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KPK USDC Yield

Risk reportEthereum0xd5cc…aa13

Risk

Depositing into KPK USDC Yield means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.

Morpho BlueVault (aggregates across markets)

How much could be lost?

Your deposit (optional)

39%of your deposit if collateral falls 50%Only smart-contract bug reaches a total 100%, with no warning to exit.

Can I exit?

Via underlying marketsonly governance changes give a 3-day timelock to exit — every other modeled failure is no-warning

What backs it?

No committed backstopnothing committed would cover a loss

Track record

No pool-level losses recorded36 audits, latest Dec 15, 2025

Collateral and oracle exposure

Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.

If collateral prices dropper asset · no liquidations · stress estimate

est. bad debt up to 20% of deposit

Driven by savUSD −30% 9% · USD3 −30% 5% · siUSD −30% 3% · other 3% · −100% 88% modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling

CollateralAllocationMarket ExposureOracle Exposure

savUSDHybridChainlink37%of vault · bad debt · $5.68mOracle exposure 4%

42%of vault · $6.32m37%of vault · $5.68m4%separate path

What it's made of

savUSD token page

Hybrid· Chainlink(aggregator)

savUSD is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (SAVUSD / AVUSD Exchange Rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BaseSAVUSD / AVUSD Exchange RateExchange rateChainlink

Heartbeat 24hDeviation 50bps

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x8399…ff12Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$825,2834 vaultsToken:0xb8d8…46a4Allocation: 42% of the vault · $6.32m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 9% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $6.32m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

USD3AUM / rate20%of vault · bad debt · $3.02mOracle exposure 4%

24%of vault · $3.6m20%of vault · $3.02m4%separate path

What it's made of

USD3 token page

AUM / rate(exchange-rate)

Priced off an exchange rate / AUM — insulated from spot depegs, but exposed to rate-provider corruption.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0x68b4…9c06

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$3.57m9 vaultsToken:0x056b…5eccAllocation: 24% of the vault · $3.6m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 5% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $3.6m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 4% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

PT-siUSD-7JAN2027Hybrid14%of vault · bad debt · $2.19mOracle exposure 1%

16%of vault · $2.4m14%of vault · $2.19m1%separate path

What it's made of

PT-siUSD-7JAN2027 token page

Hybrid(composite)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0xf9c1…7570

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$271,6143 vaultsToken:0x7654…5fd1Allocation: 16% of the vault · $2.4m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 3% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2.4m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 1% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

siUSDHybrid14%of vault · bad debt · $2.14mOracle exposure 2%

16%of vault · $2.45m14%of vault · $2.14m2%separate path

What it's made of

siUSD token page

Hybrid(composite)

siUSD is priced from an exchange-rate/NAV leg (Chainlink-formatted InfiniFi RT Oracle, Dummy feed with 12 decimals, ERC4626 vault share-rate) — no market-rate feed, so it tracks redemption value, not market price.

BaseChainlink-formatted InfiniFi RT OracleNAVQuoteDummy feed with 12 decimalsNAVBaseERC4626 vault share-rateVault

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC92% LLTV0xd2cc…fa6d

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$1.12m17 vaultsToken:0xdbdc…9bcbAllocation: 16% of the vault · $2.45m

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 3% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $2.45m · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 2% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

ftUSDHybridChainlink3%of vault · bad debt · $412,554Oracle exposure 0.3%

3%of vault · $455,7393%of vault · $412,5540.3%separate path

What it's made of

ftUSD token page

Hybrid· Chainlink(composite)

Mixes market and exchange-rate inputs — partial depeg insulation, partial market exposure.

Markets this collateral backs · 1

→ USDC86% LLTV0x7887…b779Chainlink

Aggregate Collateral Trust (ACT):$43,1872 vaultsToken:0xf7d8…9c9cAllocation: 3% of the vault · $455,739

If it breaks

−30% default

At −30%:est. bad debt up to 0.5% of depositUses 1 market LLTV curve · capped at allocation $455,739 · drag to set this asset's drop

Oracle exposure: up to 0.3% of vault drainable if the feed is compromisedseparate path: an attacker borrows against a fake price

+15 markets with no current position

Oracle dependencies

2 feeds3 control points

Up to12%of vault drainable if these feeds are mispriced · $1.78m

Each price traces to a feed and the onchain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.

Chainlink / eOracle / RedStone·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices ssftUSD, DUSD, weETH, stcUSD, savUSD, YFI, ftUSD, PT-USDG-28MAY20260x21f7…73ca4% of vault · $680,411drainable if it is compromised
Chainlink·a 3/5 Safe multisigprices ssftUSD, ftUSD0x1118…70cb<1% of vault · $43,186drainable if it is compromised
RedStone / Chainlink·a 2/3 Safe multisigprices PT-cUSD-23JUL2026, stcUSD, PT-srNUSD-28MAY2026, PT-sNUSD-4JUN2026, srNUSD0x6906…4472<1% of vault · $0.00000017drainable if it is compromised
Onchain exchange rate· no external feed or adminprices USD3, srRoyUSDC4% of vault · $577,213mispriceable only via the issuing contract
Unidentified feeds· vendor and onchain control not resolvedprices PT-siUSD-7JAN2027, siUSD3% of vault · $518,523mispriceable if these feeds lie


Full-deposit & protocol-level(2)
	100%	Full deposit	Instant
	20%	up to 88%	Instant
Price-driven collateral stress(1)
	20%	up to 88%	Instant
Oracle & liquidation failures(5)
	20%	up to 88%	Instant
	20%	up to 88%	Instant
	6%	up to 58%	Instant
	12%	up to 51%	Instant
	—	up to 12%	Instant
Vault role & allocator(3)
	—	Full deposit	3 days
	—	Full deposit	Instant
	—	up to 50%	3 days

Trust and control

The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.

Track record · no pool-level losses recorded · 5 protocol incidents · 36 audits

Vault operators

The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.

Reaches deposit, no delayReaches deposit, timelockedCan't reach deposit

Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land

Curator change queued

The timelock is your window to exit before each one takes effect.

raise a market's supply cap ×4— applies now; no time to exit first

Owner5-of-8 multisig0x8b88…a537

Curator2-of-5 multisig0x7e43…4171

Sentinels11 multisigSafety role · veto only

Safety role, not an attack role: can revoke ANY pending timelocked curator change, instantly cut caps, and pull funds from adapters back to idle. Strictly risk-reducing — a captured sentinel cannot introduce new risk.

5-of-8 multisig0x8b88…a537

Allocators41 multisig3 EOAsReaches deposit · instant

Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.

single key (EOA)0x331d…1204
2-of-5 multisig0x7e43…4171
single key (EOA)0xaf15…9440
single key (EOA)0xf0cf…2a75

Audits

361 critical, 13 high findings logged

CertoraDec 15, 2025report
BlackthornDec 4, 2025report
SpearbitDec 4, 2025report
BlackthornSep 15, 2025report

+32 more audits

Governance & control

Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.

Governance owner6-of-1012 chains0xcba2…9afa

Rewards owner3-of-70xf057…b2e9

Rewards updater3-of-50x5eb9…3297

Snapshot proposer5-of-80x6abf…f6a2

Governance Contract0xcBa2…9AFa

Top-10 Voter Concentration100.0%

Quorum to Pass500,000 MORPHO· top 10 hold 2.49m

Voting Token

MORPHO0x58D9…c2B2

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

9 things this pool relies on but doesn't control. Select one for its story.

Morpho Blue

oracles

Market Specific oracle

Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).

No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.

Updated 7min agoSources:on-chain reads via @defillama/sdkhttps://hub.snapshot.org/graphqlhttps://api.morpho.org/graphql

KPK USDC Yield

Risk

Collateral and oracle exposure

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

What it's made of

If it breaks

Oracle dependencies

Loss scenarios

Trust and control

Vault operators

Audits

Governance & control

Dependencies that can affect your deposit

Market Specific oracle