Hyperithm USDC Apex

Risk reportEthereum0x0932…9e2f

Risk

Depositing into Hyperithm USDC Apex means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

37%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 17% of deposit

Driven by PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 −30% 11% · sUSDat −30% 2% · AA_FalconXUSDC −30% 2% · other 2% · −100% 89% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026HybridPTMarket rate48%of vault · bad debt · $4.49mOracle exposure 5%

54%of vault · $5m48%of vault · $4.49m5%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(composite)PTMarket rate

PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 PT is priced by a Pendle market-rate oracle.

BaseOjo PT Feed Pendle Chainlink-compatible OracleNAV

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x217d…51f0

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$11.41m17 vaultsToken:0xecfa…3957Allocation: 54% of the vault · $5m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 11% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $5m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 5% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

AA_FalconXUSDCHybrid17%of vault · bad debt · $1.61mOracle exposure 3%

20%of vault · $1.88m17%of vault · $1.61m3%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(composite)

AA_FalconXUSDC is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (Idle Tranches exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BaseIdle Tranches exchange rateExchange rate

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0x52ea…93fc

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$5.47m17 vaultsToken:0xc26a…f99cAllocation: 20% of the vault · $1.88m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.88m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

mHyperBTCHybridChainlink10%of vault · bad debt · $928,808Oracle exposure 1%

11%of vault · $1.06m10%of vault · $928,8081%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· Chainlink(composite, managed)

mHyperBTC uses a composite oracle path; verified external provider(s): Chainlink.

BaseComposite base price pathQuoteChainlink quote feed path

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC77% LLTV0xece5…a3c1Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$352,6263 vaultsToken:0xc849…3085Allocation: 11% of the vault · $1.06m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.9% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $1.06m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

sUSDatHybrideOracle7%of vault · bad debt · $667,104Oracle exposure 0.8%

8%of vault · $737,0467%of vault · $667,1040.8%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid· eOracle(managed)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x5228…461deOracle

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$769,4005 vaultsToken:0xd166…2df7Allocation: 8% of the vault · $737,046

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 2% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $737,046 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.8% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

mF-ONEMarket4%of vault · bad debt · $416,340Oracle exposure 0.5%

5%of vault · $460,0114%of vault · $416,3400.5%separate path

What it's made of

Market(composite)

mF-ONE is priced via mF-ONE/USD Discounted — market-rate feed.

BasemF-ONE/USD DiscountedMarket

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x0cb1…eb78

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$2.17m14 vaultsToken:0x238a…66baAllocation: 5% of the vault · $460,011

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $460,011 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.5% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

reUSDHybrid1%of vault · bad debt · $134,912Oracle exposure 0.2%

2%of vault · $152,8621%of vault · $134,9120.2%separate path

What it's made of

Hybrid(exchange-rate)

reUSD is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (reUSD/USD exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BasereUSD/USD exchange rateExchange rate

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0xa66a…4e70

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$4.19m20 vaultsToken:0x5086…0c72Allocation: 2% of the vault · $152,862

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.3% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $152,862 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-USDat-14JAN2027Unclassified0.3%of vault · bad debt · $31,388Oracle exposure <0.1%

0.4%of vault · $34,3030.3%of vault · $31,388<0.1%separate path

What it's made of

Unclassified(managed)

Oracle design not classified (long-tail market).

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x034f…2dad

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$630,2937 vaultsToken:0xba96…314fAllocation: 0.4% of the vault · $34,303

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.1% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $34,303 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to <0.1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+31 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

2 feeds · 1 control point

Up to11%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $1.05m

Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink / RedStone / eOracle·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC, wstETH, PT-apxUSD-18JUN2026, mHyperBTC, PT-apyUSD-5NOV2026, stcUSD, PT-apxUSD-5NOV2026, stUSDS, PT-apyUSD-27AUG2026, PT-apyUSD-18JUN2026, PT-USDG-28MAY2026, PT-apxUSD-27AUG20260x21f7…73ca1% of vault · $131,990drainable if it is compromised
Unidentified feeds· vendor and on-chain control not resolvedprices PT-reUSD-10DEC2026, AA_FalconXUSDC, mF-ONE, PT-USDat-14JAN2027, wFalconX, siUSD, mHYPER, PT-sNUSD-5MAR20269% of vault · $825,784mispriceable if these feeds lie
On-chain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices reUSD<1% of vault · $17,949mispriceable only via the issuing contract


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	17%	up to 89%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	17%	up to 89%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	11%	up to 95%	Instant
	17%	up to 89%	Instant
	17%	up to 89%	Instant
	16%	up to 84%	Instant
	—	up to 11%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Curator change queued

The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.

raise a market's supply cap ×8— applies now; no time to exit first

Owner2-of-3 multisig0xee7e…18c8

Curatorsingle key (EOA)0x7517…a325

Sentinels1 · 1 EOASafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

single key (EOA)0xc56e…40fd

Allocators2 · 1 contract · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

contract0x00b8…1e27
single key (EOA)0x9123…562f

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner6-of-1012 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 voter concentration100.0%

Quorum to pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated Sep 29, 2026Sources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

Hyperithm USDC Apex

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle