Hyperithm USDC Apex
Risk reportEthereum0x0932…9e2f
Risk
Depositing into Hyperithm USDC Apex means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.
Collateral and oracle exposure
Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.
Driven by PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 −30% 13% · wFalconX −30% 3% · PT-sUSDat-27AUG2026 −30% 2% · other 2% · −100% 89% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling
PT-reUSD-10DEC2026HybridPTMarket rate54%of vault · bad debt · $4.44mOracle exposure 7%61%of vault · $5m54%of vault · $4.44m7%separate path
What it's made of
PT-reUSD-10DEC2026 PT is priced by a Pendle market-rate oracle.
- → USDC92% LLTV0x217d…51f0
If it breaks
−30% default
wFalconXHybrid15%of vault · bad debt · $1.2mOracle exposure 2%16%of vault · $1.34m15%of vault · $1.2m2%separate path
What it's made of
AA_FalconXUSDC is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (Idle Tranches exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.
- → USDC92% LLTV0x52ea…93fc
If it breaks
−30% default
PT-sUSDat-27AUG2026HybridPTManaged9%of vault · bad debt · $705,817.42Oracle exposure 1.0%10%of vault · $783,371.049%of vault · $705,817.421.0%separate path
What it's made of
PT-sUSDat-27AUG2026 uses an operator-managed oracle with deviation/timelock bounds; no verified external price-source provider was found.
- → USDC92% LLTV0x4fcf…bb39
If it breaks
−30% default
mHyperBTCHybridChainlink4%of vault · bad debt · $324,456.43Oracle exposure 0.4%4%of vault · $360,106.964%of vault · $324,456.430.4%separate path
What it's made of
mHyperBTC uses a composite oracle path; verified external provider(s): Chainlink.
- → USDC77% LLTV0xece5…a3c1Chainlink
If it breaks
−30% default
sUSDatHybrideOracle1%of vault · bad debt · $119,497.71Oracle exposure 0.1%2%of vault · $125,786.51%of vault · $119,497.710.1%separate path
What it's made of
Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.
- → USDC92% LLTV0x5228…461deOracle
If it breaks
−30% default
mHYPERMarket1%of vault · bad debt · $104,821.34Oracle exposure 0.2%1%of vault · $117,776.771%of vault · $104,821.340.2%separate path
What it's made of
mHYPER is priced via mHYPER/USD — market-rate feed.
- → USDC77% LLTV0xdabd…f1c0
If it breaks
−30% default
PT-apyUSD-5NOV2026HybridPTLinear discountChainlink1%of vault · bad debt · $101,442.57Oracle exposure 0.1%1%of vault · $109,952.941%of vault · $101,442.570.1%separate path
What it's made of
PT-apyUSD-5NOV2026 PT is priced by a Pendle linear-discount model, quoted via Dummy feed with 12 decimals.
- → USDC86% LLTV0x1001…4e65Chainlink
If it breaks
−30% default
reUSDHybrid1%of vault · bad debt · $99,473.69Oracle exposure 0.1%1%of vault · $109,951.51%of vault · $99,473.690.1%separate path
What it's made of
reUSD is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (reUSD/USD exchange rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.
- → USDC92% LLTV0xa66a…4e70
If it breaks
−30% default+23 markets with no current position
Oracle dependencies
2 feeds · 1 control pointUp to11%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $871,698.85
Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.
- Chainlink / RedStone / eOracle·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices cbBTC, WBTC, wstETH, PT-apxUSD-18JUN2026, mHyperBTC, PT-apyUSD-5NOV2026, stcUSD, PT-apxUSD-5NOV2026, stUSDS, PT-apyUSD-27AUG2026, PT-apyUSD-18JUN2026, PT-USDG-28MAY2026, PT-apxUSD-27AUG20260x21f7…73ca<1% of vault · $55,701.78drainable if it is compromised
- Unidentified feeds· vendor and on-chain control not resolvedprices PT-reUSD-10DEC2026, wFalconX, PT-sUSDat-27AUG2026, mHYPER, mF-ONE, PT-srUSDat-27AUG2026, AA_FalconXUSDC, PT-USDat-27AUG2026, siUSD, ROY-ST-apyUSD, PT-sNUSD-5MAR202610% of vault · $799,230.48mispriceable if these feeds lie
- On-chain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices reUSD<1% of vault · $10,477.8mispriceable only via the issuing contract
Loss scenarios
Each row is a distinct failure, and every loss is a share of your deposit — the same percentage whatever you deposited. Loss is that share at a −30% collateral crash, the standard stress; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong, a conditional loss if it happens rather than a likelihood. Open a row for the loss at every crash depth, the dollar amounts, conditions, and the math.
| Full-deposit & protocol-level(2) | ||||
| 100% | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| 20% | up to 89% | Instant | ||
| Price-driven collateral stress(1) | ||||
| 20% | up to 89% | Instant | ||
| Oracle & liquidation failures(5) | ||||
| 20% | up to 89% | Instant | ||
| 20% | up to 89% | Instant | ||
| 9% | up to 80% | Instant | ||
| 16% | up to 72% | Instant | ||
| — | up to 11% | Instant | ||
| Vault role & allocator(3) | ||||
| — | Full deposit | 3 days | ||
| — | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| — | up to 50% | 3 days | ||
Trust and control
The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.
Vault operators
The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.
Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land
Curator changes queued
The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.
- raise a market's supply cap ×4— applies now; no time to exit first
- raise a market's supply cap ×8— applies in 2 days; time to exit first
Sentinels1 · 1 EOASafety role · veto only
Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.
- single key (EOA)0xc56e…40fd
Allocators1 · 1 EOAReaches deposit · instant
Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.
- single key (EOA)0x9123…562f
Audits
- Certora· Dec 15, 2025report
- Blackthorn· Dec 4, 2025report
- Spearbit· Dec 4, 2025report
- Blackthorn· Sep 15, 2025report
Governance & control
Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.
Dependencies that can affect your deposit
9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.
Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).
No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.