug reaches a total loss.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest 15 Dec, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropvault-wide · no liquidations · stress estimate

−30%est. bad debt up to $1.65m

tap a preset or drag

Driven by PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 $842,767 · mHYPER $281,620 · mHyperBTC $224,025 · other $304,367 · −100% $10.44m modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026HybridPTMarket rate$3.59m33% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $518,827

$4.11m34% of vault$3.59m33% of vault$518,827separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(composite)PTMarket rate

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 PT is priced by a Pendle market-rate oracle.

BaseOjo PT Feed Pendle Chainlink-compatible OracleNAV

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x217d…51f0

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$4.6m14 vaultsToken:0xecfa…3957Allocation: $4.11m · 34% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $842,767Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $4.11m · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $518,827 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

mHYPERMarket$3.1m28% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $435,970

$3.53m29% of vault$3.1m28% of vault$435,970separate path

What it's made of

Market(composite)

mHYPER is priced via mHYPER/USD — market-rate feed.

BasemHYPER/USDMarket

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0xdabd…f1c0

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$611,3465 vaultsToken:0x9b55…91b9Allocation: $3.53m · 29% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $281,620Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $3.53m · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $435,970 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

mHyperBTCHybridChainlink$2.46m22% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $289,099

$2.75m23% of vault$2.46m22% of vault$289,099separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(composite, managed)

mHyperBTC uses a composite oracle path; verified external provider(s): Chainlink.

BaseComposite base price pathQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0xece5…a3c1Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$289,1414 vaultsToken:0xc849…3085Allocation: $2.75m · 23% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $224,025Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2.75m · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $289,099 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-sUSDat-27AUG2026HybridPTManaged$703,0996% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $78,120

$781,2196% of vault$703,0996% of vault$78,120separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(managed)PTManaged

PT-sUSDat-27AUG2026 uses an operator-managed oracle with deviation/timelock bounds; no verified external price-source provider was found.

BaseDeviation/timelock managed oracle wrapperQuoteNo independent quote feed identified

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x4fcf…bb39

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$157,2913 vaultsToken:0xc689…84f7Allocation: $781,219 · 6% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $165,209Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $781,219 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $78,120 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-USDat-27AUG2026HybridPTManaged$555,5875% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $59,340

$614,9275% of vault$555,5875% of vault$59,340separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(managed)PTManaged

PT-USDat-27AUG2026 uses an operator-managed oracle with deviation/timelock bounds; no verified external price-source provider was found.

BaseDeviation/timelock managed oracle wrapperQuoteNo independent quote feed identified

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0xda25…64cd

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.09m7 vaultsToken:0x1d69…1e08Allocation: $614,927 · 5% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $130,548Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $614,927 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $59,340 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-srUSDat-27AUG2026HybridPTManaged$35,4650.3% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $3,940

$39,4050.3% of vault$35,4650.3% of vault$3,940separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(managed)PTManaged

PT-srUSDat-27AUG2026 uses an operator-managed oracle with deviation/timelock bounds; no verified external price-source provider was found.

BaseDeviation/timelock managed oracle wrapperQuoteNo independent quote feed identified

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x3296…32d7

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$4,3343 vaultsToken:0x2d43…82b4Allocation: $39,405 · 0.3% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $8,333Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $39,405 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $3,940 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

sUSDatHybrideOracle$1,176<0.1% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $199,963

$201,1392% of vault$1,176<0.1% of vault$199,963separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· eOracle(managed)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x5228…461deOracle

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.07m5 vaultsToken:0xd166…2df7Allocation: $201,139 · 2% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $276.29Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $201,139 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $199,963 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

srNUSDHybridRedStone$1<0.1% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $0.0019

$1<0.1% of vault$1<0.1% of vault$0.0019separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· RedStone(managed)

srNUSD uses a deviation/timelock managed oracle over RedStone price-source leg(s), not a direct raw market-rate feed.

BaseDeviation/timelock managed oracle wrapperQuoteRedStone underlying price-source leg(s)

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x9e10…f4beRedStone

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.22 vaultsToken:0x65a4…89dbAllocation: $1 · <0.1% of the vault

If it breaks

vault −30%

At −30%:est. bad debt up to $0.23Uses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1 · inherits vault-wide stress

Oracle exposure: up to $0.0019 drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+28 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

3 feeds · 2 control points

Up to$1.59mdrainable if these feeds are mispriced · 14% of vault

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink / RedStone / eOracle·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC, wstETH, PT-apxUSD-18JUN2026, mHyperBTC, PT-apyUSD-5NOV2026, stcUSD, PT-apxUSD-5NOV2026, stUSDS, PT-apyUSD-27AUG2026, PT-apyUSD-18JUN2026, PT-USDG-28MAY2026, PT-apxUSD-27AUG20260x21f7…73ca$289,099 · 3% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised
RedStone / Chainlink·a 2/3 Safe multisigprices PT-cUSD-23JUL2026, stcUSD, PT-srNUSD-28MAY2026, PT-sNUSD-4JUN2026, PT-stcUSD-23JUL2026, srNUSD0x6906…4472$0.0019 · <1% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised
Unidentified feeds· vendor and on-chain control not resolvedprices PT-reUSD-10DEC2026, mHYPER, PT-sUSDat-27AUG2026, PT-USDat-27AUG2026, PT-srUSDat-27AUG2026, siUSD, mF-ONE, wFalconX, ROY-ST-apyUSD$1.1m · 10% of vaultmispriceable if these feeds lie
On-chain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices reUSD, srmHYPER, jrUSDe$0.0011 · <1% of vaultmispriceable only via the issuing contract

Loss scenarios

Each row is a distinct failure. Possible loss is the share of your deposit at the selected collateral drop; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong — a conditional loss if it happens, not a likelihood. Price-scaling rows move with the drop selector; the rest are fixed. Enter a deposit to see the dollar figures as your own. Open a row for conditions, mitigations, and the math.

10 scenarios · 8 with no time to exit

Collateral drop


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	$10.99m	Full deposit	Instant
	15%	$1.65m	up to $10.44m	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	15%	$1.65m	up to $10.44m	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(4)
	15%	$1.65m	up to $10.44m	Instant
	15%	$1.65m	up to $10.44m	Instant
	12%	$1.37m	up to $7.35m	Instant
	—	—	up to $1.59m	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	—	up to $5.49m	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Curator change queued

The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.

raise a market's supply cap ×4— applies now; no time to exit first

Owner2-of-3 multisig0xee7e…18c8

Curatorsingle key (EOA)0x7517…a325

Sentinels1 · 1 EOASafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

single key (EOA)0xc56e…40fd

Allocators1 · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0x9123…562f

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· 15 Dec, 2025report
Blackthorn· 4 Dec, 2025report
Spearbit· 4 Dec, 2025report
Blackthorn· 15 Sep, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner5-of-912 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer3-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 254,036

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 21 Jul, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql