Risk
Depositing into EURCV Prime means underwriting risks you usually can't see: how much you could lose, whether you'd get out in time, and what would cover it.
Left to right, a deeper collateral crash. Hover any point for the scenarios that drive the loss — only a smart-contract bug reaches a total loss.
Collateral & oracles
Each token you're exposed to, and the market it backs. If that market breaks, this is how much the vault loses, in dollars and as a share of the vault. Open a row for the price feed, stress curve, and supply-cap detail. Below, the oracles those prices depend on and what is at stake if one is compromised.
Driven by LBTC $26,501 · WBTC $805.4 · wstETH $7.25 · −100% $146,808 modeled all-to-zero bad-debt ceiling
LBTCMarketChainlink$142,44079% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $33,591$176,03197% of vault$142,44079% of vault$33,591separate path
Priced off live market data — a depeg moves the price and can liquidate positions.
- → EURCV86% LLTV0xef61…331dChainlink
WBTCMarketChainlink$4,3292% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $404.18$4,7333% of vault$4,3292% of vault$404.18separate path
WBTC is priced via WBTC / BTC × BTC / USD, quoted in EUR / USD — 3-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).
- → EURCV86% LLTV0x4072…a8e4Chainlink
wstETHMarketChainlink$38.96<0.1% of vault · bad debtOracle exposure $4.6$43.57<0.1% of vault$38.96<0.1% of vault$4.6separate path
wstETH is priced via Custom price feed for wstETH / ETH × ETH / USD, quoted in EUR / USD — 3-hop market-rate feeds (Chainlink).
- → EURCV86% LLTV0x44d6…dd90Chainlink
+2 markets with no current position
Oracle dependencies
1 feed · 1 control pointUp to$34,000drainable if these feeds are mispriced · 19% of vault
Each price traces to a feed and the on-chain admin that can move it. Compromise either to misprice the collateral and borrow against it. Per-row amounts overlap and are not summed.
- Chainlink·a 4/9 Safe multisigprices WBTC, LBTC, wstETH, USDC, EUTBL0x21f7…73ca$34,000 · 19% of vaultdrainable if it is compromised
How you could lose money
Each row is a distinct failure. Possible loss is the share of your deposit at the selected collateral drop; Worst case is the ceiling if everything goes wrong — a conditional loss if it happens, not a likelihood. Price-scaling rows move with the drop selector; the rest are fixed. Enter a deposit to see the dollar figures as your own. Open a row for conditions, mitigations, and the math.
| Full-deposit & protocol-level(2) | |||||
| 100% | $180,806 | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| 15% | $27,313 | up to $146,808 | Instant | ||
| Price-driven collateral stress(1) | |||||
| 15% | $27,313 | up to $146,808 | Instant | ||
| Oracle & liquidation failures(4) | |||||
| 15% | $27,313 | up to $146,808 | Instant | ||
| 15% | $27,313 | up to $146,808 | Instant | ||
| — | — | up to $34,000 | Instant | ||
| 0% | $0 | $0 | Instant | ||
| Vault role & allocator(4) | |||||
| — | — | Full deposit | 3 days | ||
| — | — | Full deposit | Instant | ||
| — | — | up to $90,403 | 3 days | ||
| — | — | $0 | Instant | ||
Who you're trusting
The people and processes that can change this protocol under you.
The roles that can actually move your deposit — the real principal-loss path.
Role timelock 3 days to exit before owner/curator actions land
Allocators3 · 3 EOAsReaches deposit · instant
Moves funds between markets the curator has ALREADY approved — instantly, with NO timelock and no exit window. Cannot reach a brand-new market, but can concentrate you into an approved-but-stressed market or order withdrawals so you hit weak liquidity first.
- single key (EOA)0xaa85…bbbd
- single key (EOA)0x8236…2b47
- single key (EOA)0xd582…2287
- Certora· 15 Dec, 2025report
- Blackthorn· 4 Dec, 2025report
- Spearbit· 4 Dec, 2025report
- Blackthorn· 15 Sep, 2025report
Protocol-wide governance: bounded context, not the path to your deposit.
Every Morpho Blue market chooses an immutable oracle contract at creation; implementations can be Chainlink-like, exchange-rate, fixed-price, or custom. Failure modes: attacker-favourable price feed (covered in market-oracle-compromise) or price() revert / staleness blocking liquidations (covered in oracle-liveness-or-malfunction).
No quantified loss scenario references this dependency directly.